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ABSTRACT 
 This dissertation presents a theory for complex adaptive systems of systems 
(CASoS) as a new class of systems that can be engineered as solutions to highly complex 
problems. The exponential growth in technology, demands from a warfighting 
community to rapidly address operational challenges, and dynamic, highly complex 
environments overwhelm traditional engineering approaches. This study followed a 
grounded theory methodology. Thorough examination of systems and complexity theory 
knowledge domains and engineering disciplines resulted in a conceptual CASoS theory. 
The theory establishes the definition, characteristics, and principles of this new class of 
systems. Implications for this new class of systems identify unique capability 
requirements that are the bases for developing an engineering solution: 1) CASoS adjust 
to their environment through complex interactions among their self-organizing 
constituent systems, giving rise to purposeful emergent multi-level and multi-minded 
behavior, and 2) CASoS require an adaptive architecture that enables intelligent 
constituent systems with the ability to discover knowledge and predict the outcomes and 
effects of their actions. The CASoS systems engineering approach is a top-down and 
adaptive process that relies on continuous and ongoing design and development in 
parallel with operations. In defining a new systems domain, this research offers a 
framework to develop an engineered CASoS solution to highly complex problems. 
v 
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This dissertation presents a grounded theory for complex adaptive systems of 
systems (CASoS) as engineered solutions to highly complex problems. The CASoS theory 
provides a definition of this new class of system solutions and describes their 
characteristics and principles. This grounded theory emerges from three disciplines: 
systems theory, systems of systems theory, and complex systems theory. The research 
follows the classic grounded theory methodology of gathering and coding data and 
allowing theory to emerge. This exploratory research derives a CASoS conceptualization 
and engineering approach as implications of the theory. 
The rise of technology, computers, information systems, automation, and global 
networks has led to an Age of Interactions that has introduced multi-faceted problems 
unlike any before seen (Alberts 2011). These highly complex problems are unpredictable 
and present dire consequences if not addressed. They consist of distributed and 
heterogeneous entities and events that are dynamic—changing states rapidly and 
unexpectedly. This presents a non-linear problem space, in which awareness is limited 
(often incomplete or erroneous), and numerous decisions and actions must be made quickly 
and in an adaptive manner. According to Calvano and Johns (2004), such complex 
problems overwhelm traditional systems that cannot adapt quickly enough, cannot address 
numerous missions, and cannot process information quickly enough to make the required 
rapid decisions.  
CASoS is a new class of theoretical system solutions intended to address highly 
complex problems. This research defines CASoS characteristics and principles based on a 
classic grounded theory research methodology. CASoS adapt to their environment through 
complex interactions among their self-organizing constituent systems that give rise to 
purposeful, emergent, meta-level, and multi-minded behavior. As shown in Figure ES-1, 
they are composed of numerous heterogeneous, distributed constituent systems that can 
self-organize and, behave independently and collaboratively in a purposeful manner. This 
gives rise to the adaptive, intentional, emergent, and evolving behaviors that can address a 




complex adaptive systems behavior with systems of systems. The theoretical 
characteristics of CASoS are openness, changing boundaries, constituent system variety, 
architecture (adaptive, highly connected, collaborative, and distributed), behavior (multi-
level, purposeful, emergent, multi-minded, self-organizing, adaptive, and evolving), and 
complexity (detailed, dynamic, non-linear, and resilient). The theoretical principles of 
CASoS are holism, contextual, goal-oriented, operational viability, requisite variety, high 
flux, and information. 
 
Figure ES-1. A CASoS Interacting with a Complex Environment 
 
The research explored the engineering implications of the CASoS theory. This 
resulted in a conceptualization of an engineered CASoS and a definition of the required 
engineered capabilities. An engineered CASoS must possess the ability to make 
purposeful, intentional decisions. It must have an adaptive architecture that enables agile 




interaction mechanisms that control information sharing and interaction among constituent 
systems. The architecture is in effect, a resource of the CASoS, that is managed through 
the interaction mechanisms to ultimately enable collaboration and emergent and adaptive 
behavior. An engineered CASoS must be comprised of a system of intelligent constituent 
systems that can act independently and collaboratively and can make decisions to control 
behavior at the multiple levels. It is a system of decision systems that is collectively 
managing resources to best address the problem space. Engineering aspects of this 
intelligent decision-making include the role of appropriate human-machine interaction and 
the synchronization of decisions among distributed systems to effectively collaborate and 
self-organize. Knowledge discovery and predictive analytics are two other capabilities 
required to engineer a CASoS. A CASoS must be able to discover knowledge or gain and 
maintain situational awareness of its environment. This requires sensors for gathering data, 
and analytics to make sense of the data and develop knowledge. A CASoS must also have 
predictive analytics to hypothesize possible effects of different actions. The CASoS uses 
these predictions to influence its decisions to control its adaptive behavior.  
A final aspect of the CASoS theoretical framework was the implication of the 
theory on the systems engineering approach required to develop a conceptual design of a 
CASoS. This part of the advanced coding phase produced guidance for a CASoS 
engineering approach as well as a high-level systems engineering approach for CASoS 
design and development. Three overarching CASoS systems engineering goals were 
identified: (1) to engineer a solution that can address a given highly complex problem, (2) 
to ensure that CASoS emergent behavior is desired and that undesired and unpredicted 
emergence does not occur, and (3) to engineer a solution that can evolve over time as the 
problem domain changes. Guidance included the necessity of a top-down approach, an 
intelligent distributed peer architecture intelligent distributed peer architecture approach, 
considerations concerning constituent systems, and a process of continuous design 
throughout the system life cycle to enable adaptation and evolution. The CASoS systems 
engineering approach is a top-down design and development of the CASoS architecture 




systems, and a continuous process of operational design-on-the-fly and design-for-updates 
throughout the remainder of the CASoS life cycle. 
Theory validation was accomplished through a modeling and simulation analysis. 
The CASoS solution approach was applied to the naval tactical problem domain. This 
domain was shown to contain the characteristics of a highly complex operational 
environment. A naval tactical scenario was modeled based on a highly complex Anti-
Access/Area Denial (A2/AD) littoral threat environment with a red force consisting of sea-
launched anti-ship missiles and ground-launched anti-aircraft missiles. A blue force strike 
group of destroyers and airborne early warning aircraft accompanied a high value unit ship. 
This strike group was modeled in two ways: first as a baseline non-CASoS variant to 
represent an abstraction of the current tactical approach, and second as a CASoS variant 
employing the CASoS collaborative, connected, and adaptive solution approach. The 
modeling and simulation analysis provided a statistical comparison of tactical operational 
effectiveness of the two variants according to their ability to defend blue forces (prevent 
casualties), defend quickly (destroy red forces in less time), and maximize the use of a 
diverse set of weapons. The analysis demonstrated that the CASoS solution approach was 
superior to the baseline approach—decreasing blue casualties, decreasing the time required 
to kill red forces, and implementing an improved layered defense. The analysis 
demonstrated that the CASoS solution was superior to the baseline approach, even as the 
threat environment increased in complexity. The modeling and simulation analysis 
demonstrated the value of the CASoS characteristics and principles as enablers of the 
improved solution for the naval tactical problem domain. The naval tactical application and 
modeling and simulation results demonstrated the four validation criteria of grounded 
theories: fit, relevance, workability, and modifiability. 
This dissertation applied a grounded theory research approach to study CASoS, as 
a new class of system solutions to highly complex problems. The grounded CASoS theory 
that emerged produced a new class of systems that can be engineered to address complex 
problems. The theory provides the definition, characteristics, and principles of CASoS 
solutions. The theoretical implications provide a conceptualization of an engineered 




bodies of systems theory knowledge and systems engineering knowledge and it provides a 
conceptualization and approach to engineering solutions to highly complex problems. 
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A. THE PROBLEM1 
Most people would agree that the world is becoming more complex. Much 
of this is driven by two phenomena that have started to dominate our lives 
in recent years. First, we face an unprecedented level of integration and are 
immersed in a “complex” web of interacting technologies and processes, 
dominated by the developments in information and communication 
technologies. Second, rapid change has become the norm with technologies, 
practices, and organizations being introduced continuously into this highly 
integrated web. (Calvano and John 2004, 29) 
This dissertation develops theory, explores concepts, and presents a unifying 
framework for engineering complex adaptive systems of systems (CASoS) as solutions to 
highly complex problems. The research builds on developing bodies of knowledge in 
systems theory and complexity theory. It focuses on the application of engineered CASoS 
to address challenging multi-dimensional problems such as the emerging naval concepts 
for Distributed Maritime Operations (DMO) (King and Friedman 2017), Distributed 
Lethality (DL) (Rowden 2016b), and Integrated Fire Control (IFC) (Yoshihara 2012). A 
comprehensive study for engineering CASoS solutions, as well as a method for identifying 
and developing effective responses to naturally occurring, human-modified, and human-
made complex problem spaces, represents a new body of knowledge in systems 
engineering (Johnson 2018a). 
The rise of automation in many systems—and technology ubiquity in general— 
present complex problems that require a solution that can continually adapt to meet the 
changing demands of the operational situation. The interaction of heterogeneous and 
increased technologies introduces multi-faceted problems that are unlike any before seen. 
                                                 
1 Parts of this chapter were previously published by: 
The Grounded Theory Review (Bonnie Johnson, Karen Holness, Wayne Porter, and Alejandro 
Hernandez. 2018. “Complex Adaptive Systems of Systems: A Grounded Theory Approach.” The Grounded 
Theory Review 17 (1): 52–69). 
Bonnie Johnson. 2018. “Towards a Theory of Engineering Complex Adaptive Systems of Systems.” 
Paper published in IEEE Xplore Proceedings of the 18th Annual IEEE International Systems Conference, 




Alberts (2011) states that we have entered the Age of Interactions in which events and 
decisions are linked to many outcomes that affect many other events. Bar-Yam (2004a) 
cites many examples of complex problem spaces including military conflict, health care, 
education, international development, large-scale natural disasters, ethnic violence, and 
terrorism. National strategies often invoke the diplomatic, information, military, and 
economic (DIME) elements, as is the case when countries apply economic sanctions, or 
use diplomatic negotiations. Hillson (2009) writes that the DIME elements constitute 
actions and consequential effects that can be highly interactive, complex, and 
unpredictable. He explains that as nations implement the DIME elements, the effects can 
be highly interrelated and can have unpredictable consequences. Technology advances in 
global information and communication infrastructures increase these complex interactions 
and the tempo of cause and effect. Complexity scientists are studying the causes and effects 
of seemingly unrelated events that have significant repercussions. Lagi, Bertrand, and Bar-
Yam (2011) performed a study found that agricultural price increases in North America 
due to droughts were inadvertently linked as a causal factor in violent protests in North 
Africa and the Middle East. 
Technological advances in computers, Big Data, artificial intelligence, global 
information and communication networks have contributed to complex problem spaces. 
Figure 1 illustrates these technological contributors. Big Data refers to the current paradigm 
of enormous amounts of data and information that exist because of commercial, 
government and military enterprises, as well as individual communication and 
participation in social media (Zhao, MacKinnon, and Gallup 2015). Big Data fosters the 
Age of Interactions through the new technologies that enable rapid capture, processing, 
and storing of vast amounts of data, which result in heightened awareness, information 
overload, and unlimited access to information systems, individuals, and enterprises. The 
network of interconnected nodes and links in the upper right quadrant of Figure 1 
graphically portrays complex interactions among distributed entities. The lower left 
quadrant illustrates a vastly more complex interaction that increases in scale according to 
the number and types of nodes and interconnecting links. The graphic of satellite 





Figure 1.  Complex Problem Space Contributors. Adapted from  Bryant 
(2017), Berman (2017), Mullins (2011), and Vulpani (2015). 
Complexity is the state of having many different elements intricately 
interconnected and intricately related to their environment. Highly complex problems are 
unpredictable and present dire consequences if not handled properly. They change over 
time, are unique from moment to moment, and often present shortened reaction times for 
decision-makers involved in addressing them (Young 2012). Complex problems, resulting 
from numerous non-linear interactions, can overwhelm traditional systems that cannot 
adapt quickly enough; cannot address multiple mission occurring simultaneously; and 
cannot process information quickly enough to make effective decisions. Calvano and John 
(2004) studied systems engineering methods aimed at handling complex problems. They 
called the current age, the Age of Complexity. They found that traditional methods of 
engineering systems to meet well-defined static requirements are not sufficient to meet the 
adaptable and complex behavior required of engineered solutions for highly complex 
problem spaces.  
This dissertation studied a new class of engineered systems with the potential to 
address highly complex problem spaces. These complex decision spaces require a new 
approach: one that enables intelligent adaptive systemic behavioral responses and courses 




solution with behaviors of complex adaptive systems to enable them to produce 
intentionally designed and desired emergent behavior through the self-organization of their 
intelligent and purposeful constituent systems. 
B. THE MOTIVATION 
Complex adaptive behavior emerges from a set of distributed constituent systems 
that have the ability to communicate, attain knowledge of the environment, and act in a 
self-organized, yet cooperative manner to address a challenging problem. Figure 2 
illustrates this emergent behavior. Two prominent features of this approach are the ability 
of the constituent systems to attain situational awareness of the operational environment 
and the ability for emergent behavior to arise. These features provide an adaptive 
behavioral feedback process. 
 
Figure 2.  The CASoS Solution Opportunity. 
Adapted from Holland (1995). 
Theoretical advancements in systems thinking, systems of systems engineering, 
complexity, and complex systems engineering present new ways of contemplating 




technological advancements in decision aids, data fusion, advanced processing, 
communication, data architectures, and predictive analytics form the basis for developing 
a conceptual design and architecture for engineering new solutions. 
C. METHODOLOGY 
This dissertation addressed the following research question: What are the 
characteristics and principles of a new class of systems that can address highly complex 
problems that overwhelm current systems and engineering approaches? The goal of this 
dissertation research was to clearly define and articulate a new class of engineered system 
solutions to highly complex problems. 
A grounded theory approach enabled the discovery, development, refinement, and 
validation of a theory for complex adaptive systems of systems (CASoS) using empirical 
and abstractive data collected through observation, artifacts, and case study. CASoS 
constitute a new class of engineered system solutions to highly complex problems through 
an adaptive architecture and system of intelligent constituent systems that can learn, self-
organize, and collaborate to achieve desired adaptive emergent behavior. The research 
followed a grounded theory approach with three predominant steps, which are described in 
detail in Chapter III:  
1. The gathering of data through literature review and discourse with subject 
matter experts. 
2. Data coding and synthesis arising in a theory for the characteristics of 
CASoS. 
3. Advanced coding and theoretical integration producing a CASoS 
conceptualization and a CASoS engineering design approach. 
Using the results of the grounded theory approach, the validity of the theory was 
demonstrated through modeling and simulation analysis using the Map Aware Non-
Uniform Automata (MANA) tool. In this software, a highly complex naval tactical scenario 
was simulated to compare an engineered CASoS solution approach to a traditional baseline 




D. CONTRIBUTIONS TO SYSTEMS ENGINEERING 
This dissertation provides several contributions to the body of systems engineering 
knowledge. Through the process of answering the research question, this dissertation 
provides a theory defining and describing the characteristics and principles of a new class 
of systems: CASoS. The dissertation explains how the class of CASoS fits within existing 
systems theory. It develops a theoretical explanation of what constitutes a highly complex 
problem. It studies the implications of the CASoS theory for engineering a CASoS 
solution—describing what engineered capabilities are required and what systems 
engineering approach is needed. Finally, it demonstrates grounded theory validity through 





II. LITERATURE REVIEW 
A. INTRODUCTION2 
The motivation to conduct this dissertation research was threefold: (1) the 
emergence of complex problems that are unexplained/undefined in terms of the current 
lexicon of complex systems; (2) new approaches to complex problems have been directed 
by national and strategic leaders; and (3) new theoretical approaches and technology 
advancements offer a novel approach for engineering complex systems. 
A number of problem spaces have been observed that are becoming increasingly 
complex in the Age of Interactions. Figure 3 describes four examples. The first example, 
tactical warfare, presents highly unpredictable threat environments requiring time-critical 
decisions and potentially dire consequences (Young 2012). Modern warfare continues to 
grow in complexity due to the proliferation and evolution of technology (McBride 2000). 
Threats may arise from the land, air, sea, underwater, cyberspace, or even space itself. 
Threats may take the form of missiles, swarms of drones or small ships, directed energy, 
information warfare, cyber-attacks, or complex combinations of these. This dissertation 
generalizes the CASoS approach but implements it to address tactical warfare fusing 
distributed assets that act collaboratively and adapt to threat environments. Engineering a 
complex solution enables desired emergent behavior by utilizing distributed assets for 
collaborative operation. 
                                                 
2 Parts of this chapter were previously published by:  
Procedia Computer Science (Bonnie Johnson and Alejandro Hernandez. 2016. “Exploring Engineered 
Complex Adaptive Systems of Systems.” Procedia Computer Science 95 (2016): 58–65). 
IEEE Xplore © 2018 IEEE (Bonnie Johnson. 2018. “Towards a Theory of Engineering Complex 
Adaptive Systems of Systems.” Paper published in IEEE Xplore Proceedings of the 18th Annual IEEE 
International Systems Conference, Vancouver, BC, 23–26 April 2018). 
The Grounded Theory Review (Bonnie Johnson, Karen Holness, Wayne Porter, and Alejandro 
Hernandez. 2018. “Complex Adaptive Systems of Systems: A Grounded Theory Approach.” The Grounded 
Theory Review 17 (1): 52–69). 
Proceedings of the 18th Annual International Command and Control Research and Technology 
Symposium (ICCRTS) (Bonnie Young [now publishing as Bonnie Johnson]. 2013. “Complex Systems 
Engineering Applications for Future Battle Management and Command and Control.” In Proceedings of 





Figure 3.  Emerging CASoS Applications 
Some other examples of complex challenges include are future transportation, the 
cyber threat, and future airspaces. As more automation and sensors become commonplace 
in cars, society enters an era of self-driving vehicles as a mainstay of daily transportation 
(Hanebrink et al. 2016). Adopting a CASoS approach to this transition offers opportunities 
to streamline traffic—decreasing or even eliminating traffic jams (Walter 2017), achieving 
greater energy efficiency (Wadud 2016), and improving road safety (Laris 2017). The 
cyber threat is a complex problem space with computer hacking arising from nation-states, 
terrorist groups, and individual actors (Genge, Kiss, and, Haller 2015). As more systems 
become automated and networked, there are more possibilities for cyber-attacks. A holistic 
CASoS approach would take advantage of the cyber space’s natural environment of a 
networked architecture of distributed systems. An adaptive distributed SoS approach will 
be required to address this ever-changing problem. The complex airspace, as described by 
NASA, the U.S. National Airspace System (UAS) includes more than 87,000 flights per 
day, about 5,000 flights in the air at any given moment, and more than 14,000 air traffic 
controllers managing these flights (National Air Traffic Controllers Association 2019). The 
U.S. Federal Aviation Administration reports that “our current air traffic control system is 
not equipped to handle the predicted volume or variety of aircraft predicted for 2035 and 
beyond” (Atkinson 2015, 1). Resulting problems will include crowded skies, 
corresponding safety issues, longer delays, more congestion at airports, and less response 
time for air traffic controllers (Katina and Keating 2013). Presenting a CASoS approach to 
managing the future UAS offers required adaptability and the ability to develop holistic 




The Navy has identified a number of existing and emerging complex challenges. 
Anti-access/area denial (A2/AD) threats at sea may contain massive swarms (Kazianis 
2016) of missiles, fast attack craft, or drones. Yoshihara (2012) describes a possible 
adversarial strategy in which they launch ballistic missiles at ships and only need to reach 
the fleet’s defensive area for the Aegis system to automatically respond with expensive 
defensive engagement missiles. This causes the Navy ships to expend valuable weapons 
that are costly and difficult to resupply during maritime operations. Proliferation of 
weapons and increasing access to technology increases the number, type, and destructive 
power of possible adversaries. 
The Navy has proposed a Distributed Lethality (DL) approach using naval warfare 
assets in an adaptive force package to operate independently in offensive roles while also 
being capable of operating collaboratively within a strike group to support a variety of 
defensive, offensive, passive, and active roles (Rowden, Guamtaotao, and Fanta 2015). The 
Navy has described a future concept of operations called Distributed Maritime Operations 
(DMO) that “distributes both lethality and platforms throughout an area of operations while 
retaining the ability to concentrate the effects of weapon systems and maneuver forces” 
(King and Friedman 2017). Naval forces must be capable of flexibly adapting to 
unpredictable and changing threat environments with varying levels of system of systems 
(SoS) collaboration. Additionally, the Navy has been working on Integrated Fire Control 
(IFC) concepts in which distributed ships, aircraft, sensors, and weapon systems can 
achieve shared situational awareness and perform collaborative engagements to extend the 
defended area and response time against a variety of air, surface, and underwater threats 
(Young 2012). Figure 4 illustrates naval warfare examples of highly complex problem 





Figure 4.  A New Approach Is Directed. 
Adapted from Hill (2016) and Rowden (2016b). 
Gady (2016) reports on a successful Joint Navy-Marine Corps exercise at White 
Sands Missile Range in September 2016 that integrated a Marine Corps F-35B acting as 
an elevated sensor with a ground station connected to the Aegis Combat System simulating 
a ship at sea. This exercise is a step towards demonstrating the Navy’s desire to achieve 
both IFC and DL. Gady (2016, 1) writes, “The live fire drill was designed to test the U.S. 
Navy’s new air warfare concept, Naval Integrated Fire Control-Counter Air (NIFC-CA), 
and is focused on improving situational awareness and extended-range cooperative 
targeting. NIFC-CA is part of the U.S. Navy’s new distributed lethality naval surface 
warfare concept.” The exercise demonstrated the ability for two weapon systems to work 
collaboratively: the F-35B acting as a broad area sensor, and the Aegis Combat System 
detecting, tracking, and destroying targets. Figure 5 provides a conceptual illustration of 





Figure 5.  IFC/DL Exercise. Source: Rowden (2016a). 
Finally, an opportunity exists: the same information, computer, and network 
technologies that are causing complex problem spaces can also be enablers for engineering 
solutions in the form of CASoS. Complex operational environments require engineered 
solutions that can adapt in response to changing environments; self-organize and determine 
effective courses of action; and respond and act in purposeful and intentional ways. These 
computational and communication technologies can embed distributed systems with 
intelligence and the architectural means to perform collaboratively to achieve emergent 
behaviors as well as performing independently. Thus, a CASoS solution can provide 
behaviors at multiple system levels and can greatly increase the numbers and types of 
possible behavioral responses to complex problem spaces. For Naval DMO, DL and IFC, 
a CASoS approach will allow distributed warfare assets to self-organize and act 
independently or to collaborate in an adaptive manner. This will enhance the ability of 
distributed warfare assets to respond effectively to unpredictable threat environments that 





Figure 6.  Complex Tactical Environment. Source: Young (2012). 
Many defense studies and programs have the objective of improving tactical 
warfighters’ abilities to conduct missions in highly and increasingly complex tactical 
environments. The following concepts have led to the idea that the effective coordination 
of distributed warfare assets on ships, aircraft, underwater, and even space-based platforms 
could lead to significant tactical improvements in complex tactical environments.  
• Network Centric Warfare (NCW) (Cebrowski and Garstka 1998)  
• Navy’s Common Command and Decision (CC&D) system 
• Joint Single Integrated Air Picture (Karoly et al. 2003)  
• Navy’s FORCEnet (Clark and Hagee 2005) 
• Dave Albert’s books: Network Centric Warfare (Alberts 1999), Information 
Age Warfare (Alberts 2001), Power to the Edge—Command and Control in 
the Information Age (Alberts 2003), and Agility (Alberts 2011) 
As illustrated in Figure 6, the desired improvements include increased and shared 




cycles, layered defense strategies with improved probabilities of kill and less weapon 
attrition, and new configurations of engagement strategies involving cooperation among 
distributed weapons and sensors. 
Studying the complex tactical environment led to three observations: 
• There is value in taking a systems approach to address these types of 
complex problems; 
• The collaboration and resulting emergence from the cooperation of 
distributed systems offers significant performance gains and possibilities 
for addressing these types of complex problems; and 
• These types of problems are complex, and therefore, complex and adaptive 
system solutions are required to address them. 
These observations led to three fields of research for the dissertation literature review: 
(1) systems, (2) systems of systems, and (3) complex systems. Figure 7 provides a mapping of 
the literature review to orient the three fields and illustrate how they are interrelated. Systems 
is the all-encompassing field, including systems theory, systems thinking and an extensively 
large base of literature on the topics of system definitions, principles, characteristics, axioms, 
examples, and applications. Systems of systems (SoS) is a subclass with the set of systems. 
This discipline focuses on SoS definitions, characterizations, categorizations, examples, and 
applications. Similarly, complex systems is another subclass of systems with an extensive body 





Figure 7.  Literature Review Mapping 
The remainder of this chapter defines the niche that CASoS holds in the domains 
of systems, SoS, and complex systems. It explains how the systems movement led to 
systems theory and systems thinking, providing a foundation for a systems solution to 
highly complex problems. It describes SoS characteristics which are necessary for 
understanding collaboration of distributed constituents and emergent behavior. It explains 
the current understanding of complexity as it pertains to adaptation, non-linearity, self-
organization, and other characteristics of complex systems. This dissertation asserts that 
the class of CASoS lies within the system domain, in the intersection of SoS and complex 
systems—benefiting from the characteristics of each of these domains and enabling a 
solution to highly complex problems.  
B. SYSTEMS 
The 21st Century has been described as “The Systems Century.” The 
phenomena [of interacting technologies and processes, dominated by the 
developments in information and communication technologies] certainly 
reinforce the systemic nature of the world, and since this trend is human-
made, we must ensure that we are “engineering” it in an appropriate and 




For the purposes of this dissertation, we use Hitchins’ (2005, 1) definition of a 
system as “an open set of complementary, interacting parts with properties, capabilities 
and behaviors of the whole set emerging both from the parts and from their interactions.” 
This section explores what it means to view the world in a systemic way—identifying 
entities in the real world as systems and identifying desired systems to be engineered— all 
in an attempt to better understand problems and address them. Understanding systems 
theory and systems thinking provides a background, context, and theoretical basis for 
developing theories for CASoS solutions.  
Scientists seek to understand phenomena. Historically they have reduced objects 
into parts to determine what each part does in an attempt to better understand the whole. 
Douglas Hofstadter (1979, 312) jokes that “reductionism is the most natural thing in the 
world to grasp. It is simply the belief that ‘a whole can be understood completely if you 
understand its parts, and the nature of their sum.’” Scientists have continued this 
reductionist approach, discovering that each part is comprised of smaller parts and so on 
(Bar Yam 2004b). What is left out of this approach are the relationships that exist internally 
between the parts of objects and externally with their environment. Systems science 
recognizes the limitations of reductionism and takes a holistic and expansionist approach 
to understanding phenomena, viewing the world in terms of systems, and studying system 
behaviors and interactions with their environments.  
Systems theory had its beginnings in the late 1920s as the need for a systems 
approach arose when the biologist, Von Bertalanffy, realized that the reductionist and 
mechanistic approach of physicists and other scientists had failed to provide a complete 
understanding of physical phenomenon. Specifically, he argued that a mechanistic 
approach (in which the behavior of systems is determined strictly by the internal 
interactions of the parts from which they are composed) could not fully explain the 
biological phenomena of life. Von Bertalanffy advocated an approach to biology that 
considered the organism as a whole or a system. He based this approach on the fact that 
organisms are open systems. He developed the General Systems Theory (GST) that focused 
on system structure instead of functionality. GST included physical systems and models 




organization, wholeness, and teleology (purposeful phenomena or behavior); all of which 
had been neglected by mechanistic science (Bertalanffy 1950, 1951, 1968, 1972).  
Von Bertalanffy saw organismic and systems theory as representing what Kuhn 
(1962) called paradigm shifts, or revolutions in scientific thought and theory. He saw this 
as a departure from classical analytical (reductionist) science that was dependent on the 
isolation of component parts and the linear behavior of the parts themselves. He cited 
Rapoport (1966) who asserted that systems represent organized complexity with 
interactions that are non-linear. 
In the late 1940s, further theoretic advancements were made that contributed to the 
rethinking and broader applications of system science. Norbert Wiener published his theory 
of cybernetics in 1948, based upon emerging developments in computer technology, self-
regulating machines, and information theory. Cybernetics focused on the servo-
mechanisms that provide for negative feedback behavior in teleological (self-regulating, 
goal-seeking) systems. Von Bertalanffy viewed cybernetics as a special case of GST, 
focusing on control systems that use communication and information transfer between 
systems and their environments for feedback. Cybernetics developed concurrently with 
Shannon’s information theory (1948) and Von Neumann and Morgenstern’s game theory 
(1944). Information theory was based on the concept that information could be defined as 
entropy and the meaning of a message (in a human sense) could be considered irrelevant. 
This allowed a focus on the efficient transmission of data and how to identify and reduce 
transmission errors. Game theory developed decision-making methods for handling 
situations in which competition and conflict exist. It focused on developing strategic 
thinking and making decisions in situations involving uncertainty. Wiener (1961) 
suggested the application of cybernetics, information theory, and game theory went far 
beyond engineering to the fields of biology and the social sciences. The mathematics and 
principles developed by Wiener, Rosenblueth, Bigelow, Ashby, and others—informed by 
social scientists Lewin, Bateson, Mead, and Deutsch—were promoted as having equal 
weight in mechanical, biological, and social systems (Porter 2016). Hitchins (1992) 
reminds us that classical science and engineering concentrate on closed systems. He points 




closed system, this “knowledge is not very useful since the systems we see and interact 
with daily are open systems” (Hitchins 1992, ix). 
Ackoff and Emery (1972) explain this revolution in thought as a methodological 
key to open doors previously closed to science. Before the Systems Revolution, scientists 
derived their understanding of how things function using reductionist methods to study the 
parts and their structure. Now scientists tend to derive an understanding of the parts and 
their relationships by first understanding the functioning of the whole. The advent and 
evolution of computers has supported this revolution. Computers have enabled scientists 
to study systems that are far more complex by using non-linear computational models. 
Computer simulation has replaced some laboratory and field experimentation to expedite 
an understanding of complex systems. Systems theory provides a basis for 
multidisciplinary understanding (Adams et al. 2014). The multi-disciplinary and systemic 
perspectives of this 20th century paradigm shift in scientific inquiry established an 
ideological foundation for the current focus of systems science on nonlinearity and 
uncertainty in the behavior of complex systems. 
Systems thinking is a way of understanding problems and developing solutions 
using a systemic approach. Modern system theorists are concerned with system thinking 
and its many applications. A number of recent books and articles discuss the use of systems 
thinking for business applications as well as for addressing complex problems. Systems 
thinking is a process of understanding situations or entities by focusing on relationships 
and interdependencies. 
Systems thinking fits alongside science and engineering as a method of inquiry for 
gaining knowledge and truth (Zandi 2000). Employing expansionism over reductionism 
enables the inclusion of context and environment into inquiries. Systems thinking 
necessarily includes more real world considerations than classical science inquiries. These 
real world inquiries include irreversibility, complexity, emergent properties, 
indeterminism, complementarity, and open systems. Zandi (2000, 12) writes that “the most 
important implication of system thinking is that almost every problem that is perceived to 
be well-structured is at best really an approximation of an ill-structured one, and it depends 




The systems thinking method begins with a description of the real world in terms 
of systems. The method identifies and represents real world entities as systems and defines 
their boundaries, components, structure, and relationships. It elicits system principles and 
characteristics from the systems relationships and behavior. Finally, it describes system 
behavior in terms of inputs, outputs and state descriptions (Checkland 1993). Hitchins 
(1992) developed a cyclical model of a systems thinking process based on Checkland’s 
soft systems methodology. Figure 8 illustrates Hitchins’ cyclical model, showing a series 
of steps that begin and in end in the real world. The real-world problem is mapped into the 
systems thinking world in steps 3 and 4 where the problem is viewed and modeled 
systemically. Finally, the process compares the system model of the world with the real 
world problem to ascertain desirable changes (step 6) and determine improvements and 
actions (step 7). 
 
Figure 8.  Systems Thinking Process. Source: Hitchins (1992). 
There are a number of benefits to approaching a problem using system thinking. 
Systems thinking includes a focus on connectedness, relationships, and context, thereby 




thinking enables an understanding of systems in their context, resulting in a holistic 
understanding (Capra 1996). 
Gharajedaghi (2011) identifies three categories of systems thinking—holistic 
thinking, operational thinking, and design thinking—which he contends are all necessary for 
understanding how to deal with emerging chaotic problems. Holistic thinking is concurrently 
acquiring and iteratively expanding one’s understanding of the structure, function, and 
process of a system. Operational thinking is a “mapping of relationships—capturing 
interactions, interconnections, the sequence and flow of activities, and the rules of the game” 
(Gharajedaghi 2011, 109). It describes the dynamic process of using a structure’s parts to 
create desired functions. It unlocks the black box, or unknown set of functions, that exists 
between a system’s input and output. Design thinking selects a desired outcome and invents 
the ways to bring it about. The design process creates solutions to deal with “real world, ill-
defined, ill-structured, or wicked problems” (Gharajedaghi 2011, 137). All three types of 
thinking are important aspects of systems thinking and provide a foundation for engineering 
CASoS. 
C. SYSTEMS OF SYSTEMS 
The concepts, systems within systems, and the more well known, system of 
systems, were first introduced by Berry (1964) and Ackoff (1971). These new types of 
systems came into popularity in the 1990s as a number of systems engineers began to study 
them with regard to “joint warfighting” (Manthorpe 1996), “large-scale concurrent and 
distributed systems” (Kotov 1997), and “large networks of systems” (Shenhar 1994). The 
SoS concept has continued to gain interest and assert itself as a sub-discipline of systems 
engineering, referred to as SoS engineering (SoSE) (Dahmann and Baldwin 2008). 
A SoS is the meta-level system structure resulting from the collaboration of 
independent systems. Hitchins’ (2005, 8) defines a SoS as “an open set of complementary, 
interacting systems with properties, capabilities and behaviors of the whole SoS emerging 
both from the systems and from their interactions.” His definition highlights the interaction 
of the systems to achieve emerging capabilities and behaviors. He goes on to explain that 




level structure. The SoS exhibits increased functionality and performance capabilities, 
referred to as emergent behavior. Emergent behavior arises from the interactive behavior 
of the constituent systems. Dagli and Kilicay-Ergin (2009) noted that if any part of the SoS 
is lost or degraded, this will degrade the performance of the whole. This mirrors the system 
concept that all subsystems are required elements of the primary system. The concepts of 
collaboration and meta-level structure within the SoS are important features for addressing 
complex problems. Both offer potentially significant advantages for engineered SoS, with 
the ability to provide behavior at multiple levels and exhibit emergent behavior. Coupling 
these advantages with the feature of purposefulness enables intentional purpose-driven 
emergent functionality at multiple levels. This capability is the basis for seeking a SoS 
solution to certain highly complex problems. 
Examples of engineered solutions that benefit from a SoS approach include: Navy 
ships, commercial aircraft, the International Space Shuttle (ISS), and UAV surveillance 
aircraft such as the Global Hawk. All of these examples involve the integration of high-
tech constituent systems such as sensors, communication, propulsion, power, and 
aeronautical or buoyancy systems. Navy ships also include weapon systems and in the case 
of aircraft carriers, they contain an entire air wing of aircraft and aircraft support systems. 
Commercial aircraft coordinate within a larger system of air traffic control systems. The 
ISS and many UAV’s include offboard systems such as ground control operations and 
launch and recovery systems. All of these SoS examples are dependent on the integration 
and collaboration of constituent systems for the higher level functionality that emerges 
from the combination of constituent system actions. For some SoS, (such as ships and 
aircraft), the constituent systems are largely collocated, however other SoS consist of 
geographically distributed systems (such as the ISS and UAV examples). 
SoSE has been evolving to address the unique challenges presented by the 
characteristics of a SoS, namely the parallel development of multiple systems and the 
difficulties in making them interoperable. Much of the focus of SoSE has been on 
integrating existing systems with the prospect of purposefully gaining emergent 
capabilities through their interactions (Maier 1998, Dahmann, Lane, Rebovich, and 




joining or networking existing systems together, writing that such efforts are “very likely 
to inadvertently couple functions that were previously not coupled which may unwittingly 
be creating a complex mesh of unforeseen unwanted couplings, the behavior of which can 
be both unexpected and counter-intuitive.” He notes the crucial importance of viewing an 
engineered SoS with a top-down holistic approach in each phase of the life cycle to avoid 
unwanted emergent behavior. 
D. COMPLEXITY 
The complexity and diversity of the world is the hope for the future. (Palin 
2003, 1) 
Complexity is a result of open systems and their nonlinear interactions with each 
other and their environment. The ever-advancing progression of computers and analytic 
computational methods has enabled a better understanding of complex behavior. These 
methods of identifying and understanding complex behavioral dynamics have spread to 
many disciplines that span the understanding of complexity in natural systems (e.g., 
weather, climate effects, group animal behavior [such as swarms, colonies, migrations, and 
epidemics]) and socio-technical systems (e.g., financial networks, social media interaction, 
communication systems, information systems, power systems, military conflicts, 
transportation, urban studies). Many universities and institutes are applying complexity 
theories and approaches to study a variety of natural and human-generated phenomena. 
They seek to understand complexity and its causes and to prevent or lessen the damaging 
results of financial crises, natural disasters, and epidemics, to name a few. They hope that 
by studying complexity, they can better identify and predict complex behavior. 
A simple way to introduce complexity is with the BOAR principle: “complexity 
lies Between Order And Randomness” (Page 2011, 32). Complexity theory has arisen from 
observed phenomena that produces surprisingly unpredictable results from simple 
structures (Honour 2006). Waldrop (1992) explains that complexity is operating at the edge 
of chaos. Complexity occurring in systems may exhibit chaotic behavior while also 
resulting in recognizable patterns (Honour 2006). Figure 9 is an example of complexity 




large flock of birds. Theorists explain that because structural order produces stability, 
complex systems persist in chaotic environments even as their components change and 
adapt. Complex systems often survive by changing their behavior. Complex systems, 
therefore, provide useful solutions to complex environments through their dynamic 
characteristics (Honour 2006). These characteristics of adaptation, dynamic change, and 
resilience are critically desired features of engineered CASoS solutions. 
 
Figure 9.  An Example of Naturally Occurring Complex Behavior. 
Source: Dibenski (1986). 
Complexity theory provides an approach to understand and define a system. It 
contributes to an understanding of the effect of environments on complex systems and how 
systems can learn by selecting alternative courses of action for improvement (Dagli and 
Kilicay-Ergin 2009). Combining the disciplines of system science and biology to 
understand system dynamics from the principles of thermodynamics has contributed new 
theories of complexity and chaos based on the non-linear behavior found in organic and 
inorganic systems (Ackoff 1971, Prigogine and Stengers 1984, Simon 1996). Complex 




give rise to collective emergent behaviors (Bar-Yam 1997, 2004a). Capra (1996) explains 
that complexity science deals with non-linear interactions among systems that often result 
in non-intuitive, unpredictable behavioral outcomes, or patterns. 
Complex systems are defined as large combinations of interacting elements (or 
components) that have no central control and whose interactive behavior produces 
emergent level behavior (Mitchell 2009). They require the ability to sense their 
environment and are able to process this information. They adapt to their environment 
through learning and evolution. They produce emergent and self-organizing behavior. 
Hitchins (1996) defines three components of complexity: variety, connectedness, and 
disorder. He explains that a system is more complex when there is a large amount of variety 
in the components; a large number of interconnections between components; and when the 
variety and interconnections are tangled and disorderly, rather than orderly. Figure 10 
shows examples of three categories of systems: ordinary, systems of systems, and complex 
systems. 
 
Figure 10.  Systems According to Degree of Complexity. 
Adapted from White (2005). 
Sandia National Laboratories began studying complex systems in 2002 and 
introduced the Phoenix initiative in 2008 to study CASoS. They defined CASoS as “vastly 
complex eco-socio-economical-technical systems,” and studied them to design a “secure 




goals) to influence CASoS: (1) to predict; prevent or cause; and prepare; (2) to monitor; 
recover or change; and, (3) to control (Glass et al. 2011). They defined three characteristics 
that must describe each aspiration: decision, robustness of decision, and enabling 
resilience. They also established three primary CASoS goals: to maximize security, 
maximize health, and minimize risk. These aspirations, components, and goals establish 
high-level guidance as this dissertation develops theory for CASoS characteristics and 
approaches to engineering CASoS solutions. Figure 11 is the Phoenix Initiative’s 
illustration of CASoS engineering. It gives examples of CASoS (such as ecosystems, 
enterprises, infrastructures, economies and societies) and perturbations that affect them 
(such as terrorist attacks, pandemics, natural disasters, and governmental policies).  
 
Figure 11.  CASoS Engineering: CASoS, Perturbations, and Aspirations. 




Sandia’s focus on understanding CASoS as a problem space provided a basis for 
this dissertation research. Glass et al. (2011, 13) write that “the sheer complexity of 
CASoS, the subtlety of their adaptive behaviors, the difficulty of running experiments, and 
the problems of integrating the different analytic frameworks and representations required 
to understand their component systems underscores the need for new theory, methods and 
practice.” This dissertation extends the body of knowledge that Sandia initiated, by 
developing a detailed systems theory for the characteristics of CASoS and applying this 
theory to engineered solutions to highly complex problems. Sandia’s work focused on 
identifying highly complex environments that present complex, adaptive, and distributed 
problems. This dissertation addresses the shortfalls of the Sandia work: 
• Does not describe the characteristics and principles of a CASoS solution 
• Does not identify required capabilities to engineer a solution 
• Does not identify a CASoS systems engineering approach. 
This dissertation produces a theory for an engineered system solution and approach, 










III. RESEARCH APPROACH 
A. INTRODUCTION3 
All research projects … need to add something of value to the body of 
knowledge. (Remenyi 2014, xii) 
By developing a theory for engineering a CASoS, this dissertation contributes to 
the bodies of knowledge regarding systems, SoS, and complex systems. The application of 
an approach based on CASoS theory to address certain highly complex problem spaces 
opens a new area of research within the domain of systems engineering.  
This chapter describes the method of inquiry to develop a theoretical framework of 
CASoS with a general discussion of classic grounded theory—an approach resulting in the 
emergence of theory based on creativity, reflection, conceptualization, and a self-critical 
iteration of ideas. The majority of the chapter discusses the detailed application of 
grounded theory to produce the CASoS theory.  
B. GROUNDED THEORY 
A theory is systematically organized knowledge applicable in a relatively 
wide variety of circumstances, using a system of assumptions, accepted 
principles, and rules of procedure devised to analyze, predict, or otherwise 
explain the nature of behavior of a specified set of phenomena. But it is also 
simply the best explanation which is available at the time. (Remenyi 2014, 
64–65) 
1. Theory 
Theory is a means of understanding and explaining observed phenomena. Adams 
et al. (2014) define theory as “a unified system of propositions made with the aim of 
achieving some form of understanding that provides an explanatory power and predictive 
ability.” They go on to write (2014, 115), “a theory does not have a single proposition that 
                                                 
3 Parts of this chapter were previously published by:  
The Grounded Theory Review (Bonnie Johnson, Karen Holness, Wayne Porter, and Alejandro 
Hernandez. 2018. “Complex Adaptive Systems of Systems: A Grounded Theory Approach.” The Grounded 




defines it, but is a population of propositions (i.e., arguments, hypotheses, predictions, 
explanations, and inferences) that provide a skeletal structure for explanation of real-world 
phenomena.” 
2. Developing Theory 
There are different research methods for developing theory. A common practice 
(deduction) follows the positivist scientific method of hypothesizing a theory and 
conducting experiments to test the theory, resulting in its adoption or rejection. The 
positivist approach is widely applied in the physical sciences. It relies on the scientific 
method, logic, and mathematics to develop theories that are predictive, reproducible, 
reliable, rigorous, and objective. Stol et al. (2016) explain that positivism assumes that the 
universe behaves according to inalterable, discoverable laws, and systems are merely the 
sum of their components. 
Interpretivism, which is on the opposite side of the philosophical spectrum, is 
widely used in the social sciences, which aims to understand and interpret human behavior. 
Stol et al. (2016) explain that interpretivism relies largely on qualitative data and assumes 
that no universal truth or reality exists (but rather reality is what people imagine it to be), 
and systems exhibit emergent behaviors not reducible to their component parts.  
Another approach to developing theory is the classic grounded theory method, 
which is based on induction, and falls somewhere between positivism and interpretivism. 
Induction is a method used to determine possible correlations of the deficiencies between 
the desired and calculated. Patton (2015) explains that the classic grounded theory method 
studies observations and data in a structured and analytical way, enabling theory to arise 
or emerge from the data analysis to describe the phenomena. The results and findings are 
thus grounded in the empirical world. The grounded theory method builds, rather than tests, 
theory. 
A recent review of software engineering research projects using the grounded 
theory research method, revealed a wide use of mixed methods from both positivism and 
interpretivism (Stol et al. 2016). However, this dissertation is neither positivist nor 




about human behavior. Instead, its objective is to develop a theory for a new class of 
systems that shows potential as engineered solutions to highly complex problems. The 
research is rooted in pragmatism, and is largely theoretical or non-empirical, relying on 
examination of literature, reflection, and discourse with knowledgeable experts. This 
dissertation focused on developing a critical theory that describes the class of CASoS 
solutions that can be applied to address highly complex problems. For these reasons, the 
classic grounded theory approach was chosen to provide a rigorous methodology for 
performing this theoretical engineering research. Grounded theory is an effective 
methodology for pragmatic research based on rationalism (a reason-based approach to 
understanding). 
3. Grounded Theory 
The classic grounded theory research method originated in the 1960s by Glaser and 
Strauss (1967) and was developed “due to a desire to build theories more rigorously and 
dispassionately by grounding them in objective reality” (Stol et al. 2016, 3). The classic 
grounded theory process relies on theory-method linkage, a rigorous yet iterative research 
methodology, and creative synthesis. Theory-method linkage is the important connection 
between data analysis and the formulation of theory. This theory-building results from an 
iterative process of gathering and analyzing data, and articulating a theory to explain the 
phenomena (Creswell and Poth 2018). The iterative process of data gathering, coding, and 
analysis is illustrated in Figure 12. This shows how the classic grounded theory process 
begins with low-level concepts and works toward high-level theoretical concepts using a 
series of analysis techniques. Data coding is the process of categorizing and organizing 
data about phenomena; identifying properties and causal conditions that influence 
phenomena; specifying strategies or actions that result from phenomena; and, 
characterizing the context and influencing conditions.  
Theoretical sensitivity, coding, sampling, constant comparison, saturation, 
selective coding, and integration are additional analytical steps in the research process 
(Holton 2007; Glaser and Holton 2004). Theoretical sensitivity recognizes and extracts 




organizing theoretical insights and making abstract connections from the data. Theoretical 
sampling identifies and pursues clues that arise as data is gathered, studied, and coded. The 
sampling process of data collection is controlled by the emerging theory, rather than being 
planned ahead of time. Codes are discovered, and the researcher tries to saturate them by 
constant comparison with new data. Saturation occurs when no new codes are identified 
and data categories have been clearly articulated. Selective coding occurs once a core 
variable (or central theoretical theme) emerges. The selective coding focuses and delimits 
thee process to only analyzing data related to the emerging theory and related concepts. 
Integration pulls together of the abstract theoretical scheme into a final grounded theory. 
 
Figure 12.  Conceptual Ordering of General Grounded Theory Methods. 
Source: Birks and Mills (2015). 
This study relied primarily on literature review as the primary source of data. 




which involved the application of imagination and creative thinking to a hypothetical 
situation. The theoretical grounded theory approach studies established ideas and theories 
through the literature review process. It extends these ideas to create new theories and 
insights with the goal of providing better or fuller explanations. This process is based on 
rationalism, which is the philosophical view that regards reason as the primary source of 
understanding. Remenyi (2014, 71) explains, “Rationalism holds reason to be a faculty that 
can access truths beyond the reach of sense perception both in certainty and generality.” 
Remenyi (2014) describes eight distinct steps in the theoretical grounded theory approach:  
1. Research question formulation, 
2. Literature review,  
3. Explanation of why a theoretical approach is being taken,  
4. Concept identification and reflection, 
5. Theoretical conjecture and formulation,  
6. Discourse with peers and experts,  
7. Theoretical conjecture, refinement, and acceptance, and  
8. Discussion on the impact, implications, and validation of the theory. 
(Remenyi 2014) 
This dissertation incorporated Remenyi’s eight theoretical research steps as part of 
the classic grounded theory method as it provided insight into performing grounded theory 
using literature review as the primary data source. Table 1 shows how the eight steps map 
into the three levels of data coding from the classic grounded theory method. Steps one 
through four occur during the low level concept phase; step five occurs during the medium 
level concept phase; and steps seven and eight occur during the third phase of advanced 
level concepts. Step 6, discourse with peers and experts, occurs during all three phases of 




Table 1.   The Theoretical Grounded Theory Steps According to the Data 
Coding Levels of the Classic Grounded Theory Method 
 
 
Classic grounded theory was the appropriate research method for this dissertation. 
As an intentionally designed and engineered CASoS does not yet exist, it was necessary to 
gather and study data (theories, concepts, ideas, definitions, indicators, etc.) to better 
understand CASoS and its engineered application to real world problems. Classic grounded 
theory provided a rigorous qualitative approach, which was required to allow a theory to 
emerge from the data. Classic grounded theory is consistent with a systems approach, 
which made it an effective approach for this dissertation’s goal of developing system 
theory. Classic grounded theory views reality in terms of systems and their interactions and 
it offers a holistic perspective. The benefit of a classic grounded theory research approach 
to this dissertation was that it lent formalism and rigor to the development of a CASoS 
theory. By using this methodology, the intent was that the CASoS theory is plausible, 
transferable, and applicable to real world problems. 
Theory validation was also a consideration in the choice of research methods. For 
classic grounded theory, the process of theory validation is based on the concept of research 
quality. Birks and Mills (2015) write that quality in grounded theory research methodology 
leads to theory credibility. They equate quality with procedural rigor. A quality grounded 
theory approach is demonstrated through controlled research processes and methodological 
congruence. Remenyi (2014) writes that credibility is based on two criteria: the quality of 
the scholarship employed and whether the research results have added something of value 
to the body of knowledge. Glaser and Strauss (1967) write that a grounded theory is neither 
right or wrong, but instead is validated if it demonstrates fit, relevance, workability, and 




represent. A theory is relevant if it evokes “grab” or captures the attention and is not only 
of interest to the academic community. A theory works when it explains how it solves a 
problem. A theory is modifiable if it can be altered when new relevant data arises and 
changes the theory when compared with existing data. These methods of theory validation 
were compatible with this dissertation’s goals of applying a rigorous methodology and 
solving real world problems by extending the systems body of knowledge. 
C. DISSERTATION METHODOLOGY 
This section describes how the classic grounded theory approach was applied to 
specifically answer the research question: What are the characteristics of the CASoS as a 
new class of systems, and how can they be engineered to address highly complex 
problems? 
1. Initial Coding: Low Level Concepts 
The first phase of the dissertation research was the development of initial or low 
level theoretical concepts. Initial coding, also referred to as open coding, is a process of 
fracturing or opening data to: compare incidents, identify phenomena and patterns, and 
begin the process of identifying conceptual possibilities (Holton 2007). Figure 13 
illustrates this phase, listing the types of activities that were performed (inside the circle) 
and showing steps 1–4 of the theoretical method, as well as step 6, which occurs throughout 
the process. The classic grounded theory activities (purposive sampling, initial coding, data 
collection, data generation, theoretical sampling, constant comparative analysis, and 
category identification) occurred during the four steps of this phase. The following 
subsections present the research activities conducted during these first four steps, with a 





Figure 13.  Initial Coding: Low Level Concepts. 
Adapted from Birks and Mills (2015). 
a. Research Question Formulation (Step One) 
Research began pragmatically with a goal of improving the U.S. naval warfighters’ 
military advantage in complex tactical threat environments. Data collection consisted of 
studying maritime tactical threats, operational environments, and capability gaps in the 
Navy’s ability to effectively address or outmaneuver tactical threats. Comparative analysis 
of this data exposed the challenges and surfaced patterns of complexity in the tactical 
problem domain. Additional data gathering and discourse with peers led to the concept that 
an engineered solution to the naval tactical problem domain would require the abilities to 
be adaptive and to rely on coordinated, yet distributed, warfare resources. Continued data 
gathering and open coding revealed the concept of a CASoS (Glass et al. 2011) as a 
potential solution to highly complex problems, such as the naval tactical domain. This 
resulted in the formulation of the research question, what are the characteristics of the 
CASoS as a new class of systems, and how can they address highly complex problems? 
b. Literature Review (Step Two) 
Literature review was the primary method of data collection throughout the 
research process. Literature review informed all three phases of the classic grounded theory 




phase was to understand how a systems approach might address complex problems based 
on studying existing approaches and the existing understanding of the characteristics of 
various systems. After reviewing many types of systems and system characteristics, a set 
of initial codes, establishing categories of systems, emerged. Additional forms of data 
collection resulted from coursework, targeted studies, and discourse with experts and peers. 
These initial codes and coded data are contained in Appendix A.  
The process of data gathering also relied on theoretical sampling which is a process 
for generating theory by collecting data, coding or organizing the data, and deciding what 
data to collect next in order to allow a theory to emerge. Theoretical sampling was applied 
throughout the research process as new information sources were recommended by experts, 
discussed in related academic courses, and cited in the literature reviewed. Theoretical 
sampling was applied to the three primary knowledge domains of systems theory, SoS 
theory, and complex theory, as well as to the review of research methods, and complex 
problem domains.  
c. Explanation of Why a Theoretical Approach Was Chosen (Step Three) 
An intent of this dissertation was to produce methodological congruence—a state 
of accordance between the research philosophy, stated aims, and methodological approach 
(Creswell and Poth 2008). The overarching goals—to expand the body of knowledge of 
systems theory and identify an engineered solution approach to highly complex 
problems—provided a foundation for seeking an appropriate research philosophy and 
methodology. A review of inquiry methods and research philosophies ensued. This 
included a review of books and journals on research methods, as well as intellectual 
discourse. 
Works from Remenyi (2014), Bryant and Charmaz (2007), Creswell and Poth 
(2018), and Patton (2015) informed the decision to use a theoretical approach, specifically 
the classic grounded theory approach. The major points of this research direction follow. 
• The types of data available (literature review and use-cases of observed 
phenomena, information from discourse with experts) are suitable for the 




• The need to develop theory for engineered CASoS solutions to complex 
problems (Glass et al. 2011) and the desire to allow it to emerge from the 
process of data collection, critical analysis, comparison, and creativity, 
supported the decision to use the classic grounded theory research method. 
Classic grounded theory enables theory to emerge from constant 
comparative analysis and theoretical sampling of diverse qualitative data. 
• Classic grounded theory is consistent with a systems approach, which views 
reality in terms of systems and their interactions as well as having a holistic 
perspective. With the objective of adding to the body of systems theory 
knowledge, classic grounded theory was an appropriate choice. 
• The desire to provide validation and acceptance of the theory, was a strong 
factor in selecting classic grounded theory which provides a formal and 
rigorous research method for enabling valid theory to emerge from data and 
analysis.  
• The decision to follow the classic grounded theory method was based on 
informed opinion, experience, and pragmatism. 
d. Concept Identification and Reflection (Step Four) 
The process of data collection, initial coding, and theoretical sampling, led to a 
deeper understanding of complex problems and initial concepts for the CASoS solution. 
This initial level consisted of identifying and understanding the naval tactical use-case as 
an exemplary complex problem. A better understanding of this use-case provided a 
conceptual basis for developing a theory for CASoS solutions. 
The first research phase resulted in the following initial concepts: (1) the military 
domain is a complex problem, and therefore requires a complex solution; (2) an engineered 
solution for the tactical problem should take advantage of using distributed warfare systems 
as a SoS; and (3) taking a system approach to this problem enables a top-down holistic 
approach as well as a means of addressing the complexity aspects. The process of initial 




theory, and complex systems theory. The initial evidence showed that these bodies of 
knowledge form the basis for producing a theory for engineering a solution to certain 
highly complex problems. This led to a generalized approach to the problem: to describe 
the characteristics of complex problems; and by doing so, understand and describe the set 
of solution systems that could address such a problem domain. This generalized approach 
became the focus of the next phase of the grounded theory research approach: the 
development of medium level concepts or intermediate coding. 
2. Intermediate Coding: Medium Level Concepts 
Intermediate level coding and other associated grounded theory methods produced 
medium level concepts during the second phase of the dissertation research. The focus of 
this phase was the study of the theory and concepts that formed the foundation of the 
generalized treatment of CASoS as a solution approach to complex problems. Based on 
theoretical sampling, the decision following the first phase of initial coding was to 
generalize the problem domain and perform a rigorous study of the characteristics and 
principles of systems, SoS, and complex systems to provide the theoretical foundation for 
developing a theory of CASoS. Figure 14 illustrates the classic grounded theory approach 
followed during this phase of the research. This phase relied on intermediate coding to 
identify properties, dimensions, patterns, and relationships within the CASoS 
conceptualization. To do this, I applied theoretical sensitivity—the recognition and 
extraction of data elements that have relevance to the emerging theory—resulting in a focus 
on CASoS as a new class of system solutions. Theoretical saturation was the final state 
reached when the theoretical concepts were clearly articulated and any additional data 





Figure 14.  Intermediate Coding: Medium Level Concepts.  
Adapted from Birks and Mills (2015).  
a. Theoretical Conjecture and Formulation (Step 5) 
Data gathering for this phase consisted of a literature review of concepts, theorems, 
definitions, and axioms within the three core disciplines of systems theory, SoS theory, and 
complex systems theory. Information and feedback was obtained through coursework, 
discourse with peers and experts, and participation in conference presentations and 
publications. Data gathering was performed iteratively and concurrently with the process 
of intermediate coding of information into categories. The main categories of the 
intermediate coding were developed as: systems, purposeful systems, SoS, complex 
systems, complex adaptive systems (CAS) and CASoS. Figure 15 illustrates the 
relationships between these categories of systems. Appendix A contains the in-depth 






Figure 15.  Intermediate Coding Categories 
A study of highly complex problem domains produced a characterization of what 
constitutes such problem spaces based on intermediate coding. A comparative analysis of 
existing complex domains included problems identified by Bar-Yam (2004), Glass et.al. 
(2011), Braha, Minai, and Bar-Yam (2006), Alberts (2001, 2003, 2011), and Harney 
(2012). This data was coded and compared with data that described characteristics of 
complex environments: Ames et al. (2011), Calvano and John (2004), Miller and Page 
(2007), Mitchell (2009), Ottino (2003), Page (2011), and Stevens (2008). Data concerning 
these problems were gathered from literature review, coursework, and discourse with 
experts at conferences. The characterization of highly complex problems is discussed in 
Chapter IV. 
The process of intermediate coding produced the theory for the CASoS class of 
engineered system solutions. The theory for the characteristics and principles of CASoS 
resulted from the identification and comparison of characteristics of systems, SoS, and 
complex systems from the literature review and data gathered. Appendix B contains a 




from the data as the categories of the characteristics and principles of CASoS. The process 
of iterative discourse with advisors and experts produced feedback and refinement of the 
theory. The theory reached theoretical saturation as additional data sources served only to 
reinforce the theory. The CASoS theoretical framework including the theory for the 
definition, characteristics, and principles of CASoS as well as the theoretical concepts for 
CASoS engineered implications is contained in Chapter IV. 
A process of concept synthesis, further discourse, and evaluation, clarified the 
engineering implications of the CASoS theory. These implications formed the basis for the 
development of the conceptual design of an engineered CASoS solution to highly complex 
problems. Further reflection and analysis of the data gathered led to a derived set of 
engineered capabilities that would be required to design and build a CASoS. A number of 
papers were written describing these capabilities, which included distributed sensors to 
gain awareness of the environment, an intelligent and adaptive architecture for sharing data 
and information among a set of distributed intelligent agents that make decisions for 
constituent system actions as well as collective SoS actions. Feedback from publishing and 
presenting the papers led to further refinement of the CASoS required engineered 
capabilities. The results of this step are provided in Chapter V. 
b. Discourse with Peers and Experts (Step Six) 
Discourse with peers and experts was a crucial contributor to this dissertation. The 
exchange of ideas in every step of the research process, informed the decisions for how to 
proceed, provided a wealth of knowledge, and directly influenced the CASoS theory that 
emerged. The following methods were used to gain this discourse: taking courses (Systems 
of Systems, Complex Systems, and Systemic Strategic Thinking), participating in 
conferences (Complex Adaptive Systems Symposium, National Fire Control Symposia, 
Complex Systems Conferences, IEEE Systems Conferences, Military Operations Research 
Symposium, and the Association of the Advancement of Artificial Intelligence Symposia), 
and conversing, informally, with many experts from these groups and with faculty 
members of the Naval Postgraduate School. In many cases, the discourse led to 




led to decisions, such as the focus of the dissertation, the choice of research method, the 
choice of the focused use-case application. Discourse also provided invaluable feedback 
for the CASoS theory and derived engineered capabilities and approach. 
3. Advanced Coding: High Level Concepts 
The final high-level concept phase consisted of advanced coding and theoretical 
integration. It focused on integrating the coded data and concepts from the intermediate 
phase into a coherent theory for the new class of CASoS. Figure 16 illustrates this final 
phase of the research approach. The steps during this phase were “theoretical conjecture, 
refinement, and acceptance” (step 7) and “discussion on impact and implications” (step 8). 
Discourse with peers and experts (step 6) occurred during steps 7 and 8. 
 
Figure 16.  Advanced Coding: High Level Concepts. 
Adapted from Birks and Mills (2015). 
a. Theoretical Conjecture and Refinement and Acceptance (Step 7) 
The advanced coding and theoretical integration consolidated the abstract concepts 
into a final grounded theory for an engineered CASoS. This final coding process allowed 
refinement of the theory based on the process of mapping the CASoS theory to advanced 
codes representing engineered capabilities. This process produced a conceptualization of 




was incorporated as amendments and refinements to the theory. This feedback provided 
greater clarity, completeness, and accuracy to the theoretical concepts.  
The process of theoretical conjecture provided an explanatory theory for an 
engineered CASoS based on the initial and intermediate levels of coding. The development 
of a conceptual CASoS design provided a method for understanding how the CASoS 
approach becomes a workable solution. The solution depended on the derived set of 
engineered capabilities that must exist (or be required) for an intentionally designed 
CASoS to be a viable solution. These capabilities must exist for the engineered solution to 
attain the needed CASoS characteristics. 
b. Impact, Implications, and Verification (Step 8) 
The final research step was a study of the theory’s impact and implications. There 
were two areas of engineering implications from the CASoS theory: (1) a set of required 
capabilities, and (2) a required systems engineering approach. Advanced coding techniques 
produced these engineering implications. A mapping of the CASoS theoretical 
characteristics and principles to a set of system property codes produced a 
conceptualization of an engineered CASoS along with required capabilities. Secondly, a 
study of data gathered for three codes: traditional systems engineering, systems of systems 
engineering, and complex systems engineering, produced implications for a CASoS 
systems engineering approach.  
A modeling and simulation analysis of a specific application of the CASoS 
approach provided data to demonstrate theory validation. This analysis compared a CASoS 
solution approach to the naval tactical domain with a baseline non-CASoS approach. The 
results of this analysis (presented in Chapter VI) provided insight into CASoS and non-
CASoS interactions with a complex environment. The modeling and simulation results 
support the grounded theory validation objective of demonstrating that the theory has fit, 
relevancy, workability, and modifiability.  
The final form of the theory establishes the characteristics and principles of CASoS 





IV. CASoS GROUNDED THEORY 
A. INTRODUCTION4 
A high complexity task requires a system that is sufficiently complex to 
perform it. (Bar-Yam 2004a, 99) 
A new class of theoretical CASoS systems is intended to address highly complex 
problems that arise in operational environments through engineered complex solutions. 
This idea has led to the dissertation’s central research question: How can a CASoS solution 
be engineered to address highly complex problems? This chapter presents a theory for 
CASoS, which includes the definition, characteristics, and principles for this new class of 
complex systems. 
In the remainder of this chapter, Section B provides an explanation of the key 
findings and patterns that were discovered as data was gathered. Examples of the process 
of open coding and selective coding demonstrate the research process. Section C contains 
the grounded theory of CASoS. This includes a discussion on how the theory fits into 
systems theory. It includes the theory for what constitutes highly complex environments 
that require a CASoS solution. Finally, it includes the theoretical definition, characteristics, 
and principles of CASoS as a new class of engineered system solutions.  
B. THE EMERGENCE OF THE CASoS GROUNDED THEORY 
A classic grounded theory approach was taken to gather and analyze data related to 
complex problems and system solutions through which a potential engineered solution 
could be discovered. Figure 17 is an overview of the coding process, highlighting the major 
steps that led to a theory for CASoS, as a new class of engineered solutions. 
                                                 
4 Parts of this chapter were previously published by:  
The Grounded Theory Review (Bonnie Johnson, Karen Holness, Wayne Porter, and Alejandro 
Hernandez. 2018. “Complex Adaptive Systems of Systems: A Grounded Theory Approach.” The Grounded 
Theory Review 17 (1): 52–69.) 
Proceedings of the 18th Annual International Command and Control Research and Technology 
Symposium (ICCRTS) (Young, Bonnie (now publishing as Bonnie Johnson). 2013a. “Complex Systems 
Engineering Applications for Future Battle Management and Command and Control.” In Proceedings of 





Figure 17.  Overview of Coding Process 
The first three steps of initial or open coding included gathering and coding data 
concerning (1) the naval tactical problem domain, (2) complex problems in general and 
their solution approaches, and (3) selective coding in three bodies of knowledge: systems, 
systems of systems, and complex systems. Intermediate coding consisted of the selection 
of the core category and related emergent themes, and the coding of highly complex 
problems and CASoS characteristics and principles. This process produced an emerging 
theory for a new class of engineered solutions to highly complex problems, designated as 
CASoS. Finally, the advanced coding phase studied the implications of the CASoS theory. 
The details of the initial and intermediate coding results are described in this chapter. The 




1. Initial Coding 
a. Finding and Sorting Data about the Naval Tactical Problem Domain 
Research began pragmatically with a goal of improving the U.S. naval warfighters’ 
military advantage in complex tactical threat environments. Data collection consisted of 
studying maritime tactical threats, operational environments, and capability gaps in the 
Navy’s ability to effectively address or counter tactical threats. Comparative analysis of 
this data was performed by identifying characteristics of the tactical maritime environment 
and comparing these to a set of characteristics of complex problem domains that are 
defined in current literature. The results of this initial coding are contained in several 
publications: Johnson, Green, and Canfield 2001, Johnson 2002, Johnson and Green 
2002b, Young 2004a, Young 2004b, Young 2005, Young 2012, Young 2013a, Young and 
Green 2014, Johnson and Hernandez 2016. The analysis and publications expose the 
challenges and patterns of complexity in the naval tactical problem domain. Johnson, 
Green, and Canfield (2001) provided evidence of the potential performance benefits of a 
SoS approach, in which distributed warfare systems would be networked for coordination 
using automated intelligence. Potential benefits included significant improvements in 
overall probability of kill and better usage of weapon resources through improved 
situational awareness (SA) and a layered defense. Another key result was the observation 
of a pattern of complex behavior in the tactical problem domain (Young 2013a). Additional 
literature review (Alberts 2011, Ames 2011, Bar-Yam 2004a, Calvano and John 2004, 
Levin 2002) and discourse with experts, led to the concept that any engineered solution to 
the tactical domain would require the ability to adapt to dynamic situations and threats. 
b. Open Coding of Complex Problems and Solution Approaches 
Continued data gathering through literature review revealed the concept of a 
CASoS (Glass 2011) as both a description of highly complex problems and as an approach 
to addressing them. Purposive sampling identified additional problem domains that had 
similar phenomenon and characteristics to the naval tactical problem. These cases provided 
information-rich comparisons that resulted in the identification of patterns of similar 




decision to generalize the study of CASoS as a potential engineered solution beyond the 
single focus on the naval tactical case. 
The process of data collection, initial coding, and theoretical sampling, led to a 
deeper understanding of complex problems and initial concepts for the CASoS solution. 
Initial coding included identifying and understanding the naval tactical use-case as an 
exemplary complex problem. A better understanding of this use-case provided a conceptual 
basis for developing a theory for CASoS solutions. 
Viewing the problem domain through a systems approach facilitated conceptually 
organizing warfare assets as distributed resources. This resulted in identifying common 
command and control functionality across military platforms and patterns of similar system 
characteristics. This conceptually shifted the focus from a platform-centric paradigm to a 
network-centric paradigm, enabling a foundation for SoS concepts (Johnson 2002). The 
research process identified solution concepts based on collaborations among distributed 
warfare assets, such as layered defense and interoperability within the Navy (Johnson and 
Green 2002b). Research on distributed sensor resource management included an example 
of implementing a set of distributed systems as a SoS in a network-centric paradigm 
(Johnson and Green 2002a). 
Continued emphasis on a SoS approach of using weapon and sensor systems from 
different ships and aircraft to operate collaboratively led to identifying categories and types 
of possible collaborations. The functions for combat engagement, or weapons-fire control, 
were identified and defined in general terms. Each function was studied to determine if it 
could be performed in a distributed manner. A number of distributed engagement concepts 
were developed, including precision cue, launch on remote, engage on remote, forward 
pass, remote fire, and preferred shooter determination (Young 2005). 
A course on complex systems prompted a study of the tactical domain as a complex 
problem. Several sources from literature stated that complex problems can only be 
addressed by complex system solutions (Bar-Yam 2003a, 2004a; Calvano and John 2004). 
Based on this concept, the tactical domain was studied to determine if it had the 




characteristics of complexity. Next, a comparative analysis related the problem domain to 
the characteristics of complexity. The analysis resulted in a determination that the tactical 
problem domain is, in fact, a complex problem space. In addition, the expected behavioral 
complexity of this domain was better understood and could be used to support an improved 
approach to the solution concepts. An additional result was a method by which future 
problem domains could be classified as complex or not. 
The research process produced conceptualization of engineered approaches to 
battle-management that enable SoS collaboration among distributed warfare assets. One 
area of study was automated battle-management decision aids. Tactical decisions within 
the problem domain were identified and studied in terms of areas that could benefit from 
the support of automated decision aids (Johnson 2001). A number of studies produced 
concepts for decision aid capability and functionality as well as a distributed architecture 
to support these concepts (Young 2004a, 2004b, 2005, 2012). One concept resulting from 
this area of the research was the idea of a designer SoS—an approach in which the 
collaborations of warfare assets could be designed during operations to enable near-real-
time adaptation to the tactical environment (Young 2013b). Another idea was to focus 
future tactical architectures and processes within a decision paradigm that focuses on 
warfare actions to be taken rather than on achieving situational awareness as the end goal 
(Young and Green 2014). 
Initial open coding resulted in the following concepts: (1) the military domain is a 
complex problem, and therefore requires a complex solution; (2) an engineered solution 
for the tactical problem should take advantage of using distributed warfare systems as a 
SoS; and, (3) taking a system approach to this problem enables a top-down holistic 
approach as well as a means of addressing the complexity aspects. The process of initial 
coding identified three primary categories for additional research and selective coding: 
systems theory, SoS theory, and complex systems theory. The initial evidence showed that 
these bodies of knowledge form the basis for producing a theory for engineering a solution 
to certain highly complex problems. This led to a generalized approach to the problem: to 
describe the characteristics of complex problems; and by doing so, to understand and 




generalized approach became the focus of the next phase of the grounded theory research 
approach: selective coding. 
c. Selective Coding of Open Codes for Solution Approaches: Systems, 
Systems of Systems, Complex Systems 
Selective coding focused on gathering and coding data from three bodies of 
knowledge: systems theory, SoS theory, and complex systems theory. A number of system 
principles, axioms, and laws were identified, providing insight into, and explanations of 
system behavior and behavioral effects. Data was gathered from literature and coded 
according to four categories: systems, purposeful systems, systems of systems, and 
complex systems. This initial organization of data was based on the goal of examining 
systems and their characteristics and principles and then understanding three special cases 
of systems with potential traits for addressing complex problems: purposeful systems, 
systems of systems, and complex systems. 
As a result of the selective coding, the primary characteristics of systems were 
found to be: openness (interactions with environment involving exchanges of inputs and 
outputs); boundary (a construct that distinguishes the system from its environment); 
architecture (the form of the system); and behavior (the actions performed internally or in 
conjunction with its environment). These characteristics formed the foundation for coding 
the characteristics of CASoS during the intermediate coding phase. Each of the three 
specialized types of systems contributes additional characteristics based upon their intrinsic 
traits: 
• Purposeful systems were identified as being capable of self-organization, 
autonomy, and directiveness, which means they are goal-seeking and 
capable of self-regulation. They are not reliant on an external source of 
control. This requires purposeful systems to have situational awareness that 
enables them to dynamically evolve toward longer-term goals. 
• Systems of systems consist of interoperable constituent systems that can act 
independently and also to collaborate—thus they exhibit behavior at 




as emergent SoS level behavior. Constituent systems can be separated from 
one another geographically. SoS behavior can be dynamically nonlinear and 
can result in cascading effects. 
• Complex systems are characterized by large numbers of interconnected 
constituent systems that are often highly varied. The constituent systems 
self-organize at the local level and produce system-wide emergent behavior 
that can be characterized by nonlinear dynamics. Complex system behavior 
can be reflexive, impacting nearby constituent systems as well as the 
environment. This triggers environmental changes and varied feedback 
loops causing increased dynamic behavior. 
Table 2 lists the types of characteristics and principles of each of these four codes. 
The characteristics and principles were based on the data gathered from literature. 
Appendix A contains the details of the selective coding process. 
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Appendix A defines and describes the principles in detail. This section highlights the 
results of this part of the selective coding process that affected the selection of the core 
category: 
• Many system principles from the data included explanations of how systems 
adapt to, endure, and interact with their environment; achieve states of 
equilibrium; and progress on goal-oriented paths of evolution and cyclical life 
cycles. Principles addressed the impact of initial conditions on system end 
states, the hierarchical nature of many systems, and the ability of systems to 
produce, transfer, and modify information. They also explored how limits in 
system variety and architecture can constrain the ability for systems to adapt, 
endure, interact, and achieve stability. 
• The principles of purposeful systems added some useful insights: the ability for 
purposeful systems to achieve specific goals is dependent on system structures, 
relationships, interactions, resources and behavior—and that these can support 
reaching goals or limit them. Conditional dependency exists—the behavior of 
each subsystem influences the behavior of others. Also, some desired behavior 
is the result of counterintuitive actions or negative feedback loops. 
• The study of SoS principles uncovered the sub-optimization principle which 




will be less than optimal. And that if the SoS has optimum efficiency, then the 
constituent systems will be less than optimal. Thus, a balance must be 
established between the optimization of independent and collaborative 
behavior. 
• The principles of complex systems highlighted the importance of irreversibility 
or the history-dependent nature of complex system courses of action; 
explaining that self-organization can be purposeful or can occur spontaneously 
as a result of feedback and interaction with a changing environment. The ability 
to predict complex behavior and effects is dependent on the level of chaos 
within the system and gaining an accurate understanding of a complex system 
requires multiple representations dependent on the level of chaos and linearity. 
2. Intermediate Coding 
a. Core Category and Related Emergent Themes Identified: CASoS as a 
Solution to Highly Complex Problems 
A process of reflection following the selective data coding process, produced several 
results. One was the potential of system solutions that are purposeful, comprised of systems of 
systems, and complex to address complex problems. Key features of the solution would 
include: 
• the ability to produce desired multi-level, multi-minded, adaptive behavior,  
• an architecture that promotes adaptive behavior, information exchange, and 
shared situational awareness, and,  
• the ability for geographically distributed constituent systems to collaborate in 
a goal-oriented manner. 
The initial set of characteristics and principles that resulted from selective data coding 
provided a framework for organizing the concepts that led to identifying CASoS as a possible 
class of engineered system solutions to complex problems. CASoS became the core variable 
selected as the focus of the intermediate coding phase. Related concepts included the need to 




systems and to establish how they fit into systems theory, in order to allow a theory to emerge 
for the definitions, characteristics, and principles of engineered CASoS as a set of solutions to 
highly complex problems. 
b. Intermediate Coding and Theoretical Sensitivity: Complex Problems, 
CASoS Characteristics and Principles 
The intermediate coding phase consisted of gathering, analyzing, and coding data from 
literature sources and discourse with experts. Data was coded according to CASoS 
characteristics and principles, with a goal of enabling a theory for the definition of CASoS and 
its characteristics and principles to emerge. The codes and subsequent understanding of the 
class of engineered CASoS systems emerged through a process of refinement and revision 
until arriving at a state of theoretical saturation when the codes remained unaltered by new 
data. The initial set of codes for CASoS definition, characteristics, and principles were based 
on the codes from the selective coding process. Some of these codes were combined, revised, 
and in some cases, eliminated, as the analysis uncovered what codes were appropriate for 
engineered CASoS to address highly complex problems. 
Table 3 contains the data references that led to definition of the class of CASoS. The 
definition emerged from 17 data sources that included high-level definitions from the Sandia 
Phoenix project and many definitions of complex systems and complex adaptive systems. 
Table 3.   Coded Data References for CASoS Definition 
Code # of 
Data  
Data References 
Definition of a 
CASoS 
17 Ames et.al. (2011), Bar-Yam (1997, 2003, 2004a), Fisher 
(2006), Glass et al. (2008, 2011), Harney (2012), Hitchins (1992, 
1996, 2003, 2007), Holland (1992), Levin (2002), Miller and 
Page (2007), Mitchell (2009), Ottino (2003) 
 
Table 4 presents the data references for system characteristics that were gathered 
and coded. The data came from sources discovered during the selective coding process, 




and experts. The codes emerged from a combination of the selective coding process and 
from the patterns of CASoS characteristics that were identified during the process of 
organizing the data. The number of data sources that referenced each type of system 
characteristic that related to CASoS provides an indication of the importance of that 
characteristic as a fundamental trait or in some form of application. Openness and boundary 
are each referenced seven times in the data gathered. The data indicated that there were 
both fundamental characteristics of all systems, but not necessarily central to the actual 
addressing of complex problems. Constituent variety, on the other hand, was not a 
fundamental characteristic of all systems, but was mentioned frequently as an important 
trait of complex systems. Architecture, behavior, and complexity were the characteristics 
mentioned most frequently in the data as distinguishing traits of system solutions to 
complex problems. Particular types of architecture and behavior were mentioned as being 
key enablers for solving complex problems. Complexity was mentioned many times in the 
data as a required system characteristic to address complex problems. 
Table 4.   Coded Data References for CASoS Characteristics 
Code # of 
Data  
Data References 
Openness 7 Adams, Hester, Meyers, and Keating (2014), Akers, Hester, Bradley, 
Meyers, and Keating (2014), Bertalanffy (1950, 1951), Checkland (2000), 
Gharajedaghi (2011), Hitchins (1992) 
Boundary 7 Bertalanffy (1951, 1968), Checkland (1993, 2000), Skyttner (2005), 
Hitchins (1992, 2007)  
Constituent 
Variety 
19 Ackoff and Emery (1972), Adams, Hester, Bradley, Meyers, and Keating 
(2014), Akers, Keating, Gheorghe, and Sousa-Poza (2015), Boulding 
(1956), Camazine, Deneubourg, and Franks (2001), Emery (1969), Holland 
(1992, 1995), Levin (2002), Miller and Page (2007), Mitchell (2009), Ottino 
(2003), Page (2011), Petrov (2002), Richardson (2004, 2004, 2005, 2007), 
Skyttner (2001) 
Architecture 28 Ackoff (1971), Ackoff and Emery (1972), Adams, Hester, Bradley, Meyers, 
and Keating (2014), Ashby (1962), Barbasi (2003), Bar-Yam (2003, 2004), 
Carbrera and Carbrera (2015), Dagli and Kilicay-Ergink (2009), Dahmann, 
Rebovich, and Baldwin (2009), Holland (1992, 1995), Keating (2009), 
Maier (1998), Maier and Rechtin (2000), Miller and Page (2007), Moffat 
(2003), Nichols and Dove (2011), Ottino (2003), Richardson (2004, 2004, 
2005, 2007), Ryan (2006), Skyttner (2001), Vakili, Tabatabaee, and 




Code # of 
Data  
Data References 
Behavior 46 Ackoff and Emery (1972), Adams, Hester, Bradley, Meyers, and Keating 
(2014), Akers, Keating, Gheorghe, and Sousa-Poza (2015), Ashby (1962), 
Bar-Yam (1997, 2003, 2004, 2004), Boulding (1956), Carbrera and Carbrera 
(2015), Camazine, Deneubourg, and Franks (2001), Efatmaneshnik, 
Bradley, and Ryan (2016), Emery (1969), Giammarco (2017), Gould (2002), 
Harney (2012), Hitchins (1992, 1996, 2003, 2007), Ho, Richards, and 
Gonsalves (2006), Holland (1992, 1995), Keating (2009), Langford (2017), 
Levin (2002), Lowe and Ng (2006), Marsh (2009), Miller and Page (2007), 
Moffat (2003), Nichols and Dove (2011), Oliver, Kelliher and Keegan 
(1997), Ottino (2003), Petrov (2002), Polacek, Giannetto, Khashanah, and 
Verma (2012), Richardson (2004, 2004, 2005, 2007), Ryan (2006), Sheard 
(2007), Skyttner (2001), Stacey (1995), Sterman (2000), Stevens (2008), 
Vakili Tabatabaee, and Khorsandi (2012) 
Complexity 39 Akers, Keating, Gheorghe, and Sousa-Poza (2015), Allen (2016), Ames, 
Glass, Brown, Linebarger, Beyeler, Finley, and Moore (2011), Bar-Yam 
(1997, 2003, 2004, 2004), Calvano and John (2004), Cilliers (1998), 
Efatmaneshnik, Bradley, and Ryan (2016), Harney (2012), Hitchins (1996), 
Ho, Richards, and Gonsalves (2006), Holland (1992, 1995), Hooper (2009), 
Levin (2002), Levy (2000), Lowe and Ng (2006), Miller and Page (2007), 
Mitchell (2009), Moffat (2003), Oliver, Kelliher and Keegan (1997), Ottino 
(2003, 2004), Page (2011), Petrov (2002), Polacek, Giannetto, Khashanah, 
and Verma (2012), Richardson (2004, 2004, 2005, 2007), Senge (2006), 
Sheard (2007), Stacey (1995), Sterman (2000), Stevens (2008), Suh, Furst, 
Mihalvov, and deWeck (2010), Vakili Tabatabaee, and Khorsandi (2012) 
 
Figure 18 shows the codes for the CASoS characteristics and their relationships to 
the subcategories that resulted from the intermediate coding. The characteristics are 
organized according to six categories: openness, architecture, behavior, constituent variety, 
boundary, and complexity. Four of the six categories are further refined into a next level 
of greater detail. These characteristics are defined and discussed more fully in Section C 






Figure 18.  Codes for CASoS Characteristics 
The high-level CASoS characteristic codes of openness, architecture, behavior, and 
boundary are based on system characteristics. The codes of constituent variety and 
complexity are more specific to CASoS. The sub-category codes for architecture, behavior, 
boundary, and complexity sub-categories reflect the unique characteristics of CASoS. This 
theory for CASoS characteristics is based on evidence from the data gathered and an 
iterative coding process that revised the organization of characteristics to reflect the data 
and to ensure consistency among the characteristics. For example, the CASoS architecture 
must support the system of system and complexity aspects of this class of systems. 
Therefore, the architecture must connect and support distributed constituent systems and 
their collaborations and interactions. Additionally, the architecture must be adaptive itself, 
to support the overall adaptiveness of the CASoS to its complex environment. The 
architecture also has an inherent connectedness which reflects a high level of interaction 




required a process of examining each code and comparing it to all of the other codes for 
consistency and clarity. 
Some of the critical evidence from coded data that shaped CASoS characteristics 
included: 
• Hitchins’ (2009) explanations of systems of systems and their innate 
similarity to systems in every respect except for behavior at multi-levels and 
the ability for independent behavior of constituent systems. This supported 
a systems-thinking perspective of SoS and also provided an explanation of 
emergence as a result of multi-level behavior and interaction. 
• Purposeful systems, as discussed by Ackoff and Emery (1992) and 
Boulding (1956), are explained as having intentional behavior and actions 
which implies intentional emergence for CASoS. 
• Ashby (1962)’s description of self-organizing systems, combined with 
many references to self-organization as a key characteristic of complex 
systems, indicated that the constituent systems of a CASoS must be able to 
self-organize. Coupling this concept with the ideas of purposefulness, 
resulted in the concept of CASoS purposeful or intentional self-
organization. This also implies intentional collaboration, adaptiveness, and 
emergence. 
• Adaptiveness, in terms of behavior, is discussed in a number of systems 
theory articles and books. However, Akers, Keating, Gheorghe, and Sousa-
Poza (2105), Holland (1992, 1995) and Ryan (2006), distinguish adaptive 
behavior from reactive behavior and attribute a purposefulness to intelligent 
adaptive behavior that requires sensing the environment and anticipating the 
effects of adaptive behavior. These concepts provided a basis for the defined 
CASoS characteristic of adaptive behavior. 
• Adaptiveness as an inherent characteristic of the CASoS architecture was 




proposed the idea that the overall adaptive behavior of the CASoS would 
be a result of adaptive interactions between constituent systems. Thus, an 
adaptive architecture would be a CASoS characteristic. 
• The characteristic of multi-mindedness originated from ideas from the naval 
tactical use-case in which a collaborative solution would need to address 
multiple threats or missions concurrently. Gharajedaghi (2011) was a key 
data source that supported this concept. 
• The concept for the changing boundaries was originally a result of 
considering the naval tactical domain and understanding how the 
participation of an additional warfare resource (e.g., ship, aircraft, etc.) 
might affect a collaborative network and conversely, how collaboration 
would be affected if a warfare resource is destroyed or leaves the 
collaborative network (Young 2012). This concept translated to this study 
as the effect of additions or subtractions of constituent systems in an overall 
CASoS. 
• Holland (1992) introduces the concept of a complex adaptive system that 
evolves as it steadily exhibits new forms of emergent behavior. This 
provided conceptual evidence for including evolving behavior as a key 
characteristic of CASoS. 
Table 5 presents the data references for system principles that were gathered and 
coded. The data for system principles came from the selective coding process, from 
secondary literature sources, and from peers and experts. The codes emerged from a 
combination of the selective coding process and from the patterns of CASoS principles that 
were identified during the process of organizing the data. The Principle of Holism was 
referenced the most times as a key principle of systems and especially as an enabler of 
emergence and SoS meta-level behavior needed to address complex problems. Fourteen 
data references led to the definition of the Principle of Operational Viability for CASoS. 




system solution. The Contextual Principle, the Goal Principle, and the Principle of 
Requisite Variety each had 11 data references supporting them as required abilities to 
address complexity in the problem space. The High Flux Principle (with 5 references) and 
the Information Principle (with 4 references) were based on fewer data references, but were 
considered important principles of CASoS as the data indicated they were specifically 
required to address complex problems. 
Table 5.   Coded Data References for CASoS Principles 
Code # of 
Data  
Data References 
Holism 26 Adams, Hester, Bradley, Meyers, and Keating (2014), Ashby 
(1962), Beer (1979), Checkland (1993), Cilliers (1998), Hitch 
(1953), Hitchins (1992, 1996, 2003, 2009), Holland (1992, 
1995), Korzybski (1994), Paul, Beitz, Feldhusen, and Grote 
(2011), Petrov (2002), Phelan (1998), Rasch and Knodt (1994), 
Richardson (2004, 2004, 2005, 2006), Simon (1955, 1956), 
Skyttner (2001), Smuts (1926), Wiener (1961) 
Contextual 11 Adams, Hester, Bradley, Meyers, and Keating (2014), Cilliers 
(1998), Holland (1992, 1995), Petrov (2002), Richardson 
(2004, 2004, 2005, 2006), Skyttner (2001), Weinberg (1975) 
Goal 11 Adams, Hester, Bradley, Meyers, and Keating (2014), Hitch 
(1953), Holland (1992, 1995), Korzybski (1994), Petrov 




14 Adams, Hester, Bradley, Meyers, and Keating (2014), Hitchins 
(1992, 1996, 2003, 2009), Holland (1992, 1995), Paul, Beitz, 
Feldhusen, and Grote (2011), Petrov (2002), Richardson 
(2004a, 2004b, 2005, 2006), Skyttner (2001) 
Requisite 
Variety 
11 Adams, Hester, Bradley, Meyers, and Keating (2014), Ashby 
(1956, 1962), Holland (1992, 1995), Petrov (2002), Richardson 
(2004a, 2004b, 2005, 2006), Skyttner (2001) 
High Flux 5 Richardson (2004a, 2004b, 2005, 2006), Skyttner (2001) 
Information 4 Adams, Hester, Bradley, Meyers, and Keating (2014) 





Figure 19 shows the codes for the CASoS principles and their relationships to the 
subcategories that resulted from the intermediate coding. This dissertation identifies and 
defines seven theoretical principles of CASoS that serve as required fundamental concepts 
or aspirations for engineering a CASoS as a solution to highly complex problems. The 
seven principles are: holism, context, goal, operational viability, requisite variety, 
information, and high flux. Four of the seven are based on lower-level system principles 
that provide a conceptual foundation. The CASoS principles are defined and described later 
in this chapter in Section C. 
 
Figure 19.  Codes for CASoS Principles 
Table 6 contains the data references for the related themes—the supportive 
concepts for the CASoS theory. The data was gathered from literature sources found during 
the selective coding process, from secondary sources, and from discourse with experts. The 
codes emerged from the selective coding process that produced the core variable and the 
related themes. Data was then organized according to the two themes. Both themes were 
supported by a significant number of sources. The first theme concerning the characteristics 




and examples of how complex environments arise and descriptions of the root causes of 
complexity. A definition of the characteristics of complex environments resulted from 
comparing the data sources and developing a comprehensive list. The second related 
theme, concerning how CASoS fits into systems theory, was based on 15 data sources that 
discussed how complex systems, adaptive systems, and SoS fit into systems theory. A 
master data matrix can be found in Appendix B. 
Table 6.   Coded Data References for Related Themes 







13 Allen (2016), Ames et.al. (2011), Bar-Yam (1997, 2003, 2004), 
Calvano and John (2004), Glass et al. (2008, 2011), Harney 
(2012), Miller and Page (2007), Mitchell (2009), Ottino (2003), 




15 Ackoff (1971), Azani (2009), Bar-Yam (2004a), Dagli and 
Kilicay-Ergink (2009), Dahmann, Lane, Rebovich, and 
Baldwin (2009), Dahmann, Rebovich, and Baldwin (2009), 
Efatmaneshnik, Bradley, and Ryan (2016), Fisher (2006), 
Giammarco (2017), Jackson and Keys (1984), Keating (2009), 
Langford (2017), Maier (1998), Nichols and Dove (2011), 
Zhang, Huang, Zhang, and Liu (2006) 
 
C. GROUNDED THEORY FOR CASoS 
This section presents the grounded theory for CASoS. The theory for CASoS is 
organized into (1) the core variable (the definition, characteristics, and principles), and (2) 
the related themes (complex operational environments and the relationship between 
CASoS and systems theory). Figure 20 illustrates the components of the CASoS theory. 
This section is organized as follows: (1) highly complex environments, (2) definition of a 
CASoS, (3), explanation of how CASoS fits within systems theory, (4) CASoS 
characteristics, and (5) CASoS principles. It begins with highly complex environments, as 
an understanding of this related theme provides necessary context for the definition of a 




systems is presented. This related theme provides important context for the CASoS 
definition. Finally, the last two sections present the theory for the CASoS characteristics 
and principles. 
 
Figure 20.  Components of the Grounded Theory for CASoS 
1. Highly Complex Operational Environments 
Complex environments give rise to complex problems. There are a number of types 
of complex environments that are specifically relevant to CASoS. These environments can 
occur naturally in the case of natural disasters such as hurricanes, wildfires, floods, and 
earthquakes—resulting in difficult-to-predict problems that cascade quickly and cause dire 
consequences if not addressed effectively. Epidemics or pandemics are difficult to predict 




international travel. Socio-technical environments spawn complex problems as in large 
organizations such as the U.S. health care system with huge financial challenges, a 
notorious medical error rate, and low quality of care despite an expansion of medical 
knowledge, increasingly sophisticated technology, and excellent physician education (Bar-
Yam 2004a). A purely human-made environment that has produced unintended and far-
reaching problems is the Internet, and its billions of users and connected systems now face 
a myriad of cyber vulnerabilities. Military conflicts are environments that pose complex 
problems. The war on terrorism, as an example, is based on a terrorist network dispersed 
globally that is nearly indistinguishable from civilians—functioning in small, independent 
units only loosely coordinated with one another (Bar-Yam 2004a). 
From a systems perspective, a complex operational environment can be viewed as 
a set of entities or events presenting a diverse set of missions to be addressed by a system 
solution. Figure 21 illustrates the environment with a loose boundary acknowledging that 
while factors external to a system boundary could also affect the system, those 
environmental entities and events within the environmental boundary are driving the 
system behavior. The inwardly pointing arrows represent heterogeneous events occurring 
in the operational environment that affect the system. The different colors indicate the 
heterogeneity of the events. The different lengths, locations, and directions represent events 
that are occurring at different times and locations with respect to the system. These events 
could be threats in a military tactical environment, financial transactions in an economic 
environment, or various obstacles and destinations in a transportation environment. In 
Figure 21, the solution is depicted as a simplified single system; however, the system could 
be a complex and diverse set of distributed technologies, humans, and organizations. When 
operational environments become complex, they oftentimes produce highly complex 






Figure 21.  A Complex Operational Environment 
a. Characteristics of Highly Complex Operational Environments 
A number of environmental characteristics have potential for creating conditions 
that require a solution that can only exist in a highly complex solution space. A complex 
environment can contain one or more of the following characteristics, however, the greater 
the number it contains and/or the greater the value of any particular characteristic 
implies a greater level of complexity. 
• Large numbers of objects and/or features in the environment 
• Heterogeneity and/or diversity of environment objects/features 
• Distribution, kinetics, and interactions of environment objects/features with 
respect to each other and the system solution 
• Diverse, changing, and numerous behaviors and actions 
• Rapid tempo of change 
• Uniqueness of situations or states 




• Large number of diverse and severe behavioral constraints, rules, and 
parameters  
• Rapid and often unexpected shifts from non-complex to complex states of 
environmental behavior 
Viewing the complex problem space as a dynamic system undergoing state 
changes, provides insight into how the problem must be addressed over time. Figure 22 
illustrates an example of these state changes, starting with the environment in a non-
complex state and transitioning through several different complex states. The differences 
in the states of the problem space arise from the many combinations of entities and 
behavioral events possible in the environment. The figure also shows that a complex 
problem space can transition back into the steady-state, in which it is not presenting a 
complex situation. 
 




b. Implications of a Highly Complex Problem 
The implications of a highly complex problem on a solution system are dependent 
on the level of complexity and the type of complex characteristics present in the 
environment. In general, the complex environment’s changing behavior can be translated 
into a set of multi-mission objectives for the system solution. These objectives are also 
changing in time to adapt to the environment. Often, the system solution will have both an 
incomplete and inaccurate awareness of its complex environment. The specific 
implications for a particular system solution will be directly dependent on the individual 
characteristics of the problem domain.  
The solution system needs to develop knowledge of its environment, called an 
internal model, which is a picture that represents the system’s understanding and reasoning 
about the real world. As the environment changes, the system’s picture, or internal model, 
will have to quickly adapt to reflect those changes. This implies that as certain 
environmental characteristics increase to the point of high or severe complexity (such as 
tempo, numbers of events, heterogeneity of events, and kinetics of events), the system’s 
awareness decreases in accuracy and completeness. 
Complex problems translate into challenging conditions for system solutions. The 
many events translate into multiple missions, information overload, shortened reaction 
times, and constant change. The following list identifies and describes conditions that result 
from highly complex problems: 
• Events and/or entities that are numerous, distributed, and heterogeneous 
• Concurrent multi-missions that need to be addressed 
• Information overload 
• Incomplete, inaccurate, and delayed knowledge of the environment 
• Time-criticality–shortened reaction times for responses 





• Cascading events due to interactions among entities 
• A dynamically changing situation 
• Uniqueness—the constantly changing environment translates into an ever-
unique (and perhaps never before encountered and never repeating) series 
of situations changing in time 
This environment overwhelms traditionally engineered systems that cannot 
collaboratively adapt within the required timescales to address the large numbers of 
changing and diverse missions. The following list identifies limitations in traditional 
systems that prevent them from adequately addressing highly complex problems: 
• Cannot adapt quickly enough 
• Cannot address multi-missions occurring concurrently 
• Cannot flexibly reconfigure architectures, collaboration, courses of action 
• Cannot process information quickly enough to make effective decisions 
• Cannot manage distributed resources effectively enough 
• Have fixed system behavior which can limit adaptive responses 
• Are unable to gain shared knowledge of the operational environment among 
distributed constituent systems 
• Are unable to gain accurate, timely, and comprehensive knowledge of the 
environment 
• Cannot take into account the implications of system and SoS actions, and 
use these predictions to support the decision process. 
In order to effectively address these limitations, a diverse set of distributed systems 
must very rapidly coordinate their efforts to their best individual and collective advantages 




complete internal model of the environment and the ability to make intelligent decisions in 
short timeframes. For example, a threat situation in which a naval force is overwhelmed by 
the number and types of threats could cause reduced reaction times that can lead to deadly 
consequences. Information overload and inaccurate battlespace knowledge are just some 
of the conditions that can results in an inability to respond with defensive actions quickly 
or accurately enough. 
Understanding the implications of complex problems provides an understanding of 
what is needed for a system solution. The solution system must necessarily be open, so it 
can interact with the highly complex environment. It must also be complex and adaptive in 
order to effectively respond to the changing environment and to interact nonlinearly as the 
complex and unpredictable situation unfolds. The system must obtain knowledge about the 
environment and develop behavioral objectives based on this knowledge. The system must 
act based on the objectives; and this action constitutes interaction between the system and 
its environment. Additionally, these abilities must occur continuously: updating the 
knowledge and objectives, and continuing to respond adaptively, as the situation changes. 
Figure 23 illustrates a system solution interacting with a highly complex operational 
environment. The illustration captures a snapshot in time—depicting complex events in the 
environment, and system responses. 
Recalling that a SoS is merely an instance of a system that happens to be comprised 
of independently acting constituent systems rather than interdependent subsystems, the 
system solution illustrated in Figure 23 can be expanded to be viewed as a SoS. This leads 
to the next section that discusses the CASoS as the system solution and addresses its 





Figure 23.  A System Solution Interacting with its Highly Complex 
Operational Environment 
2. Definition of CASoS 
The definition of the new class of CASoS solutions emerged from the classic 
grounded theory research approach. A process of studying data gathered from system 
theorists and complexity theorists provided a basis for defining CASoS in terms of the three 
primary aspects of complexity, adaptivity, and emergent behavior. The definition of 
CASoS is as follows: 
CASoS are a class of systems that adapt to their environment through complex 
interactions among their self-organizing constituent systems that give rise to 
purposeful, emergent, meta-level, and multi-minded behavior.  
An illustration of a CASoS consisting of numerous and heterogeneous constituent 
systems that are interacting with each other and their external environment is provided in 
Figure 24. It shows different thicknesses of the connections between constituent systems 
to illustrate different types of interactions. Thicker connections represent a behavioral 
collaboration among systems that is giving rise to emergent behavior with the environment. 




a fundamental characteristic of CASoS. The interactions, collaboration, and emergent 
behavior are changing in time and adapting to the environment. 
 
Figure 24.  CASoS Illustration 
This definition for a CASoS has the following fundamental elements: 
• A CASoS has the potential to address highly complex problem spaces 
through its ability to adapt and behave at multiple levels. 
• A CASoS is comprised of a relatively large number (commensurate to the 
number of entities/events in the environment) of heterogeneous, distributed 
constituent systems that give rise to emergent behavior through their 
interactions. 
• The complex nature of a CASoS may manifest itself in a number of ways: 
heterogeneous and diverse constituent systems, large numbers of 
constituent systems (relative to the entities in the environment), and/or 




• The constituent systems in a CASoS have the ability to self-organize, 
behave, and collaborate; and can do this in a purposeful manner or 
according to a set of predetermined rules. 
• CASoS complexity is a result of adaptive behavior and interaction with a 
complex environment. 
• CASoS adaptiveness results from the CASoS performing autonomously 
using the outcomes of their behavior and interactions to select a subset of 
those behaviors for enhancement and replication. 
3. How CASoS Fit within Systems Theory 
This section discusses CASoS as a class of systems within systems theory. The 
theory for how the class of CASoS fits within the paradigm of systems, SoS, and complex 
systems is based on the comparative analysis of definitions of the properties and 
characteristics of the systems that fall within each domain. A careful analysis of the 
similarities and differences among the different classes of systems, combined with studying 
examples from each class, led to the explanation of how the class of CASoS fits within 
systems theory. Figure 25 illustrates how the class of CASoS lies in the intersection of the 





Figure 25.  The Class of CASoS Lies within the Intersection of 
SoS and Complex Systems  
CASoS are a subset of the class of SoS. They possess all of the characteristics of 
SoS, but also contain additional properties, as CASoS are a specialized subset of the larger 
class of SoS. The class of SoS exhibits multi-minded emergent behavior as well as system-
level behavior from the independent actions of constituent systems. The class contains non-
adaptive and non-complex SoS that produce multiple levels of behavior. These non-CASoS 
have connectedness and interoperate to produce multi-minded behavior addressing 
multiple and sometimes non-complementary goals, but they do so without exhibiting 
nonlinear and complex behavior. Thus, they do not freely adapt to address their 
environment in the same way as CASoS. Some properties that are inherent to CASoS, but 
not to the larger set of SoS include: self-organization, flexible architectures, and 
adaptiveness. These properties lead to principles such as irreversibility, darkness, and 
evolution, that are not found in non-complex SoS. Table 7 lists the differences between 




Table 7.   Differences Between SoS and CASoS 






















Figure 26 shows that CASoS contain the characteristics of all systems, complex 
systems, systems of systems, and a set of additional characteristics that are unique to CASoS. 
 




CASoS are a subset of the class of complex systems. CASoS contain the characteristics 
of complex systems (emergence, reflexivity, connectedness, and causality) but they also have 
the ability to adapt. The characteristic of adaptiveness means that CASoS perform an 
autonomous process that uses the outcomes of their behaviors and interactions with the 
environment to select a subset of those past behaviors for replication or enhancement (Levin 
2002). This allows the CASoS to change its architecture to produce evolutionary behavior 
(based on new interactions) that adapts to address its changing environment. The behavior of 
the CASoS has the characteristics of complex systems, but with the additional feature of being 
comprised of independent constituent systems that can adapt and act in their own right. Thus, 
the CASoS adaptive behavior stems from both individual constituent systems acting 
independently, as well as emergent SoS behavior arising from the collaborative network of 
interactions. This results in large, difficult-to-reduce, systems that can behave dynamically with 
a wide range of time scales and with highly multi-minded effects. 
Another differentiator between CASoS and other kinds of complex systems is the 
ability to anticipate the future (Holland 1992). CASoS have the ability to distinguish 
themselves from others and the environment. They create internal models to anticipate the 
future, and then direct their behavior to achieve expected outcomes (Holland 1992). Their 
internal models allow them to look ahead to possible future consequences of different courses 
of action before committing to those courses of actions (Holland 1992). The CASoS can then 
avoid acts that might result in negative consequences. Thus, the CASoS can purposefully 
control its ability to adapt based on internal models and the ability to predict. 
4. CASoS Characteristics 
A characteristic is a distinguishable feature of an object: a quality belonging (or 
inherent) to a system and serving to identify it. This section presents the characteristics of 
CASoS based on systems theory concepts and definitions gathered as part of the processes of 
initial and intermediate level coding contained in Appendix B. The codes for CASoS 
characteristics were identified as openness, boundary, constituent system variety, architecture, 




concerning the primary attributes of all systems. The sixth code, complexity, was identified as 
a necessary attribute to study, as CASoS are a subset of the class of complex systems. 
a. Openness 
A CASoS is an open system that interacts with its environment. This open interaction 
is inherent to the complexity and adaptiveness of CASoS. An important implication is that a 
complete understanding of a CASoS includes an understanding of its context or operational 
environment (Gharajedaghi 2011). This is necessary to comprehend the open and adaptive 
interaction. Adams et al. (2014, 119) present the Contextual Axiom, stating that “system 
meaning is informed by the circumstances and factors that surround the system.” This means 
that an understanding of external circumstances, factors, and constraints, contribute to a full 
understanding of a CASoS. Figure 27 illustrates a CASoS interacting openly with its 
operational environment. CASoS actions are shown as multi-colored arrows representing 
different types of responses to the environment’s events. 
 





The boundary of a CASoS delineates which systems are in the CASoS. Systems 
inside the CASoS boundary are constituent systems. Constituent systems primarily interact 
with each other by exchanging information. They have the potential to collaborate to form 
systems of systems and produce emergent meta-level behavior. Figure 26 shows the 
boundary of the CASoS as the oval surrounding the constituent systems. It also shows some 
systems in the environment that are outside the boundary of the CASoS. They may have 
potential to become collaborative constituent systems within the CASoS, but until that 
occurs, they are considered part of the operational environment of the CASoS.  
(1) Changing Boundary 
New systems join the CASoS as the boundary changes. New systems joining the 
CASoS become constituent systems. Existing constituent systems can leave or are 
excluded from the CASoS as the boundary changes over time. Boundaries occur at the 
interfaces of the constituent systems and therefore, the boundary changes as a result of the 
development or elimination of an interface. Figure 28 illustrates the changing boundary of 
a CASoS as four snapshots in time. The first snapshot shows constituent systems in the 
CASoS as well as two systems outside the boundary. The second snapshot shows that the 
CASoS boundary has changed and the blue and white systems have entered the CASoS, 
becoming interacting constituent systems and a brown system has left the CASoS giving 
up its role as a constituent system. Additionally, a new red system has appeared in the 
CASoS external environment. In the third snapshot, the boundary has changed again and 
the brown and red systems have joined and become constituent systems. The boundary 
changes once more and the forth snapshot shows several constituent systems exiting the 





Figure 28.  The CASoS Changing Boundary 
(2) Internal Boundaries 
Internal to a CASoS, there are inner boundaries that define collaboration among 
multiple constituent systems. Defining inner boundaries is a useful construct to identify 
and understand collaborative behavior within a CASoS. There can be multiple inner 
boundaries occurring simultaneously, indicating that multiple collaborative SoS can be 
functioning within a CASoS. There can be multiple levels of internal boundaries, or 
internal boundaries within other internal boundaries. This indicates the possibility of a 
hierarchical collaborative structure with a CASoS. Internal boundaries can overlap 
indicating constituent systems simultaneously belonging to more than one SoS within the 
CASoS. Finally, the inner boundaries within a CASoS change in time as the collaborative 
interactions among the constituent systems change. Figure 29 illustrates some of the 
internal boundary concepts for CASoS. The dotted lines surround sets of constituent 
systems that are collaborating as a system of systems. For this higher level of collaboration, 
the couplings need to be tight—indicating a greater interaction. The internal boundaries 





Figure 29.  CASoS Internal Boundaries 
c. Constituent System Variety 
CASoS effectiveness against highly complex problems; relies on constituent 
system variety, in terms of heterogeneity, diversity, and individuality. These factors 
contribute to complexity by enabling variety in the types of responses available to address 
complex environments (Levin 2002). Constituent system variety also provides the 
continual appearance of new kinds of systems to participate as CASoS constituent systems. 
The degree of variation has a direct impact on the ability for the CASoS to adaptively 
change and evolve through the process of selection of actions and interactions. The greater 
the constituent system variety, the greater the number of CASoS behavioral options exist 
to address the complex environment. 
d. Architecture 
The CASoS architecture is the structure and form of the system. It defines the 
interactions of the constituent systems that enables collaboration and adaptive emergent 
behavior. The architecture is the configuration of the connections among the constituent 
systems including the exchange of information between systems. This section presents the 
theory for the required characteristics of a CASoS architecture, which were organized into 





Adaptiveness must be an inherent characteristic of a CASoS in order to enable 
dynamic, responsive, and purposeful interactions among the constituent systems to produce 
CASoS behavior that can address highly complex problems. The CASoS architecture’s 
ability to be adaptive enables dynamically changing internal interactions among constituent 
systems. These interactions create a variety of collaboration configurations that produce 
multi-level behavior. The adaptiveness of the CASoS architecture is a primary enabler of 
the novel, evolving, and purposeful behavior that can address complex environments. 
(2) Connectedness 
The CASoS architecture has the characteristic of connectedness, which is the 
quantity of interactions or density of connections between the constituent systems. The 
measure of connectedness has two aspects: (1) the potential at any given time for the 
dynamics of a CASoS architecture to change; and (2) the level of connectedness at any 
given time based on the internal activity of a CASoS. The first concept is a measure of the 
architecture as a resource—indicating its readiness and potential to support collaboration 
and thus, emergent, multi-level behavior. The second concept of connectedness is a 
measure or indicator of CASoS activity at any given time, providing insight into the state 
of a CASoS at a snapshot in time. 
(3) Collaborative 
A CASoS architecture must support collaboration among the constituent systems. 
In order to be collaborative, a CASoS architecture must support information flow that 
includes awareness knowledge, control signals for decentralized control, and metadata for 
synchronization among constituent systems. The degree to which the CASoS architecture 
supports collaboration, will determine the number of behavioral options possible to address 
the complex problem space. Figure 27 illustrates both loose connections (shown as thinner 
lines), representing a less collaborative interaction between constituent systems, and tight 
connections (shown as thicker lines), representing more highly collaborative interactions 





A CASoS architecture must support distributed constituent systems. These systems 
can function independently from each other and can be separated geographically. The 
CASoS architecture must also support co-located constituent systems that function 
independently, but are physically connected to each other. Therefore, a CASoS architecture 
must accommodate a mix of constituent systems that are separated from one another, 
attached to one another, and potentially moving with respect to one another. The CASoS 
architecture must also support distributed control (or the ability of constituents to self-
organize), distributed decision-making, and the flow of information among the distributed 
and co-located constituent systems. 
e. Behavior 
CASoS behavior refers to the actions and operational performance of a CASoS as 
it addresses its complex environment. CASoS behavior is a result of the actions and 
interactions of its constituent systems, which can be intended (purposeful) or unintended, 
can result in multi-level actions including meta-level emergence, can be multi-minded 
(addressing multiple missions concurrently), includes self-organization, adaptation, and 
evolution. This section presents the theory for CASoS behavioral characteristics. 
(1) Multi-Level Behavior 
Multi-level behavior is the CASoS characteristic of producing behavior at multiple 
hierarchical levels: at the constituent system level and at the SoS meta-level. The 
constituent systems within a CASoS can act independently as well as collectively through 
interactions. The collective local-level interactive behavior produces emergent or 
aggregate meta-level behavior. In addition, there can be multiple groups of constituent 
system within a CASoS collaborating concurrently. Thus, a CASoS can produce multiple 
levels of emergent behavior. The concurrent multi-level behavior of a CASoS produces 




(2) Purposeful Behavior 
A purposeful system “can change its goals in constant environmental conditions; it 
selects goals as well as the means by which to pursue them. It thus displays will” (Ackoff 
and Emery 1972, 31). Kenneth Boulding (1956, 202) developed the general systems 
framework—an “arrangement of theoretical systems and constructs in a hierarchy of 
complexity.” He calls the most basic level the static structure—referring to the static 
relationships and patterns of natural phenomena such as electrons, cells, atoms, molecules, 
etc. The second level is the simple dynamic system with predetermined motions—the 
clockworks level. The third level is the cybernetic system—differing from the control 
mechanism in level two due to the transmission and interpretation of information. A 
thermostat is an example of the third level. The fourth level is the open system or self-
maintaining structure. The fifth level is the genetic-societal level, typified by the plant, and 
characterized by differentiated and mutually dependent parts and blueprinted growth. The 
sixth level is the animal level, including abilities such as mobility, teleological behavior, 
and self-awareness. The seventh level is the human level including self-consciousness, 
which is different from self-awareness, because “he not only knows, but knows that he 
knows” (Boulding 1956, 135). Level eight is social organization which includes 
interrelationships, value systems, and social systems. Finally, level nine is transcendental 
systems, that Boulding describes as the unknowables or higher-level questions that do not 
have answers but do exhibit systematic structure and relationship. 
Ackoff and Emery’s purposeful system fits into Boulding’s system classification 
framework at level six and above. The systems below level six, such as plants with 
blueprinted growth (level five), the self-maintainers (level four) and the cybernetic 
thermostat-like systems (level three), exhibit behavior in a predetermined fashion based on 
environmental conditions. These non-purposive systems adapt to their environment and 
have characteristics that enable them to sense aspects of their environment including 
changes; however, they cannot change their goals in constant environmental conditions. 
This distinction is an important consideration for the engineering of system solutions that 
are purposeful and that can make decisions concerning their actions and behavior. Systems 




of purposeful systems. The other example is systems that include artificial intelligence or 
automated decision aids for determining purposeful actions. 
The intent of engineered CASoS is to develop the CASoS to be purposeful: to 
behave with intent that not only adapts in response to its complex environment, but also to 
exhibit anticipatory behavior to address a problem proactively. CASoS are goal-seeking or 
purposeful systems that respond differently to various environmental conditions to produce 
particular and desired outcomes (states). Gharajedaghi (2011) refers to this ability as 
responsive as opposed to reactive, which is the term he uses for the non-purposeful state-
maintaining systems. Responsive systems have a choice of actions and the actions are 
voluntary. CASoS, as a class of responsive and purposeful systems, “can produce not only 
the same outcomes in different ways in the same environment, but also different outcomes 
in both the same and different environments” (Gharajedaghi 2011, 37). Additionally, a 
CASoS can cause different end states (goals) under constant conditions. Gharajedaghi 
(2011) refers to this ability to change ends under constant conditions as free will. He writes 
that “such systems not only learn and adapt; they can also create” (Gharajedaghi 2011, 37).  
(3) Collaborative or Aggregate Behavior 
The collaborative behavior of a CASoS is the behavior that emerges from the 
interactions of constituent systems. The collaborative behavior can range from loosely 
coupled interactions to tightly coupled interactions. The collaboration can have a duration 
associated with it. Constituent systems can participate in multiple collaborations 
simultaneously. There can also be collaborations within collaborations. The CASoS 
collaborative behavior depends on the number of systems participating, the duration, the 
level of interaction, the connectedness, and in some instances, the agreements (handshakes) 
among constituent systems concerning the collaboration. 
(4) Multi-Minded Behavior 
CASoS exhibit multi-minded behavior to address multiple objectives in the 
environment. Multi-minded behavior is the ability to perform multiple courses of action 
simultaneously. Multi-minded behavior is a necessary characteristic of a CASoS that 




time, occurring in a distributed fashion, and often overlap in time. The CASoS must be 
able to multi-task, functioning in multiple ways that address multiple missions 
simultaneously. 
(5) Self-Organizing Behavior 
CASoS perform self-organizing behavior. They “display organization without a 
central organizing authority” (Ottino 2004, 399) and without any external organizing 
principle being applied. Thus, their constituent systems behave in such a manner that the 
architecture of their interactions becomes organized for collaboration. Self-organization 
means that collaborative behavior occurs without external control or centralized control. In 
the case of purposeful CASoS, the constituent systems decide to self-organize and 
collaborate for desired emergence. Figure 30 illustrates a group of loosely connected 
systems that decide to self-organize to interact and collaborate. The illustration shows an 
increase in connectedness and internal boundaries surrounding groups of constituent 
systems that have self-organized and interact to perform collaborative behavior.  
 




(6) Adaptive Behavior 
CASoS exhibit adaptive behavior. Adaptation is key to addressing complex 
problems. Akers, Keating, Gheorghe, and Sousa-Poza (2015) identify six types of 
behaviors of complex systems to address their environment. The first two are non-adaptive: 
endurant behavior is the use of defensive mechanisms to deflect impacts from the 
environment and regulator behavior alters internal settings to compensate for changes in 
the environment. The other four behaviors are adaptive: organizer behavior alters its 
internal structure, relationships, courses of action, and configuration to address its 
environment; migrator behavior is defined as avoidance actions—or physically moving 
away from risks in the environment; insulator behavior is defined as self-protection 
actions—when a system uses external entities for protection; and finally, manipulator 
behavior alters the environment to reduce, eliminate, or prevent negative impacts (Akers, 
Keating, Gheorghe, and Sousa-Poza (2015), Akers 2015). A CASoS embodies all of these 
forms of complex behaviors and can exhibit them at will through the actions and 
interactions of its complex constituent systems. A CASoS can exhibit multiple types and/
or instances of adaptive behavior through independent constituent system actions (as well 
as aggregate meta-level actions). 
(7) Evolving Behavior 
Evolving behavior is an inherent characteristic of CASoS. Evolving behavior is the 
longer-term adaptation in goals and purposeful behavior as the CASoS learns to better 
address its complex environment. This evolution occurs through adaptive learning using 
positive and negative reinforcing feedback. Bar-Yam (2003a) writes about the engineering 
applications of co-evolution, hierarchical or multi-level selection, evolutionary 
programming, genetic algorithms, and other methods for artificial selection of functions 
and purposeful behaviors based on evolving goals over time. Petrov (2002) discusses the 
importance of prediction of behavioral consequences and effects, and the use of these 
predictions to evolve system goals over time. A CASoS must use its knowledge of itself 
and environment, to predict the possible effects and environmental impacts of different 





CASoS are, by definition, complex, and therefore contain the characteristics of 
complex systems. These characteristics include detailed complexity, dynamic complexity, 
disorganized and organized complexity. For a CASoS, this means that there are many 
objectives or missions, some of which may be inconsistent. Control is decentralized and 
distributed among the constituent systems. Change at any level may have CASoS-wide 
impacts due to the connectedness of the constituent systems, and change may be cascading 
and dramatic. The lateral interactions among constituent systems are more dominant than 
the hierarchical relationships. Short-term behavior is more predictable than long-term 
behavior. Innovation and adaptation are inherent. Complexity is also a result of constituent 
system heterogeneity, diversity, and individuality. This is a key property of a CASoS, as it 
enables variety in the types of responses available to address the complex environment. 
(1) Detail Complexity 
Detail complexity is the characteristic of detail in scalability and the increasing 
number of entities and in combinatorial complexity (Senge 2006). For CASoS, detail 
complexity can manifest as very large numbers of constituent systems and by very large 
numbers of interactions, or high connectedness. It can also result from facing many 
missions concurrently as a result of the problem space. This can translate into huge amounts 
of data and information and consequently into increased decision complexity. Detail 
complexity results in a situation in which humans cannot fully comprehend the CASoS and 
its decisions due to natural cognitive limitations.  
(2) Dynamic Complexity 
Dynamic complexity arises from a large number of interactions among constituent 
systems that creates time delays and volatile unpredictability for the state of the CASoS. 
Dynamic complexity is attributed to a number of factors including tight coupling, 
connectedness, feedback, nonlinearity, adaptiveness and self-organization. Similar to detail 
complexity, dynamic complexity is also a characteristic of CASoS that goes beyond the 




(3) Non-Linearity and Uncertainty 
Complex systems can exhibit non-linear dynamics as they interact with a highly 
complex environment. Non-linearity may arise from sudden changes in behavior ranging 
from a high degree of stability to very unstable behavior. Non-linear behavior adds to 
unpredictability and uncertainty. In addition, common in complex systems is the tendency 
for relatively small changes to lead to large effects, for instance, when small changes in 
initial conditions leads to very different dynamics over time. The goal of an engineered 
CASoS is to exhibit predictable and intended behavior. This intended behavior can be non-
linear in terms of the complex dynamics and multi-level and concurrent multi-level 
behavior; however, CASoS design approaches must include methods to address the non-
linearity to ensure desired behavior (Fradkov, Miroshnik, and Nikiforov 1999). 
(4) Resilience 
A common characteristic of many complex systems is resilience—a system’s 
ability to respond to environmental events by absorbing the disturbance or reorganizing to 
address them. (Fraccascia, Giannoccaro, and Albino 2018). A CASoS has a number of 
features that provide the characteristic of resilience. The greater the level of complexity 
inherent in the CASoS due to large numbers of heterogeneous constituent systems, an 
adaptive, collaborative, distributed architecture, and the purposeful, adaptive, multi-level 
and multi-minded behavior the larger the number of preemptive and responsive actions 
required to increase overall resilience. 
5. CASoS Principles 
In general, a principle is a fundamental assumption about an object: it is a concept 
that serves as a guide for the behavior or evaluation of that object. In systems theory, 
principles reflect a system’s designed purpose and represent values that orient and rule the 
conduct of a system in its environment. A number of principles, axioms, propositions, and 
laws exist in the field of systems theory. A study to produce a formal definition of systems 
theory by Adams et al. (2014) contains a fairly comprehensive list and description of 
systems principles. Richardson (2004a, 2004b, 2005, 2006) studied how these system 




systems. This dissertation developed a theory for the principles of CASoS based on the 
application of systems principles to the design of CASoS solutions to highly complex 
problems. A classic grounded theory method produced a set of codes or categories of 
system principles that developed into the principles for CASoS solutions: holism, 
contextual, goal, operational viability, requisite variety, high flux, and information. This 
section defines and describes the CASoS principles. 
a. CASoS Holism Principle 
The CASoS Holism Principle states that a CASoS has emergent behavior that is a 
result of complex constituent system behavior and interactions. This principle is based on 
the System Holism Principle which is simply stated as the whole is greater than the sum of 
its parts (Richardson 2004a; Smuts 1926; Skyttner 2000). Richardson (2004a, 76) writes 
that “this is one of the most interesting aspects of complex systems: that micro-level 
behavior can lead to macro-level behavior that cannot be easily (if at all) derived from the 
micro-level from which it emerged.” The System Holism Principle also infers that 
emergent wholes cannot be reduced to their parts. For CASoS, this principle manifests as 
the emergent, adaptive, and evolving behavior that is necessary to address its complex 
environment. The CASoS meta-level behavior is not reducible to its parts (constituent 
systems). Rather, the meta-level behavior is a result of a complex combination of 
constituent system behavior and interactions. For engineered CASoS, the holistic behavior 
is intentionally designed and purposeful. This implies the ability for the CASoS to 
understand and predict what types of collaborations and interactions will produce meta-
level effects that will provide the courses of action to effectively address the highly 
complex environment. The CASoS must gain and develop knowledge for how individual 
behavioral contributions and their interactions can combine to provide holistic behavior 
that is greater than the sum of the parts. 
b. CASoS Contextual Principle 
The CASoS Contextual Principle states that CASoS as a solution to highly complex 
problems relies on the abilities to gain understanding of its context and itself. This principle 




“system meaning is informed by the circumstances and factors that surround the system.” 
This axiom stresses the importance of gaining an understanding of the circumstances that 
enable or constrain a system. The Complementary Law and Darkness Principle are 
additional theoretical system concepts that support the CASoS Contextual Principle. 
The Complementary Law (Weinburg 1975) states that “any two different 
perspectives (or models) about a system will reveal truths regarding that system that are 
neither entirely independent nor entirely compatible” (Richardson 2004a, 76). For CASoS, 
the Complementary Law implies that there are multiple models that provide overlapping 
and potentially contradictory descriptions of the CASoS. 
The Darkness Principle in complexity thinking is the concept that no system can be 
known completely (Richardson 2004a; Skyttner 2001). This suggests that the best 
representation of a CASoS is the actual CASoS itself, and all other representations are 
imperfect models. Therefore, no representation will be able to offer a complete and 
accurate understanding of a CASoS. 
Taken together, the Complementary Law and Darkness Principle support the 
CASoS Contextual Principle by explaining that multiple descriptions with different 
perspectives are needed to attempt to understand and describe CASoS; however, the 
representations will fall short of a total and complete model. They also imply that a CASoS 
will have incomplete and inaccurate self-awareness; and that a CASoS will have to self-
generate, or create, a variety of internal models with different perspectives in order to 
increase self-awareness. An example of different CASoS perspectives is illustrated in 
Figure 31. These models represent the types of information and perspectives that a CASoS 
uses to create internal models. The ability for a CASoS to be self-aware, and to understand 
its context, is necessary to perform purposeful behavior. However, it should be kept in 
mind that the CASoS ability to be completely self-aware is limited, and thus the CASoS 
can never be an ideal or perfect system. Therefore, according to Cilliers (1998, 4–5), the 





Figure 31.  CASoS Contextual Principle: Multiple Models of a  
CASoS and its Environment 
c. CASoS Goal Principle 
The CASoS Goal Principle states that CASoS achieve specific goals through 
purposeful behavior using behavioral decisions, adaptation, and feedback from causal effects 
and the environment. The CASoS Goal Principle builds on several system principles: the Sub-
optimization Principle, the Satisficing Principle, the Principle of Circular Causality, and the 
Feedback Principle. 
The Sub-optimization Principle, described using many examples by Hitch (1953), 
refers to the condition that if each subsystem, taken individually, is made to perform with 
maximum efficiency, the system as a whole will not perform with maximum efficiency. The 
Satisficing Principle (Simon 1955, 1956) states that the decision-making process whereby a 
system chooses an option; may not result in the best option, but it may be good enough. Taken 
together, these principles infer that CASoS are not ideal systems. They cannot work at 




between constituent level and emergent level optimization that produces behavioral outcomes 
that are good enough to address highly complex problems. 
Circular Causality (Korzybski 1994, Adams et al. 2014) states that a system outcome 
becomes a causative factor for future effects and consequences, causing influencing in a variety 
of different ways. The Principle of Feedback (Wiener 1948) states that all purposeful behavior 
requires signals from the environment to direct future behavior towards a goal. Taken together, 
these principles affect and guide the ability for a CASoS to meet a goal. A CASoS solution 
must have the ability to consider the effects of behavioral choices, as each CASoS action may 
cause an event in the complex problem space, which results in a circular causal loop. 
Additionally, a CASoS must have the ability to sense and understand feedback signals from 
the environment in order to adapt future CASoS behavior toward a goal. 
d. CASoS Operational Viability Principle 
The CASoS Operational Viability Principle states that in order for the CASoS to be a 
viable solution during operations, the CASoS must maintain stability and resilience. Beer 
(1979) described system viability as a measure of balance to be maintained in two ways: (1) 
subsystem autonomy versus integration and, (2) stability versus adaptation. For a CASoS, this 
translates into a balance between (1) constituent system autonomy vs. collaborative behavior; 
and (2) maintaining CASoS stability while adapting and evolving in terms of architectural 
changes and behavioral goals. Several system principles apply to CASoS in support of 
operational viability: the Pareto 80/20 Principle, the Principle of Redundancy of Resources, 
and the Principle of Relaxation Time.  
The 80/20 Principle (that 80% of the output will be produced by 20% of the system) 
reflects that while many constituent systems in a CASoS may be interacting and behaving at 
any given time, only a small percentage of them will be contributing to the desired emergent 
behavior. Viewing a CASoS as a network of constituent system nodes provides a network 
perspective for the 80/20 Principle. In this case, a study of a number of complex systems has 
shown that only a fraction of the nodes contribute to the long-term behavior (Richardson 
2004a). Many nodes become stable nodes demonstrating significantly less state-changes or 




emergent CASoS behavior, they actually serve the purpose of creating intrinsic stability. They 
act as a means to dissipate perturbations, and therefore create behavioral resilience. 
A related system principle is the Principle of Redundancy of Resources. This principle 
describes a system’s ability to maintain stability under conditions of external disturbance 
(Skyttner 2001). CASoS have a variety of means by which stability can be maintained. The 
CASoS’s resources are their constituent systems, interactions, and behaviors (both individual 
and collective). A CASoS uses its resources purposefully to address its environment in 
intentional ways. Holistic resource management is the use of constituent systems to fulfill 
holistic CASoS goals. This method allows a more efficient and effective use of pooled 
resources than having each resource acting independently. The CASoS can build in 
redundancy to maintain overall stability. Providing excess resources (Paul, Beitz, Feldhusen, 
and Grote 2011) is a means of increasing the reliability and safety in CASoS solutions. 
The Principle of Relaxation Time is another system principle that applies to CASoS 
that can improve operational viability. The Relaxation Time Principle (Richardson 2001) 
states, “system stability is possible only if the system’s relaxation time is shorter than the mean 
time between external disturbances” (Skyttner 2001, 93). For a CASoS, the time required to 
act, exhibiting adaptive behavior, and then to return to a state of equilibrium (to relax before 
the next action), must be shorter than changes in the environment. The CASoS has the natural 
advantage of pursuing multiple actions concurrently, which will provide greater overall 
relaxation time as some constituent systems are acting while others relax. However, a better 
understanding, and thus prediction, of the temporal dynamics of the problem space will support 
a better CASoS design for operational viability.  
e. CASoS Requisite Variety Principle 
The CASoS Requisite Variety Principle states that the CASoS must have a greater 
number of courses of action possible in the solution space than there are events in the problem 
space in order to be an effective solution. The Law of Requisite Variety states that system 
control is only possible when the controlling system’s variety is greater than the variety of the 
situation to be controlled (Ashby 1956). For a CASoS this means that the number of possible 




not met, the CASoS will be overcome by the highly complex problem. There are several 
methods for designing a CASoS to increase the “variety of the controller” or to increase the 
number of possible actions. These include having a greater number of constituent systems, 
having greater diversity of constituent systems, and having a greater number of possible 
interactions and aggregations. 
f. CASoS High-Flux Principle 
The CASoS High-Flux Principle states that the rate of resource flux must support the 
overall ability for adaptation to address the highly complex problem space. Resource flux 
refers to the availability and use of resources in a timely manner. The systems theory high-flux 
principle states that as the rate of resource flux through the system increases, the number of 
resources available to address the environment increases (Skyttner 2001). Complex systems 
have a greater range of possibilities for discovering and creating new patterns of resource 
relationships. In a CASoS, the ability for high-flux or adaptive architectural interactions can 
allow a transformation to a new and quite different system altogether (Richardson 2004b). 
Thus, High-Flux is a guiding principle for CASoS interactions and an enabler of adaptive 
architectures. 
g. CASoS Information Principle 
The CASoS Information Principle states that CASoS create, possess, transfer, and 
modify information. This principle is based on the Information Axiom (Adams et al. 2014) that 
provides an understanding of how information affects systems. A related system principle is 
the Redundancy of Potential Command (McCulloch 1959) which states that desired and 
effective system actions occur when an adequate amount of information exists. In other words, 
power and decisions reside where information resides. For a CASoS, this principle implies an 
information architecture that supports a distribution of decision-making throughout the 
constituent systems. Combining this principle with the Holism, Context, and Goal Principles 
results in a requirement for CASoS to gain and maintain shared contextual, causal, and 
environmental feedback knowledge in order to support holistic decision-making in each 









V. ENGINEERING IMPLICATIONS OF THE CASoS THEORY 
A. INTRODUCTION5 
Given the existence and rise of highly complex problems and the emergence of a 
grounded theory for CASoS as a new class of system solutions to these problems, this 
chapter discusses engineering implications of the theory. Chapter IV articulated the theory 
for the definition, characteristics, and principles of CASoS. This chapter presents the 
results of the final advanced coding phase of the grounded theory methodology. The results 
provide an engineering framework for CASoS by presenting a conceptualization of the 
required capabilities of an engineered CASoS solution and a CASoS systems engineering 
approach. 
CASoS, as a new class of engineered systems, present a solution opportunity for 
addressing highly complex problems through adaptive architectures and the embedding of 
constituent systems with the intelligence to learn, self-organize, collaborate, and evolve in 
order to achieve desired adaptable emergent behavior. Advances in information and 
computational technologies enable the potential development of complex, adaptive, and 
intelligent capabilities needed to engineer CASoS solutions. The implications of the 
CASoS theory presented in this chapter answer the second part of the original dissertation 
research question: how can a CASoS solution be engineered to address highly complex 
problems? It does this by first building on the theoretical framework to conceptualize the 
required engineered capabilities. Secondly, it presents implications of the CASoS theory 
for the systems engineering design process. 
                                                 
5 Parts of this chapter were previously published by:  
Springer Proceedings in Complexity (Bonnie Johnson. 2018. “Engineered Complex Adaptive Systems: 
A Military Application.” In Unifying Themes in Complex Systems IX: International Conference on 
Complex Systems (ICCS), edited by A. Morales, C. Gershenson, A. Minai, and Y. Bar-Yam, 499–506. 
New York: Springer Proceedings in Complexity.) 
IEEE Xplore © [2018] IEEE (Bonnie Johnson. 2018. “Towards a Theory of Engineering Complex 
Adaptive Systems of Systems.” Paper published in IEEE Xplore Proceedings of the 18th Annual IEEE 




This chapter has three other sections. Section B describes the advanced coding 
phase, explaining how this final classic grounded theory process answered the research 
question. Section C describes the first result of the advanced coding phase—the required 
engineered capabilities and conceptualization of a CASoS as a solution to highly complex 
problems. Section D contains the second result of the advanced coding phase—the required 
systems engineering approach to design and develop CASoS solutions. 
B. ADVANCED CODING PHASE: THEORETICAL INTEGRATION AND 
IMPLICATIONS 
The final phase of the research process was the advanced coding or high-level 
concept phase. This phase used theoretical integration to provide a comprehensive 
understanding of the CASoS theory and its implications for an engineered solution. 
Advanced coding studied the selective codes of the intermediate phase to draw conclusions 
about required capabilities for a CASoS solution, as well as considerations for applying the 
systems engineering process to realize an engineered CASoS. The results of the final phase 
were twofold: (1) a conceptualization of the required capabilities of an engineered CASoS; 
and (2) an explanation of the modified systems engineering approach required to design a 
CASoS solution. The following two subsections describe the research approach taken to 
attain these results. 
1. Advanced Coding Approach for the Conceptualization of an 
Engineered CASoS 
The CASoS grounded theory presented in Chapter IV served as a source of 
requirements and guidance for developing an engineered CASoS. The advanced coding 
processes of theoretical conjecture and theoretical integration focused on the impact and 
implications of the CASoS definition, characteristics, and principles. This produced a 
coherent theory for how a new class of system solutions can address highly complex 
problems. 
The advanced coding phase began with a study of the results of the intermediate 
coding phase (the CASoS theory) to conceptualize an engineered CASoS. A process of 




CASoS that consists of: an architecture, a system of intelligent constituent systems, and 
analytics that can perform knowledge discovery and prediction. These major parts of a 
CASoS became the three codes used for mapping the theory to the conceptualization. 
 
Figure 32.  CASoS Advanced Phase Codes 
The CASoS characteristics and principles from the intermediate coding phase were 
then mapped into these three CASoS codes. This process reinforced the conceptualization 
and provided a process for integrating the theoretical concepts into a set of capabilities 
required for an engineered CASoS. Table 8 contains the mapping of the CASoS theory into 




Table 8.   Mapping of CASoS Theory to Advanced Codes 
Conceptualization Codes CASoS Characteristics CASoS Principles 











Holism Principle, Goal 
Principle, Requisite 
Variety 




Contextual Principle, Goal 
Principle (Principle of 




The theoretical characteristics of architecture, boundary, openness, and complexity 
were mapped into the adaptive architecture code for the conceptualization of an engineered 
CASoS. These characteristics provide a description of what capabilities are required to 
engineer a CASoS architecture. The architecture must support adaptive and collaborative 
behavior of the constituent systems. It must provide an open relationship of interactions 
between the engineered CASoS and its environment. It must be flexible to allow changes 
in the internal and external boundaries of the CASoS. Several CASoS principles affect the 
CASoS architecture. The Principle of Holism requires an architecture that supports 
collaborative interactions that produce emergent behavior. The Operational Viability 
Principle requires an architecture that supports stability and resilience through a balance 
between constituent system autonomy and integration. The High-Flux Principle requires 
an architecture that supports the high rates of resource flux needed to enable behavioral 
complexity. The Information Principle requires that the architecture support information 
sharing among the constituent systems. 
The second conceptualization code, an intelligent system of constituent systems, 
has mappings from the following characteristics: behavior, constituent system variety, and 




collaborative, emergent, purposeful, evolving, and complex behavior of a CASoS. 
Functioning as a SoS, the intelligent constituent systems need to make decisions to self-
organize and form a CASoS to achieve collaborative, intentional behavior to address a 
complex problem space. In effect, the intelligent SoS is making resource management 
decisions, in which the resources are the constituent systems themselves and the CASoS 
architecture. Four of the CASoS theoretical principles are mapped into this code: the 
holism principle, the goal principle, and requisite variety. Engineering a system of 
intelligent constituent systems is required to enable the distributed and collective decision-
making needed to produce the desired (or goal-oriented) holistic emergent behavior 
described by the holism and goal principles. It is also required to meet the principle of 
requisite variety, which involves decision-making to identify courses of action and 
effective solutions involving the CASoS resources. 
The third conceptualization code, knowledge discovery (KD) and predictive 
analytics (PA), has mappings from two CASoS theoretical characteristics: constituent 
system variety and behavior. KD includes self-awareness; therefore, as CASoS are 
comprised of heterogeneous constituent systems, the KD analytics must support gaining 
knowledge of these different system capabilities. This knowledge is also needed to perform 
PA to predict the effects of these systems’ actions. CASoS behavior also guides the abilities 
to perform KD and PA. KD is required to gain an understanding of the complex problem 
space and PA is required to anticipate events in the problem space and predict the effect of 
CASoS behavior. These capabilities are enablers of effective CASoS decision-making and 
behavioral responses to address complex problems. The following CASoS principles map 
to the third code: the contextual principle, the goal principle (principle of feedback and 
circular causality), and the information principle. The contextual principle explains that the 
CASoS must gain an understanding of its context thereby requiring KD for an engineered 
CASoS. The goal principle is based on the principle of feedback which explains that 
purposeful behavior requires signals from the environment to direct future behavior 
towards a goal (thus requiring a KD capability); and circular causality which explains that 




capability). Finally, the information principle explains that a CASoS creates, possesses, 
transfers, and modifies information. Therefore, this principle also maps to a KD capability. 
Section C of this chapter contains the results of this advanced coding process. It 
presents the conceptualization of the engineered CASoS and describes what is required in 
terms of an adaptive architecture, a set of intelligent constituent systems, and KD and PA 
analytic capabilities. 
2. Advanced Coding Approach for the CASoS Systems Engineering 
Approach 
In the advanced coding phase, data was gathered from literature sources in the 
following categories: Traditional Systems Engineering (TSE), Systems of Systems 
Engineering (SoSE), and Complex Systems Engineering (CSE). This data was gathered 
and analyzed in order to understand the kind of systems engineering approach required to 
design an engineered CASoS solution. 
Appendix C contains the detailed description of the data describing the three 
systems engineering approaches. The advanced codes for this phase of the research were: 
TSE, SoSE, and CSE. Data collected from literature review and symposia were organized 
and evaluated according to the codes, as shown in Table 9. The advanced coding of this 
data produced an understanding of the differences among the three approaches, as well as 
an understanding of what types of systems can be engineered or produced from each of the 
three types. 
Table 9.   Coded Data References for Systems Engineering Approaches 







12 Blanchard and Fabrycky (1998), Calvano and John (2004), 
Haberfellner and deWech (2005), Hitchins (1992), Keating 
(2009), Kossiakoff and Sweet (1998), Ncube (2011), Neill et al. 
(2010), Paul, Beitz, Feldhusen, and Grote (2011), Polacek et al. 
(2012), Sousa-Poza (2015), White (2005) 
Systems of 
Systems 
14 Azani (2009), Dagli and Kilcay-Ergink (2009), Dahmann, 









Baldwin (2009), Hitchins (2003, 2005, 2007), Giammarco 
(2017), Jackson and Keys (1984), Keating (2009) Maier (1998), 





21 Ames et al. (2011), Bar-Yam (2003, 2004), Beckerman (2000), 
Braha, Minai, and Bar-Yam (2006), Calvano and John (2004), 
Fisher (2006), Haberfellner and deWech (2005), Hitchins 
(1996), Holland (1992), Honour (2006), Neill et al. (2010), 
Norman and Kuras (2006), Oliver, Kelliher, and Keegan 
(1997), Ottino (2004), Polacek et al. (2012), Sheard (2007), 
Stevens (2008), Svetinovic (2013), Vakili, Tabatabaee, and 
Khorsandi (2012), White (2005) 
 
Table 10 presents a summary of the results of the data gathered for the three SE 
codes. The table contains a characterization of each of the SE approaches as they relate to 
CASoS.  









• Architectures based on clearly defined relationships 
• Well-defined functionality 
• Focused on the pursuit of ideal requirements that are complete, 
unambiguous, and testable. 
• Designs can be partitioned easily and with confidence 
• Architectural interfaces are dominated by interfaces that are well-defined 
and well-understood 
• Does not allow for adaptation 
• Interfaces, once designed, are fixed 
• Boundaries, once designed, are fixed 
• Requirements, once specified, are fixed 
• Described as design by decomposition—where a high-level description 
is abstracted and then partitioned into components and then each 






• Primary focus on integrating existing systems into a SoS; thus a 
bottoms-up approach 
• Focus on interoperability of existing systems 








• Bottoms-up SoSE approach is reductionist and will lead to further 
complexity and unintended emergence 
Top-down SoSE: 
• Recommendation for future SoSE to focus on a top-down approach to 
enable directed and desired emergent behavior and to architect and 





• As environments become more complex and uncertain, TSE-produced 
systems are unable to adapt and respond as needed. 
• CSE is needed to develop complex systems that can adapt, change, and 
behave in novel ways in complex environments. 
• CSE is attempting to engineer systems that can produce aggregate 
emergent behavior while managing unpredictable emergence. 
• CSE must not pursue ideal requirements, which could limit the system 
behaviors to only specific conditions that are foreseen. 
Design the Environment: a CSE approach focused on creating an environment 
and process instead of an end-product or system 
Principles-Oriented: a CSE approach that exerts external influence on a 
complex system and is principles-oriented rather than rules-oriented 
Distributed Peers: a CSE approach in which a peer-to-peer architecture is 
comprised of distributed peers defined as autonomous machines 
Local Behavior and Emergence: a CSE approach with a focus on the behavior 
of local actions and neighbor interactions with predictions of what global 
properties will emerge. 
 
The study of the advanced codes for SE approaches produced a set of SE objectives 
and guidelines for an engineering approach for CASoS. The codes and data in Table 10 
were analyzed in terms of how these approaches would apply to an engineered CASoS. 
The results of this process, guidance and implications for a CASoS SE approach, are 
presented in Section E of this chapter.  
C. CONCEPTUALIZATION OF AN ENGINEERED CASoS 
A quintessential capability that an engineered CASoS must possess is decision-
making. It must make decisions to intentionally determine its behavior, which must adapt 
and evolve to address its complex environment. This requires decisions that govern 
individual and collaborative behavior—resulting in purposeful behavior at multiple levels 
(including emergence). Decisions must take into account many different mission objectives 




the CASoS. The decision-making capability must be distributed among the constituent 
systems to enable self-organization and purposefulness at the system level. Thus, the 
CASoS is not a pre-determined, pre-destined system operating solely on a fixed rule set.  
CASoS design and development requires a decision-centric paradigm, which 
essentially views the CASoS as a system of decision systems that share situational 
knowledge and make decisions for individual system actions with an aggregated SoS-level 
perspective in mind. These decisions must be synchronized among the constituent self-
organizing systems. Thus, decision-making must take center stage for engineering 
CASoS—it must be the focus for designing and developing the constituent systems; and, 
it must be the focus for envisioning how the CASoS will operate most effectively to address 
the complex problem space (Young and Green 2014). 
Establishing a decision-centric engineering approach ensures that CASoS behavior 
is intentional and desired. It relies on the three following capabilities: an adaptive 
architecture, a system of intelligent constituent systems, and the ability to discover 
knowledge and predict the effects of actions. An adaptive intelligent architecture enables 
agile interrelationships among the constituent systems that comprise an ultimately adaptive 
SoS that can respond to a changing complex environment. A system of intelligent 
constituent systems distributes the decision-making, enabling the systems to self-manage 
and decide to collaborate or act independently as the complex situation dictates. Finally, 
knowledge discovery and predictive analytics grants the CASoS the ability to gain and 
maintain shared situational knowledge of the environment and the distributed constituent 
systems. The CASoS uses its decision-making to analyze knowledge and prioritize 
missions, develop tasks and courses of action (adaptive responses to the problem space), 
and to develop what-if and if-then predictive scenarios to shape the synthesis of future 
intelligent decisions and adaptive CASoS relationships. The subsequent subsections 




1. An Adaptive Architecture 
An adaptive architecture enables agile interrelationships among the constituent 
systems that comprise an ultimately adaptive SoS that can respond to a changing complex 
environment.  
A primary CASoS capability is to be able to adapt to a changing environment. The 
CASoS adapts through a cycle of interactions with its environment: continuously changing 
its behavior in response to changes in the situation. A system must change its internal 
mechanisms, or undergo a physical metamorphosis, to exhibit a range of behaviors. 
However, in the case of CASoS, the inherent SoS nature allows it to exhibit a range of agile 
behaviors by adapting the interrelationships among its constituent systems. This capability, 
along with diversity and intelligence in its constituent systems, are the primary features 
that enable CASoS to address complex problem spaces. For example, when the CASoS 
determines that its environment has become highly complex, it will realign resource 
priorities and establish new interactions and collaborations in order to respond effectively. 
In order to enable the CASoS adaptive behavior to be purposeful, the adaptive 
architecture must be intelligent. Thus, the constituent systems of the CASoS intentionally 
govern their own interactions with each other, and in effect, govern the architecture as a 
whole. The intentional interrelationships result in adaptive aggregate behaviors that enable 
multiple levels of behavior, including emergence, that are not simply derived from the 
actions of the parts, but emerge from the interactions of the parts. 
Therefore, the adaptive architecture is a prime enabler of the variety of behaviors 
that the CASoS can exhibit. It establishes the outer boundary of the CASoS as well as the 
internal SoS boundaries that are changing and adapting in time and in response to the 
changing environment. Figure 33 illustrates adaptive relationships among the constituent 
systems and the changing CASoS behavior that results. The architectural structure enables 
CASoS adaptation and evolution through the interactions the adapting and evolving as the 
interactions adapt and evolve. The illustration shows an example of how a CASoS 
architecture changes in time. It depicts four iterations that are snapshots of the architecture 




(behavioral outputs are shown as colored arrows pointing up toward the environment), as 
well as one collaborative action. Next, the architecture three new collaborations to produce 
a different set of external actions. In the third iteration, the entire set of constituent systems 
are collaborating to produce one emergent behavioral action. Finally, in the fourth iteration, 
there are two overlapping collaborative systems of systems as well as two individual 
systems acting. This illustration shows the role that the architecture plays in enabling a 
variety of CASoS behaviors. 
 
Figure 33.  Desired Behavior from Adaptive Architecture 
a. The Architecture as a Decision Resource 
To take it a step further, the architecture can be viewed as a resource of the CASoS 
that can be utilized to effect desired behavior. The architecture is managed by the intelligent 
constituent systems that are organizing themselves through mutual interactions. Likewise, 
the adaptive relationships of the architecture enable the constituent systems to function in 
complex, adaptive, and collaborative manners. Thus, there is a symbiotic relationship 




The architecture, viewed as a resource, must be flexible and agile to establish 
interactions between systems and transmit information as needed. The ability communicate 
between distributed systems has real world limitations (discussed in more detail later in 
this section) such as data throughput and latency. These limitations can be minimized 
through efficient architecture usage to optimize information exchange that enables 
effective collaboration and ultimately CASoS behavioral actions. At times, if there are 
limits to data exchange, the constituent systems will have to determine which information 
is exchanged and to which recipients.  
 
Figure 34.  Symbiotic Relationship Between Adaptive 
Architecture and Intelligent Constituent Systems 
The intelligent decision-making capability of constituent systems (discussed in 
more detail later in this chapter) will manage the adaptive architecture in a distributed, yet 
coordinated, manner. The architecture can be described as self-forming as the constituent 
systems self-organize and interact. This management will not be ad hoc. Rather, the 
systems will be managing the architecture as a resource with the needs of the whole CASoS 
as well as individual system needs, in mind. Thus, it will be a purposeful architecture. 
b. Interaction Mechanisms 
In order to be adaptive, the architecture relies on a variety of interaction types 
between the constituent systems. These interaction mechanisms range from simple 
acknowledgements to information exchanges to agreements. The information exchange is 




handshakes are necessary in certain situations to guarantee a commitment from multiple 
systems to collaborate for emergent behavior.  
Table 11 identifies and describes some possible types of interaction mechanisms. 
The first two mechanisms support initial interaction: the ping, which is an 
acknowledgement of existence, and the baseline, which is an initial exchange of baseline 
information concerning system capabilities and configuration information. 
Table 11.   Types of Internal CASoS Interactions 
 
 
The third mechanism is the exchange of health, status, configuration, and capability 
(HSCC) information. This is a sharing of system information that enables systems to make 
decisions based on an understanding of each other’s capabilities in addition to their own. 





The fourth mechanism is the sharing of situational awareness (SA) data, 
information, and knowledge. This important mechanism enables systems to gain and 
maintain shared knowledge of the problem space. 
The fifth mechanism is the ability of systems to synchronize themselves through 
data interaction. Synchronization is required to ensure that SA is consistent among the 
systems. It is also needed to ensure that behavioral decisions are consistent. 
Mechanisms six through eight support agreements between constituent systems for 
collaboration. In order to coordinate actions, systems may send action intent messages to 
one another. Systems may send collaboration requests to each other to initiate and 
acknowledge collaboration. In some cases for critical operations, systems may require a 
handshake to solidify the agreement to collaborate. 
Finally, the ninth mechanism is an information request, which a system might send 
to its constituent system neighbors asking for data, information, knowledge, or 
synchronization. 
The architecture allows new systems to enter the CASoS and become part of the 
interacting constituent systems. Likewise, the architecture allows systems to exit the 
CASoS. Figure 35 illustrates an example of the types of interactions occurring as a new 
system makes contact with a CASoS (with a ping), transmits and receives baseline 
information and then goes into an interactive state with other neighboring constituent 





Figure 35.  Interaction Sequence for Newly Entering Constituent System 
c. Architecture Limitations 
A number of challenges to the adaptive architecture capability exist due to real 
world limitations. These limitations may lessen in the future as information and 
communication technologies continue to advance. Some examples of causes of these 
limitations include:  
• Distribution—The distance between constituent systems as well as the 
kinetics of systems moving with respect to one another may present 
challenges for communication. Distances can add latency, greater chances 
for error, and greater potential for negative effects from the environment. 
• Connectedness—A large number of interconnections (which may be due to 
a large number of constituent systems) can present challenges for 
maintaining the required number of communication paths. This condition 
can also lead to bandwidth issues if the data size is large. 
• Environmental Effects—Weather and other environmental conditions may 
adversely affect the communication technologies, adding latency, errors, 
and possibly causing outages. 
• Communication Technologies—Limits may be inherent in the 




bandwidth (or amount of data able to be transmitted in a time period), errors 
induced, latency, and limits to types of data transmitted. 
• Outages—Communication outages (the lack of ability to share information 
between systems) may occur if there are technology failures, environmental 
effects, or a threat-based denial of service. Alternative communication paths 
or redundant links may provide a solution. 
• Information Assurance—Communication issues could take the form of a 
cyber-attack, injecting unauthenticated and/or false data into the system, or 
causing denials of service. 
2. A System of Intelligent Constituent Systems 
The adaptive emergent behavior of the CASoS is governed by the self-management 
of the distributed constituent systems to collaborate or act independently as the complex 
situation dictates. Thus the engineered CASoS can be described as a system of intelligent 
constituent systems. This can also be thought of as distributed decision-making or a system 
of decision systems. 
The two primary capabilities of the constituent systems are: (1) to have the ability 
to make decisions concerning not only their own behavior, but also about their interactions 
(distributed control; not centralized); and (2) the ability to develop and synchronize SoS-
level decision-making. In other words, the constituent systems make decisions at the global 
CASoS-level and use the global decisions to govern their own behavior. Therefore, the 
engineered CASoS is a system and architecture that enables behavior at the system level 
to be optimized for overall goals as well as individual goals. 
An assumption is made in this section that the constituent systems have a shared 
situational awareness. This capability is discussed in the next section on knowledge 
discovery and predictive analytics. This conceptual approach is decision-centric with a 
primary focus on what decisions need to be made and a secondary focus on gaining the 
information to support the decisions. Historically, efforts have focused primarily on 




done with the information in terms of decision-making. Figure 36 illustrates the 
interdependencies of the primary engineered CASoS capabilities. The intelligent 
constituent systems capability has a symbiotic relationship with the adaptive architecture. 
It also has a strong dependency on the ability of the CASoS to perform knowledge discover 
and predictive analytics. All three capabilities are based on data: the ability to communicate 
it (adaptive architecture), develop knowledge and predictions from it (knowledge 
discovery and predictive analytics), and ultimately to make behavioral decisions based 
upon it (intelligent constituent systems). 
 
Figure 36.  Interdependent Relationships between CASoS Capabilities 
a. A System of Decision Systems 
The engineered CASoS can be described as a system of decision systems. Instead 
of a central manager and controller with a god’s eye view of the situation, the god’s eye 
view is present in each of the distributed systems. Thus, this condition of distributing the 
situational awareness is actually replicating the intelligence among the distributed systems. 
Figure 37 shows a simple example of three constituent systems collaborating to 




systems would likely be significantly greater for an actual CASoS. The red dotted arrows 
represent input data and information from the environment that is captured by sensor 
resources of the CASoS. The systems develop shared situational awareness (SA) by sharing 
the sensor data and implementing common processes to analyze it. The individual 
constituent systems then develop behavioral options or actions they can take individually 
and/or collectively. The green outwardly pointing dotted arrows illustrate the CASoS 
collective actions. 
 
Figure 37.  Simple Example of CASoS Information Sharing and Collaboration 
One of the key capabilities required for the engineered CASoS is a set of decision 
analytics (or common data processing algorithms) to analyze data and develop CASoS 
behavior decisions. An instantiation of the decision analytics must be present in each 
constituent system to provide intelligence. Figure 38 illustrates the decision analytics 




or intelligent agent, includes the data processing and analysis that needs to be present in 
each constituent system. 
 
Figure 38.  The Interplay between the Real World and the 
CASoS Decision Space 
Figure 37 illustrates the interplay between the real world and the CASoS decision 
space. The complex environment (or problem space) is shown as distinct from the 
engineered CASoS solution space in the illustration to emphasize the distinct interactions 
of each within the decision space. In an actual real world, the problem space and solution 
space would have a more complex interaction and a more accurate illustration would be 
with the CASoS surrounded by its environment. The primary inputs from the real world to 
the decision space are sensory inputs providing data about the environment and information 




(HSCC) data. A model of the problem space (the SA model) is developed in the decision 
space as well as a resource picture. Note that these models would be continually changing 
as the CASoS and its environment change. All of this information would then feed the 
resource management capability, which develops decision options for ways in which the 
CASoS can exhibit behavior to address its problem space in the real world. Data analytics 
would process quantitative data based on the internal SA model to determine the 
complexity level of the environment and develop decisions options involving 
reconfiguration and reallocation of resources. These decisions are the major output of the 
decision space and guide the actions of the engineered CASoS. 
b. Resource Management 
In the context of engineered CASoS, resources are defined as individual capabilities 
that the CASoS possesses. A constituent system can consist of one or more resources and 
therefore one or more capabilities. Examples include sensor resources, mobility resources, 
processing resources, and communication resources. A resource is defined separately from 
a constituent system because there is not always a one-to-one correspondence between 
systems and resources and they have a slightly different purpose within the CASoS. Each 
constituent system has an instantiation of the distributed intelligent processing capability 
that includes resource management (RM), knowledge discovery (KD), and predictive 
analytics (PA). Each resource is a capability that is managed to address the CASoS mission 
objectives. The mission objectives would be determined based on the analysis of the 
environment and its level of complexity. Figure 39 shows a simple example of three 
constituent systems in a CASoS. Each system contains the intelligent processing capability 
and one or more resources, illustrated by the yellow circles. 
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Figure 39.  Intelligent Constituent Systems and Their Resources 
Figure 40 is a modified version of the data fusion model that was originally 
developed by the Joint Directors of Laboratories (JDL) (Steinberg, Bowman, and Wright 
1998). This version emphasizes the level 4 resource management function that decides how 
to manage resources based on assessments of signals, entities, situations, and impacts in 
data fusion levels 0 through 3. The JDL’s model was data-centric, focusing on what kinds 
of fusion, processing, and analysis could be performed on data to gain the most knowledge 
and utility from it. The adaptation of their model shown in Figure 39 focuses on resource 
management as a starting point for conceptualizing an engineered CASoS with a decision-
centric focus. By emphasizing resource management, the design of the engineered CASoS 
is focused on its behavioral interaction with the environment rather than this interaction 
being an afterthought. 
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Figure 40.  Decision-Centric Resource Management. 
Adapted from Steinberg, Bowman, and Wright (1998). 
The ability to manage resources is a primary component of the constituent system’s 
intelligence. Resource management involves decision making to guide or control the 
CASoS’s resources, including the data fusion domain itself. In this concept, the resource 
manager contains the intelligence to determine how the sensors should be tasked or 
prioritized or made to be more cooperative to improve the data collection and ultimately 
the knowledge of the situation. The resource manager could control the data fusion domain 
to optimize the fusion processing of the data for better assessment of signals, entities, 
situations, and impacts. Also, the resource manager would task the resource systems which 
provide capability to interact with the problem domain (environment). In a military 
example, this could be tasking weapon systems to engage threats or tasking ships or aircraft 
to maneuver.  
Figure 41 shows a concept for the high-level functionality of the resource 
management capability along with its interactions with the resources and other capabilities. 
In other words, this is the common decision capability or intelligence that would be 
embedded in each constituent system. Examples of resources are shown in yellow boxes 
along the bottom of the illustration. These include sensors for observing events and entities 




conditions. Another example is data fusion, which would be part of the knowledge 
discovery capability. The adaptive architecture is also viewed as a resource. Additionally, 
there would be other CASoS resources depending on the type of solution domain.  
 
Figure 41.  Resource Management Functionality 
The resources provide sensory data as well as information about themselves and 
their status to the knowledge discovery capability. This capability develops, maintains, and 
updates knowledge of the problem domain and the resources. It provides this knowledge 
to the resource management capability as well as to the predictive analytics capability. The 
resource manager translates this knowledge into new mission objectives for the CASoS to 
address the problem domain. It assesses and prioritizes the mission objectives, which in 
complex situations could include multiple conflicting objectives. It has a conceptual 
decision engine, which would develop behavioral resource course of action (COA) options 
to address the missions. This process is envisioned to be continuous in its operation and 
changing as information is acquired and assessed, reflecting an evolving environmental 
situation (i.e., converting from complex to highly complex). The resource management 
capability would conceptually, work in concert with the predictive analytics capability—




decision engine translates prioritized objectives into resource tasks; generates resource 
allocation options; coordinates with the predictive analytics capability; and, selects an 
optimum option. The resource management options may include independent system 
resource action or collaborative action. It may also change COAs depending on how the 
missions are changing. All of the capabilities would be performed continuously and 
simultaneously in each constituent system that is part of the engineered CASoS. 
Another important feature of this capability is the ability to synchronize decisions 
among the distributed constituent systems. The ability to synchronize decisions would be 
an additional function of the adaptive architecture and would involve data communication 
among the systems to ensure consistency and to identify when decision are not consistent. 
c. Considerations for Engineering Self-Organizing and Emergent 
Behavior in CASoS 
The constituent systems, with their embedded and synchronized common 
intelligence, and the adaptive architecture, collectively decide to organize themselves. 
They can coordinate their individual behavior and interactions to create emergent behavior. 
This subsection describes how this would conceptually work. 
The combination of a common processing capability resident in each distributed 
constituent system and the adaptive architecture, allows the engineered CASoS to be 
effectively designed on the fly. This novel concept brings the ability to design a system to 
near-real-time operations. In traditional systems engineering, system behavior (in terms of 
functionality and projected performance) is determined during the design phase, prior to 
operations. This results in a limited set of possible behavior for a system to perform 
operationally.  
For engineered CASoS, this limitation would still exist at the system level. Each 
constituent system would still be comprised of resources with established functionality and 
performance capability. However, the adaptive architecture and distributed decision-
making intelligence would enable highly flexible design options at the SoS level during 
operations. The engineered CASoS would be able to reconfigure itself into numerous 




resulting emergence would only be limited by the number and heterogeneity of the 
participating constituent systems. This conceptual capability is referred to as design-on-
the-fly. It enables the engineered CASoS to self-organize, adapt, evolve, and even learn. 
Table 12 presents four different types of CASoS collaboration that lead to emergent 
behavior. Level 1, referred to as divide and conquer, is a form of coordination in which 
each constituent system agrees to address a different and unique mission objective. They 
divide these tasks among themselves and each conquer or fulfill them separately. Level 2 
is similar, but in this case, systems coordinate to act independently while addressing the 
same objective or set of objectives. For level 3, multiple constituent systems dedicate 
resources to cooperatively meet an objective together. In level 4, multiple constituent 
systems collaborate in a more highly interactive way (requiring action synchronization, 
action intent, handshakes, etc.) that might include multiple dedicated resources, multiple 
objectives, and longer durations of collaboration. Conceptually, these various forms of 
collaboration would occur continuously and at time, simultaneously, dictated by the 
complexity of the operational environment. 






d. Human-Machine Decision-Making 
An important aspect of engineered CASoS is the incorporation of humans in the 
decision-making process. The engineered CASoS must be engineered as a system that 
supports human decision makers. Thus, the CASoS is conceptualized as a decision-making 
process that supports human decisions through its adaptive architecture and automated 
intelligence.  
Automated decision aids, or machines, can support human decision-makers in a 
number of ways. Three models for human-machine decision-making interaction are shown 
in Figure 42. The manual decision-making model encompasses situations in which humans 
cognitively collect and store relevant information as well as perform the decision analysis 
(processing and decision-making). This model implies a fairly simple and straightforward 
decision space in which the amount of data and number of variants is manageable 
manually. In the semi-automated model, the human decision-maker relies on machines to 
manage, store, fuse, and process the input information to display decision analytics. For 
the engineered CASoS, decision analytics will consist of knowledge discovery, resource 
management, COA options, and quantitative measures of expected event successes and 
consequences. Finally, in the fully automated model, the human’s role is to monitor the 
automated machine decision processes and to override or change decisions when 
necessary. 
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Figure 42.  Human-Machine Interaction Models. 
Source: Johnson, Green, and Canfield (2001). 
It is important to establish the appropriate mechanism for the type of decision being 
made. In general, decision-making can be performed manually when the problem space is 
relatively simple and the number of factors to be considered and the amount of information 
is manageable by the human decision-maker. For some types of decisions, a semi-
automated human-machine interface (HMI) mechanism is most appropriate. This is 
effective for more complex decision spaces with potentially critical or dire consequences; 
requiring the support of automated decision aids, but with significant human involvement. 
A fully automated HMI mechanism is appropriate for decision spaces that are complex in 
terms of large amounts of information that must be processed and fused, but that involve 
relatively straightforward heuristics in terms of the types of decisions being made. Fully 
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automated decision modes are for relatively non-complex operations where decisions do 
not have dire consequences or for highly complex operations where the decision reaction 
time is too compressed for humans. Fully automated decision modes are appropriate when 
there is very high confidence in the information and knowledge of the situation. 
Conceptually, the engineered CASoS could treat the HMI mode as a managed 
resource to appropriately respond to changes in the complexity of the problem space. The 
complexity of the decision space would have to be continuously assessed. Increased 
complexity could be due to increases in mission objectives, greater amounts of information 
and data to process, compression in decision timelines, or a combination of these factors.  
Another important characteristic of the engineered CASoS that relates to HMI is 
trust. Some studies have indicated the importance of establishing the right level of human 
trust in intelligent (decision support and artificial intelligence) systems (Hengstler, Enkel, 
and Duelli 2016, Marsh 2005). The engineered CASoS is a system of decision systems. It 
is critical that human decision-makers interacting with the CASoS and relying on this 
artificial intelligence can have confidence in the decision options and assessments 
presented. Human operators must have an adequate level of trust in their machine partners. 
They must know when it is appropriate to have confidence in the decision options and 
when they should question decisions. An over-reliance on artificial intelligence can also 
lead to undesired COAs. The engineered CASoS can provide a capability of self-
assessment to provide a level of confidence estimate to accompany decision options. This 
capability would also support the resource management, knowledge discovery, and 
predictive analytics capabilities. 
3. Knowledge Discovery and Predictive Analytics
Knowledge discovery (KD) and predictive analytics (PA) are two key capabilities 
required for engineered CASoS. They go hand in hand as PA is directly dependent on KA 
for knowledge and information to predict possible consequences of CASoS actions. KD 
and PA are both components of a constituent system’s intelligence. They both must be 
implemented in a common fashion among the constituent systems to enable synchronized 
self-organization and emergence as a cohesive system of systems. Here in this subsection, 
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we focus on these capabilities in more detail. Figure 38 illustrates the interdependencies 
among the three CASoS capabilities that enable purposeful intelligence in constituent 
systems. It shows that KD provides the knowledge that enables RM and PA to perform 
their functions. It also shows that RM provides decision option information (concerning 
possible options for the CASoS to act) to PA. PA uses its analysis processes to make 
predictions about the effects of these actions. It then provides these predictions back to the 
RM, so the RM can take this information into account as final decisions are made for 
CASoS actions. Finally, Figure 43 shows that these capabilities exist in each constituent 
system. Thus, an instantiation of the capabilities are resident in each constituent system of 
the CASoS. 
Figure 43.  Interaction among CASoS Capabilities: KD, PA, and RM 
a. Knowledge Discovery
Decades of research have provided (and continue to provide) significant technology 
and engineered methods to achieve KD for operational environments. This research has 




data, and data analysis and fusion techniques to process the sensor data and develop a 
picture of the real world environment. Recent efforts have included the use of Big Data 
processing and artificial intelligence techniques for fusing heterogeneous data sets that 
include non-traditional data sources such as social media to improve knowledge. Research 
has also focused on improving knowledge through sensor resource management techniques 
to provide feedback controls to enhance the overall picture based on changing sensor 
parameters or coverage. 
Attempts to achieve shared operational knowledge (or shared SA) among 
distributed systems have resulted in a number of data architectures to communicate and 
manage data. These attempts have uncovered a number of challenges to achieving 
synchronized knowledge among distributed systems, such as induced errors, limited 
bandwidth, limiting architectures, and latency issues (especially with the need for real-time 
imagery). These challenges often result in significant differences between the operational 
images produced at different locations. Fortunately, these challenges are a focus of on-
going research and improvements are being made. However, these limitations must be 
taken into account as they would affect CASoS performance. 
Table 13 lists and describes the required capabilities for an engineered CASoS to 
perform KD. Obtaining sufficient data sources is required—whether they are external 
sources or sensor resources that are part of the CASoS. The advantage of having sensors 
internal to the CASoS is that they can be managed or retasked to improve or optimize the 
CASoS’s collective knowledge of the real world. For example, if there is data missing from 
a certain area of the environment, the sensors can be tasked to widen their field of view or 
point toward the area that needs coverage. The ability to manage, fuse, and share the data 
among the constituent systems is also a required capability for achieving shared knowledge 
or SA.  
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Table 13.   Engineered Capabilities for CASoS Knowledge Discovery 
Two new areas of KD capability need research and attention. The first is sensor 
resource management. Single sensor feedback management is focused on the tasking of a 
sensor to change its parameters or pointing to improve the coverage or accuracy of its 
observations. The new extension of this is to manage the set of distributed CASoS sensors. 
In this way, the sensors are managed in a cooperative manner—so their collective ability 
improves the overall shared picture of the real world environment. 
The final required KD capability for an engineered CASoS is to be holistic in the 
types of knowledge discovered. The CASoS should not only discover knowledge about the 
real world environment, but should also discover knowledge or develop a living picture of 
itself and other external systems that may be part of the solution space. In essence, the KD 





Figure 44.  Types of Knowledge Required for the CASoS Decision Space 
An additional important component of KD is the knowledge of what is not known. 
In order to make the best decisions possible based on the knowledge, it is also important to 
identify areas of incompleteness and inaccuracy in the knowledge of the decision space 
and fill those gaps. Some examples include: identifying areas of the real world environment 
that do not have sensor coverage for a period of time; areas of the environment where the 
data was less accurate; periods of time when there is known error for sensors (based on 
weather, non-optimal performance, introduced errors, etc.); and periods of time when 
pictures among constituent systems are not synchronized. The results of this type of 
analysis lead to the ability for the RM to assess the level of confidence for decision options. 
A quantitative capability can be developed to assign confidence levels based on assessed 
knowledge goodness. 
Another matter to consider for KD is the authenticity of the knowledge. Such a 
large and distributed information and decision system as a CASoS must be sure to stress 
information assurance and to defend against cyber-attacks. 
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b. Predictive Analytics
A PA capability is key to enabling a strategic CASoS—one that takes into account 
possible consequences and effects of decision-making. The PA capability would develop 
what-if and if-then predictive scenarios to shape the synthesis of future intelligent decisions 
and adaptive relationships. This conceptual capability enables the CASoS to evolve in its 
purposefulness. It gives the CASoS the ability to make behavioral decisions concerning its 
courses of action based on what the longer-term effects are projected to be. It enables the 
CASoS to have short-term and longer-term objectives and to weigh these as resources are 
managed and actions are taken. 
Figure 45 illustrates some of the notional capabilities of the conceptual PA. The PA 
would receive knowledge of the real-world SA and CASoS resource HSCC from the KD 
capability. It would receive COA options from the RM capability. As it assesses the 
consequences of CASoS COAs on the operational environment, it would develop projected 
future states of the environment (real world) and of the CASoS resources. It would use 
these projections to assess the COA options and determine which options have the most 
desired consequences. The PA provides the ability for the CASoS to ensure purposeful 
behavior that aligns with short and longer-term goals. The PA could assess, for example, 
the possible effects of weather predictions on CASoS COAs and the availability/depletion 
and projected capability of CASoS resources that factor into COA decisions. It could also 
assess overall CASoS readiness, resilience, and project capabilities. 
The engineered CASoS PA capability would have to be highly tailored to its 
problem space. For example, for an operational environment that has the potential to cause 
harm to human safety, the predictive assessment would have a capability that includes 
future projections of how COAs might affect safety. Another example is a problem space 
that includes an adversary. In this case, the PA capability would include a wargaming or 
red-cell assessment to predict enemy responses to tactical resource actions. It would also 
develop and maintain a model of the adversary’s predicted knowledge, capabilities, intents 
and strategies. This could be used to better understand and predict adversary responses in 





Figure 45.  Engineered CASoS Predictive Assessment Capability 
An important aspect of the PA capability is the development and management of 
CASoS goals. These goals may be predetermined as part of deliberate planning for the 
overall CASoS and its intended ability to address its complex problem space. The goals 
would be implemented as quantitative measures of effectiveness (MOE) and rule sets to 
guide behavioral decision-making. They would be used as preferences and evaluation 
criteria for analyzing resource COA options and performing design on the fly decision-
making. However, the CASoS would benefit from the ability to perform dynamic planning, 
which would have the capability to modify these goals (and their associated MOEs, rule-
sets, and quantified preferences) during operations. This would enable the CASoS to 
evolve in its purposefulness in an adaptive manner as the problem space changes. 
D. IMPLICATIONS AND GUIDANCE FOR CASoS SYSTEMS 
ENGINEERING 
The CASoS theory identifies differences between CASoS and other more 
traditional systems and systems of systems. This section discusses several topics related to 
engineering a CASoS that reflect these differences and provide guidance for addressing 
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these differences within the SE process. The five topics discussed are: (1) systems 
engineering goals for CASoS, (2) the necessity of a top-down systems engineering 
approach, (3) employing an intelligent distributed peer architecture approach, (4) 
considerations for engineering the constituent systems, and (5) a continuous design 
approach throughout the CASoS life cycle. 
1. CASoS Engineering Goals
There are three overarching goals for engineering a CASoS based on their unique 
characteristics. These are:  
• to engineer a solution that can address a given highly complex problem,
• to engineer desired CASoS emergent behavior and avoid undesired and
unpredicted emergence, and
• to engineer a solution that can evolve over time as the complex operational
environment changes.
The first goal, to develop a CASoS that can address a highly complex problem, 
relies on designing and developing a system that possesses the characteristics, principles, 
and implied conceptualization that have been theorized for a CASoS. This challenging 
endeavor involves the engineering of a system of constituent systems with the three 
primary capabilities outlined in Section C of this chapter: an adaptive architecture, an 
intelligent system of systems, and the capabilities of knowledge discovery and predictive 
analytics. It also involves tailoring these conceptual engineered capabilities to the 
particular problem domain being addressed. 
The second goal of ensuring that the emergent behavior is intentional and desired 
requires several engineered capabilities. These include the architecture of distributed, 
identical, and synchronized intelligence among the constituent systems. This also implies 
shared and synchronized information among the peers. Additionally, each peer must 
produce and maintain a holistic perspective of the CASoS awareness and decisions, so self-




goals of the CASoS. In effect, a CASoS must be engineered to take advantage of its 
complexity while managing unpredictability (Calvano and John 2004). 
The third goal is engineering a CASoS as an evolving system. The purpose of a 
CASoS is to function in complex environments with unforeseeable contingencies. 
Therefore, the SE approach must seek to produce a “system capable of adaptation, change, 
novelty, and even surprise” (Braha, Minai, and Bar-Yam 2006, 9). A couple of CSE 
methods have been proposed to address this challenge. One approach is to design an 
environment or a process instead of a system (Bar-Yam 2003; White 2005). The idea is 
that the environment or process creates a situation for systems to appear and evolve. The 
Internet is an example of this approach. A second idea is to use a principles-oriented 
approach that involves using external influence on a complex system to achieve desired 
behavior and to avoid undesired behavior (Polacek et al. 2012). This method does not rely 
upon a rules-oriented approach to control processes and behavior. One take-away from 
these ideas is that the CASoS adaptive architecture and intelligent agents must be 
engineered to support the participation of new constituent systems and many different 
combinations of constituent system interactions. The large number of interacting 
constituent systems, providing diverse capabilities, will give rise to numerous possible 
multi-level behaviors. This will enable adaptive, evolutionary responses to address highly 
complex problems. A second take-away is that the system of intelligent agents resident in 
the constituent systems must be capable of developing decision options and choosing 
among them in a way that is principles (or mission)-oriented instead of rules-oriented to 
enable responses to unanticipated events in the problem domain. 
2. Necessity of a Top-Down Approach 
In order to produce purposeful emergent behavior and avoid undesired emergent 
behavior, a CASoS solution must be engineered and designed from top-down. Although 
several bottom-up engineering methods have been proposed for engineering complex 
systems, these methods produce systems that will behave in unpredictable ways. Bottom-
up CSE methods are based on the premise that the constituent systems self-organize based 
on their own perspective and prioritization of actions, rather than with a holistic SoS 
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perspective. A bottom-up method would produce a complex system of constituent systems 
that self-organize and interact with each other based on a bottom-up perspective. Therefore, 
the resulting emergent behavior would be based on the interactions of a set of distributed 
systems with limited perspectives of the universal system and wider environment. Each 
system would develop its own internal model of the real world and base its actions on this 
individual knowledge and on its own projected capabilities. Constituent systems could 
perhaps negotiate collaborations with each other, but this would be based upon their own 
narrow world view and missions. A bottom-up engineering method would lead to undesired 
emergent behavior and a set of actions that are not optimized at the holistic SoS level to 
address complex problems. A bottom-up approach would start with each resource and 
determine what small part of the problem it could address. In this approach, an endless 
number of small actions are potentially taken that never fully address the universal problem 
confronted by the SoS (which, for a complex problem, would be changing over time). 
Additionally, undesired emergent behavior could arise from many systems acting and 
interacting in an uncoordinated manner. 
Therefore, a top-down holistic systems engineering approach is required for 
engineering a CASoS. A top-down approach designs a solution with a focus on the overall 
mission and performance objectives. It emphasizes multi-level and multi-mission behavior 
from a holistic perspective. This results in an architectural design that enables both 
collaborative (emergent) and constituent system level behavior to address the problem 
domain.  
3. An Intelligent Distributed Peer Architecture Approach
Vakili, Tabatabaee, and Khorsandi (2012) describe a CSE approach for designing 
a complex SoS comprised of distributed peers that they define as autonomous machines. 
They cite the peer-to-peer architecture in Internet applications as an example, explaining 
that it demonstrates improved performance by providing a large set of contributions from 
constituent assets. They explain that the distributed peers use cooperation policies between 
them to enhance the overall performance. They also propose a method to use incentives for 




A modified version of this approach can be applied to engineering CASoS 
solutions. The idea of a CASoS being comprised of a system of intelligent and distributed 
systems was discussed as a required capability of CASoS in Section C of this chapter. 
Instead of coordinating peer behaviors through incentives, the intelligent agents at each 
peer or constituent system in the CASoS would have already developed an understanding 
of the problem space and the decision space with a holistic perspective of how each peer 
would behave and interact. This approach requires designing the CASoS architecture as 
well as the intelligent agents to support this capability. 
4. Constituent System Considerations 
Dahmann et al. (2008) write that the main challenge of engineering SoS is 
coordinating the use of existing systems to meet stakeholder needs. They point out that the 
systems engineers do not have oversight of the constituent system development efforts, and 
that each has its own management, funding sources, and engineering processes. Thus, a 
bottom-up SoSE process to integrate and interoperate existing systems has generated much 
industry, government, and academic attention. Significant effort has focused on addressing 
the technical challenges of interoperability; however, an equal, if not greater, effort has 
focused on overcoming the acquisition, management, and governance challenges. This 
dissertation acknowledges these issues, but focuses solely on the technical aspects of 
engineering the constituent systems. 
The overall success of a CASoS to address complex problems relies on the ability 
to combine the individual functional and performance capabilities of numerous and diverse 
constituent systems. These capabilities can be viewed as resources for the CASoS. An ideal 
approach to benefit from the diverse capabilities is to allow a combination of legacy 
(already-existing), in-development, and future systems to participate in a CASoS. This can 
only be possible if the CASoS architecture and system of intelligent agents are engineered 
to accommodate this diversity. The proposed approach to accomplish this, while still 
meeting the theoretical characteristics and principles of a CASoS, is to embed the 
intelligent agent in each constituent system. The intelligent agent would then perform the 
control and management functions of the individual systems as well as synchronize 
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decisions and share information with the other intelligent agents in the CASoS. Therefore, 
in order for a constituent system to be a member of a CASoS, it must have an embedded 
intelligent agent. 
5. A Continuous Design Approach
CASoS must adapt and evolve in order to effectively address a changing problem 
space. The CASoS does this through its engineered capabilities (an adaptive architecture 
and system of intelligent constituent systems) and through a revolutionary systems 
engineering approach in which design and development are continuous (or living) 
processes throughout the CASoS life cycle. As shown in Figure 46, the initial CASoS 
architecture and intelligent agents are designed and embedded into legacy constituent 
systems similarly to a traditional SE process. However, during CASoS operations, a 
process of continuous needs analysis continues to occur. This is possible because of the 
CASoS abilities to perceive and study the problem domain and constantly develop course 
of action options. Thus, the CASoS has a built-in ability to anticipate future events in the 
problem domain and to predict gaps in its own resource capabilities. This continuous 
analysis provides the real-time ability to reorganize (or redesign) itself to exhibit 
intentional behavior and the longer-term ability to identify additional resources that could 





Figure 46.  CASoS Systems Engineering Process Compared to a  
Traditional Systems Engineering Process 
E. CASoS SYSTEMS ENGINEERING APPROACH 
This section presents the CASoS Systems Engineering (SE) approach. This process 
is a result of the grounded theory advanced coding process, which studied the implications 
of the CASoS theory on the CASoS systems engineering approach. The guidelines 
presented in section D of this chapter are results of this advanced coding process. The 
CASoS SE approach is based on those guidelines. 
The CASoS SE approach is top-down, beginning by articulating mission objectives 
of the CASoS as a whole system solution and designing the CASoS architecture, intelligent 
agents, and constituent systems from this holistic perspective. The SE process, illustrated 
in Figure 47, provides a methodology to address the challenging engineering aspects of a 
CASoS, which include developing an adaptive architecture and system of intelligent 
decision systems which continues to evolve as the problem space evolves. The figure 
illustrates that the problem space continues to change and evolve and that an ongoing 
recursive process of needs analysis, design, development, test, and evaluation need to 
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continue in parallel with CASoS operations. These recursive development cycles produce 
additional constituent systems and updates to the intelligent agent. 
Figure 47.  The CASoS Systems Engineering Process 
1. Initial CASoS Development Phase
An initial CASoS is designed, developed, and evaluated during the initial 
development phase of the CASoS SE process. This initial CASoS is a fully functional 
solution system with an adaptive architecture and intelligent agents integrated into an initial 
set of constituent systems. The initial set of constituent systems may include legacy and 
newly developed systems. The initial phase is a top-down process of needs analysis, 
conceptual design, detailed design, development, test and evaluation. 
a. CASoS Needs Analysis and Conceptual Design
The initial SE phase begins with the conceptualization of the problem and solution 
domain in the context of a CASoS. This top-down needs analysis and conceptualization 




characterization of the problem domain in terms of complexity factors and a solution 
conceptualized as a CASoS. Conceptualization provides a holistic foundation for tailoring 
the CASoS design to fit the given highly complex problem. Figure 48 shows the steps 
involved in the needs analysis and conceptual design. The ensuing discussion describes the 
activities in each step of Figure 48. 
 
Figure 48.  CASoS Initial Needs Analysis and Conceptual Design 
A first step is to define the real-world domain in terms of systems. Resources and 
assets that play a role in addressing the problem space must be identified and defined in 
terms of systems. These resources and assets may already exist, may be currently in 
development, or may be identified as future capabilities that are needed. This process of 
identifying systems does two things: (1) it begins the process of understanding what 
capabilities exist and are needed to address the problem domain; and, (2) it identifies the 
constituent systems that will comprise the CASoS conceptual design. It begins the process 
of analyzing interactions (through their boundaries, inputs, and outputs), and functional 
135 
performance, and behavioral capabilities. Expected performance as well as performance 
gaps can be identified and evaluated. To posit the domain in terms of systems, supports the 
definition of the basic building blocks (constituent systems) of the CASoS, which also 
provides a starting point for CASoS architecting. It provides a method for identifying 
which systems will be information producers and receivers and for understanding the 
actions (behaviors) they are capable of performing individually. It also supports the process 
of identifying collective SoS behaviors and actions that can enhance performance to 
address the problem domain. Further, it supports the definitions of the intelligent agent, 
knowledge discovery, and predictive analytic capabilities. 
A second step is to view the real-world domain holistically—with the goal of 
understanding the problem space as a whole in order to engineer the CASoS solution from 
the top down. Characterizing the domain will identify high level operational objectives for 
the CASoS solution and will begin the process of understanding how to design CASoS 
intelligent agents that can create an internal model of the domain. This will support the 
engineering of the constituent systems’ ability to develop decision options (and evaluate 
these options) from a holistic view—determining what the individual and collective actions 
of the CASoS should be. The ability for the constituent systems to view the problem 
domain holistically allows them to look at the entire spectrum of problem entities, events, 
and dynamics to develop holistic SoS-level behavioral responses by the solution. It enables 
them to define the solution response in terms of the problem as a whole. They must develop 
and maintain an internal model of the entire domain, including the problem space and 
solution space. This holistic view will allow them to predict the performance of the CASoS 
to address the problem and adjust the CASoS behavior as needed at each level.  
A third step is to develop the decision scope as an initial effort to define the adaptive 
boundary of the domain. An initial definition of a decision boundary provides a starting 
point for conceptualizing the complexity of the problem and solution spaces. This initial 
boundary captures all aspects of the problem space (expected entities, events, etc.) and 
solution space (existing resources, assets, and systems). The domain boundary will change, 
but once the initial boundary is established, the changes in the domain boundary can be 




of the real world domain through the initial establishment of the domain boundary. The 
CASoS internal model reflects the establishment and maintenance of this domain boundary 
by establishing the decision space.  
Continued study of Figure 49 shows that the lower half of the figure depicts the 
decision space. The decision space contains internal models of the problem space 
(reflecting the complex environment) and the solution space (reflecting what is known 
about the constituent systems and their capabilities and expected performance). Viewing 
the decision space as a system supports an understanding of the decision boundary and a 
clear definition of inputs, outputs and what information needs to be considered as decisions 
for courses of action are made. The decision space is flexible—adapting as the situation in 
the real world domain changes. For example, as a new system joins the CASoS as a 
constituent system or as a new event occurs within the problem domain, this is reflected in 
the decision space. 
 
Figure 49.  Establishing the Domain Boundary and the 
Decision Boundary 
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The final step in CASoS needs analysis and conceptual design is defining the 
solution space as a CASoS solution. The earlier steps articulate the problem space and 
decision space. This step develops a conceptualization of the solution as a CASoS system 
of decision systems. Figure 50 illustrates the CASoS as a system of constituent systems 
interacting with a connected architecture to collectively produce and manage an internal 
model of the real world. The figure shows the system of interacting decision spaces—each 
containing a representation (internal model) of the real world domain, developing course 
of action decisions for the CASoS with a holistic perspective, and determining effective 
actions at the system level and emergent behavior level to best address the problem domain. 




Once the solution is conceptualized as a CASoS, a set of design requirements and 
measures of performance must be developed. The requirements will guide the CASoS 
design process and the measures of performance will guide the test and evaluation process. 
b. CASoS SE Approach: Initial Design 
The next part of the CASoS SE approach is the initial design of the CASoS solution 
space. The design phase has the following inputs as shown in Figure 51: a characterization 
of the problem domain, identification of resources and assets of the solution domain, and 
initial boundaries for the real-world decision problem and solution domain as well as the 
internal model decision domain. A design for the CASoS architecture and intelligent agents 
is developed. This holistic design is based on desired functionality and performance for the 
CASoS as a whole to address the expected problem domain. An evaluation of the legacy 
resources determines whether additional resources are needed to meet the required 
performance.  
 
Figure 51.  CASoS SE Design Approach Steps  
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The adaptive architecture design must include information management for sharing, 
storing, and processing data and knowledge; methods for communicating with new 
constituent systems as CASoS boundaries change; and interaction mechanisms that support 
different levels of communication and collaboration. The design of the CASoS intelligent 
agents must include a common set of data analytics to develop knowledge of the real world 
(both the problem and solution domains), develop internal models, develop multi-level 
decision options, synchronize knowledge and decisions, and predict effects of actions. The 
design needs to include a continuous process of information sharing and synchronization 
among the constituent systems that supports continuity among the internal models and 
decisions. Figure 52 illustrates a set of constituent systems that are collaborating (and 
participating in) as a CASoS. The black upper halves of each constituent system represent 
the embedded intelligent agents and how they connect to form a CASoS. The CASoS 
agents work together and interact to form and continuously update a shared internal model 
of the operational domain. They develop COA decisions at the CASoS level that are based 
on what set of collaborative and independent behaviors of each constituent system are most 
effective to address the problem domain. 
Figure 52.  Conceptualization of CASoS: Adaptive Architecture and 
Intelligent Agents 
Performance prediction is the analysis of the CASoS functional and performance 
capabilities based on the many combinations of independent and collaborative behaviors 
possible. This analysis explores the possible multi-level and multi-minded capabilities that 




development. This process identifies performance gaps to determine what additional 
resources (or additional constituent systems) need to be developed for the CASoS to 
address the problem space.  
c. CASoS SE Approach: Development, Test, and Evaluation 
CASoS development, test, and evaluation phase has four primary tasks: to develop 
the CASoS architecture and intelligent agents, to retrofit legacy resources (creating 
constituent systems), to develop new constituent systems, and to perform test and 
evaluation. Figure 53 illustrates these tasks, showing that designs and analysis results are 
the inputs to this process and that the output is the initial operational version of the CASoS 
solution system. 
 
Figure 53.  CASoS SE Development Approach Steps 
The initial CASoS must have a fully functional adaptive architecture and initial 




problem space changes over time, additional resources may be needed. As new constituent 
systems are developed and added to the CASoS, they will generate additional data and 
produce additional functional and performance capabilities. The CASoS architecture and 
intelligent agents must be able to accommodate these additions, relying on their holistic 
and future-minded design—emphasizing adaptation and evolution.  
Legacy, or existing, resources are retrofitted with a CASoS intelligent agent that 
replaces the existing situational awareness, control, and decision functions. Integrating the 
CASoS intelligent agent into existing resources transforms them into CASoS constituent 
systems. Equipped with an intelligent agent, these systems are then capable of fully 
participating as part of the CASoS. It enables them to purposefully self-organize to 
collaborate with other constituent systems. 
Constituent systems can be developed from scratch as additional resources may 
have been identified as required to address the problem space. These newly developed 
systems are designed to provide needed functional and performance capabilities. Their 
original design will be based on the CASoS intelligent agent providing the situational 
awareness, control, and decision functions. 
The initial testing will evaluate the CASoS based on the original characterization 
of the problem space. Therefore, it will evaluate how well the initial CASoS addresses the 
problem space as it was understood initially, or as it was initially projected to be. However, 
as the nature of highly complex problems changes over time, the process of test and 
evaluation must be a living process that is continuously evolving to evaluate the 
performance of the CASoS against a changing problem. This evolution will occur in the 
adaptive phase. This initial phase provides a test and evaluation starting point. 
2. Adaptive Phase: Continuous Operations and Development 
The CASoS SE process must be adaptive to enable the CASoS to evolve as the 
problem domain evolves. The changing problem domain may require additional 
performance and functionality. Thus, the development processes of needs analysis, design, 
and evaluation must be continuously performed in parallel with CASoS operations. This 




constituent systems and updates to the intelligent agent throughout the life cycle of the 
CASoS. 
At the start of the adaptive phase, the initial CASoS becomes operational. It uses 
its decision-making capability to perform its purposeful multi-level and multi-minded 
behavior. This capability is inherent to the CASoS as a result of the adaptive architecture 
and system of intelligent constituent systems. The capabilities of the CASoS inherently 
produce a decision-making system that has self-awareness and situational awareness and 
can be thought of as a system that is able to effective reorganize or redesign itself in real-
time. It uses its knowledge to design the solution space that addresses the complex problem. 
It decides effective behaviors of its parts and interactions to produce desired multi-level 
and multi-minded actions. The CASoS configures and reconfigures itself to provide 
intentional actions that can be reactive, proactive, and/or preemptive. 
Although this capability is inherent to the CASoS, it supports a new paradigm of 
adaptive systems engineering—basically engineering or designing itself during operations 
to produce adaptive behavior in response to a changing problem domain. 
The CASoS built-in abilities to gain situational awareness and anticipate future 
events in the problem space enable them to continuously perform a needs analysis. In 
addition to developing near-term course of action options, they also analyze their own 
future resource needs to address the anticipated future environment. This information can 
be used to identify new resources needed for the CASoS. Additional resources can be added 
as constituent systems if they are designed to participate and become embedded with the 
CASoS intelligent agent. This is essentially a process of continuous design, development, 
test, and evaluation of possible updates to the intelligent agent and additional constituent 
systems to address the changing problem space. This process of acquiring additional 
constituent systems allows the CASoS to adapt to the changing problem space and to 





VI. VALIDATION OF THE CASoS THEORY 
A. INTRODUCTION 
This chapter presents an application of the CASoS solution in a modeling and 
simulation environment to validate the CASoS theory. Analysis of the outcomes of the 
modeling and simulation effort supports the grounded theory validation methodology in 
terms of fit, relevancy, workability, and modifiability.  
The naval tactical domain provides a highly complex operational environment that 
is conducive for demonstrating the application of the CASoS approach. Section B discusses 
the characteristics of this problem domain and describes the challenges that this specific 
scenario poses to existing traditionally engineered naval systems. It describes how the 
CASoS approach would apply to the naval tactical domain and compares the CASoS 
approach with the existing traditionally engineered “baseline” approach. Section C 
presents the modeling and simulation experimentation effort and associated analyses to 
compare the CASoS and baseline approaches to challenges in the naval tactical domain. 
Section D concludes this chapter, with how the simulation analysis of the naval tactical 
domain problem validates the CASoS grounded theory. 
B. APPLYING THE CASOS THEORY AND APPROACH TO THE NAVAL 
TACTICAL DOMAIN 
The naval tactical domain encompasses naval assets in the maritime environment 
that are engaged in combat. The situation can very quickly and unexpectedly escalate into 
a highly complex environment, as in the case of an unconventional or surprise attack, or 
more slowly as tension builds with a known adversary. Offensive measures can also initiate 
a tactical situation. The naval tactical domain can occur in deep water or in a littoral region 
and can involve threats and assets in the sea, air, space, cyberspace, underwater, and on 
land. The domain can include affected civilians and participating coalition partners. 
Actions and events in the tactical domain include threats, countermeasures, evasion, 
retaliation, defensive and offensive measures, stealth, sensing and tracking, jamming, 




that are in a state of combat readiness—either in a defensive or offensive posture—
preparing for a warfighting situation. In this tactical domain, the actual warfighting is a 
fraction in duration of strategic campaigns and often spans a smaller area that is part of a 
larger theater of war. 
1. The Naval Tactical Domain Presents a Highly Complex Environment 
Naval tactical warfare is highly complex (Bar-Yam 2004). Table 14 summarizes 
how the naval tactical domain exhibits characteristics of a highly complex operational 
environment that requires a CASoS solution. The naval tactical domain is comprised of 
potentially large numbers of diverse, distributed, and often interrelated threat objects and 
events. Examples of adversarial threats include ships, aircraft, missiles, countermeasures, 
submarines, decoys, surveillance systems, and cyber means. Threat events include weapon 
deployment, asset placement, sensing, jamming, and hacking. The enemy is generally 
attempting to increase its tactical advantage by avoiding detection, presenting a false 
depiction of its location and capabilities, and attempting to outmaneuver and overwhelm 
our military forces (Hughes and Girrier 2018). 
Table 14.   Highly Complex Characteristics of the Naval Tactical Operational 
Environment 
Characteristics of Highly 
Complex Environments 
Naval Tactical Environment 
Large numbers of objects/events/
features 
The naval tactical environment contains 
potentially large numbers of: 
Objects: threat assets (ships, aircraft, missiles, 
weapons, countermeasures, underwater assets, 
space assets) 
Events: weapon deployment, asset placement, 
sensing, jamming, decoys) 
Features: weather, geographical features, civilians  
Heterogeneity and/or diversity of 
environment of objects/events/
features 
Adversarial threats in the naval environment can 
be very diverse and span multiple mission areas 
(undersea, surface, air, cyberspace, and space): 
submarines, mines, ships, aircraft, UAVs, 
satellites, and many diverse kinds of sensing and 
weapon assets. Events and features are also 
diverse. 
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Characteristics of Highly 
Complex Environments 
Naval Tactical Environment 
Geographically distributed Objects/events/features in the naval environment 
are widely distributed—both horizontally across 
the sea and littoral surface and vertically 
underwater and in the air and space. 
Diverse kinematics among objects 
in the environment 
Objects in the naval environment can present 
highly diverse kinematics—undersea, on the 
surface, and in the air/space. 
Environment’s objects/events/
features are highly interrelated and/
or highly related to the solution 
Adversarial objects and events are often related 
and causal; the maritime environmental features 
play a large role in affecting both adversarial and 
blue force actions; and adversarial weapons and 
countermeasures can directly affect blue force 
systems. 
Highly dynamic/rapid tempo of 
change 
Events can vary widely in tempo, rapid events 
(weapon strikes) occur. 
Uniqueness of situations or states The combination of a large variety of objects/
events/features create a continuum of unique 
situations (environments) that are novel, 
changing, and never-before-encountered. 
Severe consequences of 
environment behaviors and events 
Consequences include warfighter casualties, 
civilian casualties, destruction of military & 
civilian assets, negative consequences to DIME 
initiatives. 
Unexpected and rapid shifts in 
states (unanticipated events); 
behaviorally unpredictable 
Adversarial intent includes surprise attacks, 
stealth location, denied access, distributed assets, 
obfuscation; unintended consequences. 
Unknowable—difficult to gain 
accurate and complete situational 
awareness 
Combat identification and the tactical picture are 
challenging pursuits involving sensors, 
communications, and processing 
Accompanied by constraints, rules, 
and parameters on behavioral 
responses 
Rules of engagement, tactics/techniques/
procedures, no-fly zones, civilian population 
avoidance 
The tactical domain is constantly changing and presenting a continuum of unique 
operational environments. Many tactical objects are in motion, have dynamic interactions, 
and are surrounded by both fixed and changing environmental features. The climate, 
weather, atmosphere, humidity, sea states, hydrography, and topography can affect sensor 
and weapon performance and affect the ability to gain situational awareness. Nearby urban 




dynamics of combat. These features contribute to creating a dynamic and complex 
environment. 
The tactical domain is unpredictable and often challenging in terms of gaining 
complete and accurate situational knowledge. Adversaries purposely attempt to create a 
fog of war to confuse naval forces (Hughes 2000). Methods include unexpected attacks, 
stealth, denied access, distributed assets, decoys countermeasures, and cyber actions. 
Gaining and maintaining shared battlespace awareness, or “collective consciousness 
among the elements of the warfighting ecosystem” (Alberts, Garstka, and Stein 2000, 135) 
is a critical enabler of tactical effectiveness. Human warfighters must manage uncertainty 
in the data collected by sensors and processed. Often the uncertainty, coupled with the 
amount and diversity of information and the shortened decision timescales, overwhelms 
human cognitive abilities (Talbot and Ellis 2015). 
Complexity in the tactical environment can also a result in severe and dire 
consequences. Devastating results can include warfighter casualties, civilian casualties, 
and destruction of military and civilian assets. The severity of consequences places a 
criticality on tactical responses and actions that increases complexity for decision-making.  
2. The Highly Complex Naval Tactical Domain Overwhelms Existing 
Solution Approaches  
The Navy has the mission of preparing its forces to achieve and maintain tactical 
superiority. In practice, this involves understanding and anticipating the tactical 
environment and adversarial threat. The Navy has recognized the tactical environment’s 
growing complexity and actively seeks engineering and technology solutions to address 
this challenge. Figure 54 highlights some of the limitations of current naval tactical systems 
when faced with complex problems within the tactical operational environment. Worst-
case examples are when naval forces cannot defend against threats that are unexpected, too 
fast moving, or too-numerous; or friendly fire incidents when civilians or blue force 
partners are mistaken for threats. These situations arise when the reaction time is too short, 





Figure 54.  Limitations of Existing Naval Approaches to Address the 
Complex Tactical Domain 
Two types of naval capabilities limit overall tactical ability: the performance of 
individual resources (sensor detection range, sensor resolution, sensor multi-function 
ability, weapon range, weapon accuracy, weapon destructive ability, etc.) and the decision 
making process, which relies on the naval architecture, to use these individual assets most 
effectively. Improving these capabilities is a critical part of achieving tactical success. 
Current naval approaches rely on a combination of human decision-making and 
automated processes to make tactical decisions. The process of threat detection, involving 
collecting and processing sensor data, is largely automated. However, humans play a role 
in threat identification. Fully automated engagement decisions are possible for air and 
missile self-defense on some naval ships—this capability (using the Aegis weapon system) 
is platform-centric, relying on only resident (or organic) sensors and weapons (Young 
2004b). However, in general, engagement decisions rely on manual decision-making, 
groups of decision-makers, and significant negotiation between humans on the multiple 




collaborative engagements involving distributed platforms, such as the ability for a weapon 
to be fired based on remote data (the Navy Integrated Fire Control—Counter Air (NIFC-
CA) program plans to use Cooperative Engagement Capability (CEC) data from a remote 
aircraft sensor to provide tracking data to support a weapon system on a ship). However, 
these capabilities are currently limited to threat cues (Young 2005). These cues provide an 
alert, identifying the existence of an incoming threat. The weapon platform must still use 
its resident (organic) sensor to detect and track the threat to provide this data to the weapon 
system (Young 2005). Thus, the current use of naval weapon systems for air and missile 
defense is a largely platform-centric capability. As tactical warfare missions become more 
complex, human decision-makers become overwhelmed by information uncertainty, 
diversity, and overload and by the challenge of identifying effective decision options 
involving distributed warfare assets (Miller 2019). The time-critical nature of many tactical 
warfare missions often provides only minutes to make these complex decisions (Treadway 
2019). 
3. A CASoS Solution to the Naval Tactical Domain 
This section describes how a CASoS approach would be implemented in the naval 
tactical domain. The CASoS approach would identify the systems in the tactical realm that 
constitute constituent systems. For this domain, the constituent systems would be the 
distributed warfare assets: platforms (ships, aircraft, submarines, helicopters, etc.), 
weapons, sensors, jammers, decoys, countermeasures, and other resources that contribute 
to tactical operations. The CASoS approach would reengineer these existing assets by 
implementing an adaptive architecture to support enhanced interaction and collaboration 
and embedding each platform with an intelligent agent (software and computing 
environment) for enhanced decision-making. Figure 55 provides a high-level illustration 
of a future CASoS approach with an adaptive architecture connecting distributed naval 
assets that are embedded with intelligent agents. The CASoS approach would maximize 
the use of the distributed warfare assets by requiring the means for purposeful, adaptive, 





Figure 55.  Illustration of the CASoS Architecture and Intelligent Agents 
Embedded in Naval Tactical Systems 
The mission-oriented SoS approach designs constituent systems to meet the 
required capabilities of the SoS, as a whole, to address different missions (Silva, Batista, 
and Oquendo 2015, Giachetti 2015). The CASoS approach enables a mission-oriented 
approach during the design phase as well as during operations. The naval CASoS approach, 
as illustrated in Figure 55, provides the capabilities desired in mission-oriented SoS—to 
identify what desired behaviors are needed from the constituent systems according to 
overall mission needs. The CASoS intelligent agents and adaptive architecture enable the 
constituent systems to individually and collectively self-organize to address naval missions 
adaptively and in near-real-time during operations. 
The following subsections describe how the CASoS engineering framework would 
shape the capabilities that are necessary to address the operational challenges in this 
specific instantiation of the naval tactical domain. As such, a notional solution is presented 
in a modeling and simulation environment for a comparative analysis with a baseline 
solution. 
a. Naval Tactical CASoS Adaptive Architecture 
The CASoS adaptive architecture connects the distributed warfare platforms and 




and knowledge so each intelligent agent can develop and maintain both situational 
awareness and self-awareness. The architecture shares data between them to support 
synchronization of these internal models and synchronization of the COA decision options. 
The architecture enables the distributed warfare assets to collaborate to an automated 
degree that is not currently possible. As a CASoS, the distributed warfare assets are 
effectively managed as if they were all collocated on one ship or aircraft. The CASoS 
architecture, as illustrated in Figure 56, enables the distributed ships and aircraft to truly 
become a fully integrated system of systems.  
 
Figure 56.  Adaptive Architecture with Embedded Intelligent Agents 
The CASoS architecture enables the naval battle group to adapt as a whole to the 
dynamic threat environment through the interaction of the distributed ships and aircraft. 
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Enabling these interactions creates many more permutations of possible force-level 
behaviors—limited only by the number and types of warfare assets participating. 
The CASoS architecture supports the changing boundary of this solution system. 
For the naval tactical domain, warfare assets (constituent systems) can join (or leave) the 
CASoS as new aircraft or ships move near (or away from) a CASoS or as assets are 
damaged or destroyed during combat. 
The CASoS architecture provides interaction mechanisms for the naval tactical 
domain to support collaborative operations. For integrated fire control, in which distributed 
weapons and sensor participate in an engagement, the architecture provides “handshakes” 
of commitment between these assets to support the collaboration for the duration of the 
engagement. Participation from a remote sensor may include providing a precision cue that 
detects the threat, fire control quality data to the weapon system, in-flight-target-updates 
to a missile interceptor in flight, or illumination of a target for endgame missile guidance. 
The CASoS architecture must support the following types of adaptation: 
• Adaptation in the relationships of the warfare resources, resulting in multi-
level and multi-minded responsiveness (at system level and force level).
• Adaptation as changes occur for the rules, doctrine, plans, and polices
governing tactical missions and engagements.
• Adaptation in the level of collaboration:  formation of new SoSs, addition
or deletion of systems from a collaborative SoS, different levels of
collaboration within a SoS.
b. Naval Tactical CASoS System of Intelligent Constituent Systems
In the naval tactical CASoS solution, an identical intelligent agent is embedded in 
each distributed warfare platform (ship, aircraft, submarine, etc.). The intelligent agents 
work together to develop shared knowledge and collaborative decisions regarding tactical 
courses of action (COA). Through this system of intelligent constituent systems approach, 
the CASoS empowers each platform—giving each a “god’s eye” view of the operational 




warfare resources (shared self-awareness). With this knowledge, each platform develops 
force-level COAs—meaning they can collectively use their distributed warfare resources 
from a holistic perspective. The adaptive architecture allows the intelligent agents to share 
data, information, knowledge, and decisions (COAs), so that COAs are synchronized and 
coordinated across the CASoS. Figure 57 is a context diagram of the CASoS intelligent 
agent—showing high level functionality, external interactions, and interactions with the 
other CASoS intelligent agents. 
 
 
Figure 57.  CASoS Intelligent Agent Context Diagram 
By avoiding a central warfare decision-maker, the CASoS approach of distributing 
intelligence allows each warfare platform to participate collaboratively as a strike group or 
to operate independently when stealth or “emissions control” operations are tactically 
advantageous. Figure 57 shows that each intelligent agent develops internal models, 
performs mission and threat evaluation, performs wargaming (predictive analytics), and 
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uses the analysis results to manage the distributed warfare resources by developing COA 
tasks. The models, analysis, wargaming, and COA tasks are synchronized with the other 
participating intelligent agents within the CASoS.  
Several domain specific aspects of the naval tactical environment contribute to 
CASoS complexity. One aspect is a dynamic feedback loop that exists between the warfare 
resources and the intelligent agents. Tactical sensors, for example, provide the primary 
source of data and information by which the intelligent agents develop knowledge and 
make decisions. These sensors are also resources that are managed by the intelligent agents. 
Another aspect is that many warfare resources are multi-functional and multi-mission. 
Some tactical sensors have the ability to sense the environment for broad area coverage 
and threat detection, focus their energy on a specific target for higher resolution and higher 
update rate tracking, and illuminate threat targets to support endgame weapons guidance. 
In a highly complex operational environment, warfare resources may be in high demand 
and choices will have to be made about how best to use them. 
c. Naval Tactical Knowledge Discovery and Predictive Analytics
Discovering knowledge (or gaining battlespace awareness) and predicting 
outcomes of actions are both key to a CASoS solution to the naval tactical domain. CASoS 
knowledge discovery is the attainment and management of knowledge of the entire domain 
(both problem space and solution space) within the naval tactical decision space. This 
includes situational awareness (knowledge of the operational environment or problem 
space) and self-awareness (knowledge of all the assets and resources comprising the 
solution space). The CASoS knowledge is shared and synchronized among constituent 
systems to ensure that each constituent has the same knowledge. Figure 58 illustrates 





Figure 58.  CASoS Internal Models for Knowledge Discovery 
The four blocks on the left side of Figure 58 describe types of situational awareness 
information concerning the problem domain. For the naval tactical domain, this includes: 
a “track picture” or representation of objects (ships, aircraft, drones, submarines, missiles, 
etc.) in the environment. CASoS intelligent agents would process, fuse, and analyze 
different types of data to determine the location, kinematics, and identification of the 
objects. The intelligent agents would perform object identification (i.e., friendly, neutral, 
or adversarial), object intent (i.e., neutral or hostile), and object attribution (identifying 
which country or organization it belongs to). The intelligent agents would develop an 
internal model of the environment for the region of interest to be considered for calculating 
environmental effects on resource capability predictions. The intelligent agents would 
develop a predictive model of the adversary’s situational awareness—the adversary’s 
internal model —to support wargaming analysis. 
The right side of Figure 58 shows three types of information that contribute to 
shared self-awareness: knowledge of the distributed warfare assets within the CASoS, 
knowledge of rules and policies affecting the CASoS, and knowledge of defended assets 
within the area of interest. By developing an internal model of the participating distributed 
warfare resources, each intelligent agent is able to manage CASoS resources with a “god’s 
eye” perspective. This opens up a much larger selection of behavior based on the many 
combinations of interactions between distributed resources that can produce desired 
155 
emergent behavior. Managing knowledge pertaining to rules and policies that guide 
allowable courses of action ensures that the tactical operations are compliant. Keeping 
track of defended assets within the area of interest supports courses of action that maximize 
objectives. In a highly contested area, if resources are limited, the CASoS can prioritize 
engagements to defend the highest value targets.  
Conceptually, the CASoS acquires data from CASoS sensor assets as well as from 
data and information sources external to the CASoS. This data is shared among the 
constituent system intelligent agents. The intelligent agents perform data fusion and 
processing and the adaptive architecture supports synchronization among the agents to 
develop the shared internal models. The intelligent agents analyze these models for 
uncertainty and incompleteness. The results of this analysis are used to update the tasking 
of sensor assets—to collect more data for specific objects or regions to improve the 
uncertainty or incompleteness in the situational awareness. Thus, the CASoS process of 
developing situational awareness is an adaptive process of managing knowledge 
uncertainty through continuous analysis and sensor feedback tasking. 
CASoS predictive analytics (PA) provides a real-time wargaming capability to 
assess decision options during all phases of tactical operations: for force readiness, 
offensive operations, and even during defensive and combat operations when the decision 
reaction time is very short. The CASoS PA concept is illustrated in Figure 59. The PA is a 
set of data analytics that assess decision options based on knowledge and information from 
the internal models. The PA capability produces assessments of COA decision options. 
Input to the CASoS PA capability includes COA decision options and knowledge 
from the internal models of the operational environment (situational awareness and the 
environmental model), self-awareness, defended assets, and the prediction of the 
adversary’s picture. The PA capability uses this information to predict and assess the 





Figure 59.  Predictive Analytics for a Naval Tactical CASoS 
PA assessments include predicting environmental effects on the COAs based on the 
current and projected weather, turbulence, sea states, day/night condition and atmospheric 
conditions. They may also include the prediction of adversarial electronic warfare, 
jamming, and clutter conditions based on possible adversary capabilities. Environmental 
effects can greatly influence sensor performance and can therefore be used to assess the 
sensor tasking options. Environmental effects can also affect weapon selection—weapons 
that depend on sensors may diminished performance in certain conditions. Directed energy 
weapons performance is largely affected by environmental effects. Weapons may be 
affected by possible adversarial jamming or countermeasures. 
PA assessment includes the performance projection of warfare assets. The PA 
capability would assess COA options based on the warfare resource internal model of self-
awareness. For example, from this knowledge, the PA could calculate the probability of 
detection or probability of kill based on sensor or weapon status, location, and expected 
capability performance.  
The PA capability could perform longer-term assessment of CASoS force 
readiness. This prediction capability would coordinate tactical readiness with planning and 
strategic goals. The PA could predict the adversary’s projected capabilities and intent and 
then develop and assess longer-term tactical plans and strategies to prepare warfare 
resources (sensor coverage, weapons load-out), platform locations, stealth and emission 
control operations, and overall force readiness. 
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The PA capability could also provide a real-time tactical wargaming capability that 
adds strategic thinking to time critical tactical operations. PA wargaming would predict the 
effects of COA options—predicting adversarial responses based on the estimated 
adversarial internal model (situational awareness of the blue forces), strategies, and 
capabilities. Predicted adversarial responses could be taken into account in the selection of 
COA alternatives. PA wargaming would also assess COA alternatives to determine which 
has the highest probability of success and the best chance of protecting defended assets. 
Consequence prediction and assessment would provide additional insight into the selection 
of COAs for tactical operations.  
4. Comparison of the CASoS Approach to the Existing Naval Tactical
Approach
There are several major differences between the existing approach to naval tactical 
operations and the proposed CASoS approach. The existing approach has evolved over 
many years as technology has advanced and as the threat space has changed. Warfare assets 
have been developed to be largely platform-centric—meaning that the sensors and weapons 
on a given aircraft or ship platform have been designed to be highly integrated with each 
other and the platform to coordinate their functions to support the missions of that platform. 
As an example, on some ship platforms, there are automated modes (using the AEGIS 
weapon system) in which defensive weapons can be automatically fired based on threat 
detection and identification from sensors onboard the same platform. This has resulted in 
a platform-centric paradigm for naval tactical operations with each platform designed to 
maximize its performance based on its individual missions (Treadway 2019, Johnson, 
Green, and Canfield 2001). The commanding officer of the USS Howard destroyer, CDR 
John Fay (2014) explained that strike group collaboration primarily occurs through mission 
planning with the battlegroup commander assigning a mission to each ship. Fay (2014) 
explained that a current short-coming is that when each ship receives its mission, only a 
subset of the ship’s warfare assets is needed for the mission, leaving the other assets under-
utilized. Fay (2014) acknowledged the potential benefits that could be gained through 
increased collaboration for tactical missions and by using distributed naval assets to 




The CASoS approach shifts this platform-centric paradigm to a force-centric 
paradigm for tactical missions to take advantage of emergent behavior that can result from 
the closely coordinated interactions of the distributed naval platforms. Managing naval 
assets with a force-centric perspective enables emergent tactical behavior—extending the 
warfare capabilities of each individual platform asset—and therefore, creating many more 
defensive and offensive options. This increases overall tactical superiority—especially 
when faced with highly complex threat environments. 
Table 15 compares the existing naval tactical approach with the CASoS approach—
describing differences for specific naval tactical attributes. The current naval tactical 
approach is largely platform-centric (Treadway 2019). The attribute that is most advanced 
in terms of a force-centric capability is situational awareness. The navy has developed a 
number of data architecture approaches to work towards a common tactical picture across 
the battle force. However, the extent to which situational awareness is shared across the 
current battle force is limited (Treadway 2019). Identical and synchronized battle space 
awareness is highly desired by the navy (Treadway 2019). 
Table 15.   Comparison of Existing Naval Tactical Approach with CASoS 
Approach 




develops situational awareness. 
Several different data 
architectures exist that support 
some data sharing between 
platforms. A shared tactical 
picture is limited and does not 
support collaborative 
engagements  
Force-wide (CASoS-wide) shared 
situational awareness is achieved. 
Identical and synchronized 
situational awareness is developed 
and continuously updated and 
managed by the system of 
intelligent constituent distributed 
systems. 
Self-Awareness Platform-centric—each platform 
has knowledge (self-awareness) 
only of its resident (onboard) 
resources. Knowledge of off-
board resources is conducted 
manually by human 
communication between 
platforms. 
Force-wide (CASoS-wide) shared 
self-awareness is an automated 
capability. Knowledge of CASoS 
resources is shared and 
synchronized across the distributed 




Attribute Existing Approach CASoS Approach 
Internal Models Platform-centric; includes shared 
tactical pictures, limited shared 
situational awareness, platform-
centric self-awareness (resource 
pictures), some environmental 
data. 
Force-wide (CASoS-wide) shared 
knowledge: situational awareness 
(track picture, combat 
identification, threat model), self-
awareness (warfare resource 
model), environmental model, 
model of tactical rules and policies, 
defended assets model, adversary 
models.  
Decision Time Platform-centric decision time 
ranges from manual to semi-
automated to fully automated for 
specific tasks on specific 
platforms. Force-level decision 
time (for coordinating distributed 
resources) is manual and requires 
human coordination and 
communication between 
platforms. 
Provides real-time decision options 
that may involve a single platform’s 
resources or the collaboration of 
distributed platform resources. The 
CASoS is constantly developing 
decision options and updating these 
options as new data and knowledge 
is acquired. This maximizes the 
amount of time for reactions and 












Manual, informal  Primary capability of CASoS 
(automated) 
 
The other attributes in Table 15, such as shared self-awareness across distributed 
platforms, internal models, decision time, distributed resource management, and predictive 
analytics are currently largely platform-centric and are conducted informally and manually 
by the warfighters. A CASoS approach would provide these attributes as primary 
capabilities within a force-centric paradigm. 
The CASoS approach offers new capabilities in the naval tactical domain. 
Engineering naval systems as a CASoS provides enhanced force readiness and 
preparedness (sensor coverage, predicted adversarial actions, early detection and 
identification of threats and unknown objects) during all phases of operational 




complex states of the operational environment. It offers a solution capability to manage 
decision complexity, manage distributed resources as a system of systems, and provide a 
PA wargaming capability. Table 16 lists improvements over the traditional solution that 
CASoS enables for naval tactical operations. 
Table 16.   CASoS Improvements for Naval Tactical Operations 
CASoS Improvements for Naval Tactical Operations 
Sensor coverage—extension of range 
Situational awareness accuracy—completeness, less error 
Combat identification—more accurate and timely identification of threats 
More efficient use of sensor coverage (less wasted overlap of sensor detection coverage) 
Earlier threat detection 
Improved threat targeting 
More decision reaction time 
Synchronized track picture and combat identification throughout the force 
Improved force readiness and preparedness 
Improved efficiency of weapons utilization 
Increased probability of raid annihilation 
Improved battle damage assessment 
Integrated fire control 
Improved layered defense 
 
C. A NAVAL TACTICAL MODELING AND SIMULATION ANALYSIS 
COMPARING THE CASOS SOLUTION TO THE EXISTING BASELINE 
APPROACH 
This section presents the results of the modeling and simulation (M&S) analysis of 
the CASoS application to the naval tactical domain. This analysis provides evidentiary 
support that validates the CASoS theory by presenting data results showing tactical 




The M&S analysis was conducted using the Map Aware Non-Uniform Automata 
(MANA) tool. MANA (Lauren and Stephen, 2002) is an agent-based, time-stepped, 
stochastic mission-level modeling environment developed by the New Zealand Defense 
Technology Agency. The MANA modeling environment is based on the ideas of 
complexity science and was developed to represent some of the non-linear dynamics 
inherent in complex combat environments. It accomplishes this by treating many aspects 
of combat behavior as simple rules subject to stochastic random probabilistic processes. 
The model represented abstractions of a complex tactical problem domain and 
naval tactical solution to highlight the differences between a baseline (non-collaborative) 
approach with a CASoS approach. Many aspects of a real-world tactical scenario were 
simplified in the model; however, the model provided further understanding into how the 
collaborative and adaptive behavior of distributed constituent systems produce desired 
emergence. The model did not provide an exact and exhaustive solution to the tactical 
problem domain; but instead, used this complex domain as an example to explore the 
CASoS approach.  
1. CASoS Modeling and Simulation Description 
In order to validate the CASoS theory, the M&S scenario had to contain the 
characteristics of a highly complex operational environment. Table 17 lists the 
characteristics of highly complex operational environments and describes how these 
characteristics are represented in the model’s scenario. 
Table 17.   Characteristics of a Highly Complex Environment Represented in 
the Model 




How the Characteristics are 
Represented in the Model 
Large numbers of objects/events/
features 
Yes A relatively large number of 
red force missile threats 
Heterogeneity and/or diversity of 
environment objects/events/
features 
Yes Multiple types of threats: anti-
ship missiles and anti-aircraft 
missiles 
Geographically distributed Yes The red force launch sites are 








How the Characteristics are 
Represented in the Model 
Diverse kinematics among objects 
in the environment 
Yes Threat missiles are launched 
from different locations and at 
different (random) times—
results in diverse threat 
kinematics 
Environment’s objects/events/
features are highly interrelated 




The threats are aimed at the 
blue forces, thus creating a 
highly interrelated situation 
between the blue force and its 
environment 
Highly dynamic/rapid tempo of 
change 
Yes The kinematics and speed of 
the threats creates a rapidly 
dynamic tempo of events 
Uniqueness of situations or states Yes The randomly generated 
threats create a unique set of 
states in each run of the model 
Severe consequences of 
environment behaviors and events  
Yes The threats can kill blue 
forces if not successfully 
engaged 
Unexpected and rapid shifts in 
states; behaviorally unpredictable 
Yes The threats are unexpected 
and can only be known by the 
blue forces once they enter 
the sensor detection range 
Unknowable—difficult to gain 
accurate situational awareness 
Yes The threats are unknown until 
they enter the detection range 
of the blue force sensors 
Accompanied by constraints, 
rules, and parameters  
Yes The threats cannot be engaged 




The resulting scenario in MANA is a littoral A2/AD missile threat environment 
able to demonstrate the characteristics of a highly complex operational environment. 
Incorporating sea-based and shore-based components enabled the scenario to easily 
represent geographically-distributed red force ships and land-based launchers. This 
allowed the simulation to randomly generate two different types of missile threats being 
fired from distributed locations in relation to the blue force strike group. As listed in Table 
17, this created a model scenario with objects, features, and events that were distributed, 
randomly-generated, unpredictable, kinematically diverse, rapidly occurring, and lethal. 
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The incoming missiles were given an initial set of parameters: number of missiles (32 anti-
ship and 12 anti-aircraft), lethality (0.8), and speed (1111 km/hr anti-ship and 5186 km/hr 
anti-aircraft); which could be increased to represent higher levels of complexity. The initial 
parameters were set so they would present a complex situation without overwhelming and 
quickly annihilating the blue force. The intent was to study how the blue force’s systems 
behavior could address the threat environment as a comparison of a baseline non-CASoS 
set of blue force actions with a CASoS approach of blue force collaborative interactions. 
The randomness of red force missile launches presented unique and unexpected threat 
scenarios for each simulation run. This created an environment that was challenging in 
terms of the blue force’s ability to gain adequate situational awareness and defend with 
engagement weapons. The blue forces were equipped with sensors with set detection 
ranges and weapons with set parameters for engagements. The sensor and weapon 
constraints represented real world limits on the abilities to detect and engage missile 
threats. 
The M&S scenario, illustrated in Figure 60, contains a blue force high value unit 
(HVU) ship escorted by a strike group consisting of six destroyers (DDG), and two airborne 
early warning (AEW) aircraft. Two blue force fighter aircraft happen to be nearby. The 
blue force strike group must safely escort the HVU through highly contested waters. The 
A2/AD littoral region contains a red force with threats consisting of 32 anti-ship missiles 





Figure 60.  Naval Tactical Modeling and Simulation Scenario 
The blue force strike group must traverse the operational area, reach land, and then 
traverse back out of the operational area. The blue force strike group consists of a HVU 
ship, accompanied by six DDGs and two surveillance aircraft (AEW). The blue force is 
also aided by two fighter aircraft that are not initially part of the force group but join in the 
battle. The overall mission objective is for the HVU to safely reach the land and then safely 
traverse back out of the A2/AD region. 
The threat consists of anti-ship missiles which only attack the HVU and DDGs, and 
anti-aircraft missiles which are land-based and only attack the AEWs and fighter aircraft. 
The HVU and destroyers can engage both anti-ship and anti-aircraft red force missiles. The 
fighter aircraft can only engage anti-aircraft red force missiles. 
The blue force strike group moves together at a constant speed and in a constant, 
fixed formation (distances between the ship and aircraft platforms are set and with an 
approximate separation of 20 nautical miles). They are traveling at a higher-than-normal 
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cruising speed of 30 nm/hour as they are in an A2/AD environment. They approach the 
land along a perpendicular trajectory, and then leave the land along the same trajectory. 
The two fighter aircraft move at a higher speed and each enters the scenario at a random 
time after the start. 
Tables 18 and 19 contain the initial model parameters for the blue and red force 
assets. These parameters include the sensor detection ranges, the weapon ranges and 
lethality (probability of kill), and the speeds of the blue force assets. The threat parameters 
include the numbers of missiles, the missile lethality (probability of kill), and the missile 
speeds. 
Table 18.  Initial Model Parameters for Blue Force Assets 







2 100 mi 
range (all 
directions) 
None 300 nmi/hour 
High Value Unit 
(HVU) Ship 
1 30 mi 
range 
Short range weapon: 
20 mi range 
Pkill = 0.9 




6 30 mi 
range 
Long range weapon:  
100 mi range 
Pkill = 0.9 
1 launch per 10 seconds 
30 nmi/hour 
Short range weapon: 
30 mi range 
Pkill = 0.9 
1 launch per second 
Fighter Aircraft 2 30 mi 
range 
AMRAAM: 
30 nmi range 
Pkill = 0.9 
1 launch per 2 seconds 
400 nmi/hour 
JDAM: 
15 nmi range 
Pkill = 0.7 




Table 19.   Initial Model Parameters for Red Force Threats 
Threats Lethality Number Speed 
Anti-Ship Missiles Pkill = 0.8  32 (8 per each of 4 red ships) 1111 km/hr 





Two approaches were modeled: (1) a baseline (or non-CASoS approach) 
representing the current approach to naval tactical operations, and (2) a CASoS alternative 
representing a CASoS approach to naval tactical operations.  
a. Baseline (non-CASoS approach) 
Currently, naval ship and aircraft assets are connected through Link-16, over-the-
horizon message types, chat, message traffic and voice communications (Treadway 2019). 
Miller (2019) explains that a variety of naval decision-makers, including the Joint Interface 
Control Officer (JICO), the Command, Control, Communications, and Computer (C4) 
Officer and the N2 (Naval Intelligence) officer, are equally responsible for ensuring the 
assets work together. The current approach is highly manual and slow in response and 
decision time; and, miscommunication and misunderstanding are rampant (Miller 2019). 
The model represented the naval baseline approach as a set of distributed blue force 
assets without shared situational awareness for this real-time scenario. Each asset used only 
its own organic (or resident) sensor to gain detection of the threat. Further, the distributed 
blue force assets did not coordinate their defensive engagements. Each individual ship and 
fighter aircraft was configured to fire at an enemy threat missile after detection and when 
the threat was within range of its defensive weapon. In the baseline model, the two fighter 
aircraft were configured with random movement, independent situational awareness and 
engagements with red force anti-aircraft missiles. 
b. CASoS Alternative 
In the CASoS alternative, the model was configured to represent a CASoS approach 
to naval warfare. In this model, the distributed blue force assets functioned collaboratively 
as a CASoS. The blue force ships and aircraft have shared situational awareness, meaning 
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that as soon as one of their sensors detects a threat, all of the blue force assets gain this 
knowledge. The blue force also shared self-awareness, or knowledge of each other’s 
weapon capabilities. This is represented in the model as coordinated engagements against 
the threats. This was modeled by selecting the blue force asset closest to the threat to fire 
an engagement shot first and then allowing another asset to fire if the first shot failed. 
In the CASoS alternative model, the two fighter aircraft are initially not part of the 
CASoS. As soon as each fighter aircraft gets within 30 miles of one of the blue force strike 
group’s assets, it becomes part of the CASoS force structure network and gains shared 
situational awareness (both as a contributor of detected threats and as a recipient of the blue 
force’s detected threats). The aircraft joins the formation and changes its speed to cover the 
strike group. Its movement is no longer random, but instead matches the strike group 
movement. The fighter aircraft are equipped with Joint Direct Attack Munitions (JDAM) 
for bombing red force missile launchers and Advanced Medium-Range Air-to-Air Missiles 
(AMRAAM) for engaging anti-aircraft missiles. 
2. How the CASoS Characteristics and Principles are Represented in the
Model
This section describes how the model’s CASoS alternative represents CASoS 
characteristics and principles. The objective of the model was to reflect as many of the 
theoretical CASoS characteristics and principles as possible to study how a CASoS 
approach might improve a complex situation or at least differ from a traditional non-
CASoS approach. The model was able to reflect many of the CASoS characteristics and 
some aspects of all of the CASoS principles.  
The CASoS characteristics that were represented in the model are shaded in yellow 
in Figure 61 and described in more detail in Table 20. Figure 61 shows that most of the 
CASoS characteristics are represented in the model, with the exception of multi-minded 
behavior, evolving behavior, changing internal boundaries, and non-linearity/uncertainty. 
Modeling and studying how these characteristics might improve a solution to highly 
complex scenarios is left for future research. This model focused on demonstrating the 




multi-level (emergent) behavior through distributed and heterogeneous constituent systems 
that form a system of systems with a changing boundary. The model also presented a threat 
environment that required the CASoS to manage detailed and dynamic complexity and to 
demonstrate resilience in terms of providing a defense even when some blue force assets 
might be destroyed. 
 
 
Figure 61.  CASoS Characteristics Represented in the Model 
Table 20 describes how the model was able to represent and demonstrate many of 
the CASoS characteristics. The set of CASoS characteristics contains some characteristics 
that are present in almost all systems and groups of systems (such as openness, constituent 
variety, and purposefulness). Therefore, these more universal characteristics were present 
in both the baseline and CASoS model variants. 
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Table 20.   Descriptions of how CASoS Characteristics are Represented in the 
Model 
CASoS Characteristics 
Represented in the 
Model 
Descriptions of how these Characteristics are Represented in 
the Model 
Openness The blue force strike group is an “open” CASoS because it exchanges 




The CASoS blue force strike group in the model has an architecture that 
is collaborative, adaptive, connected, and distributed. The ships and 
aircraft in the model are geographically distributed but connected as they 
share information concerning situational awareness and self-awareness. 
Their architecture allows them to collaborate to gain shared situational 
awareness and to coordinate engagements. The CASoS architecture in 
the model is adaptive as it “adapts” to include the fighter aircraft when 
they join. 
Behavior The CASoS in the model exhibits the following behavior: multi-level, 
collaborative, purposeful, self-organizing, and adaptive. The model 
CASoS exhibits multi-level and collaborative behavior as constituent 
systems act independently or collaboratively. The CASoS is purposeful 
in terms of exhibiting desired defensive behavior. An example of self-
organization and adaptation is when the fighter aircraft change their 
behavior after joining the CASoS. 
Changing Boundary The CASoS in the model has the characteristic of changing boundary. 
The boundary of the CASoS changes as the fighter aircraft join the 
CASoS. 
Constituent Variety The CASoS in the model has constituent variety, as it consists of 
different types of constituent systems: DDGs, AEWs, and fighter aircraft. 




The CASoS in the model exhibits the following characteristics of 
complexity: detail complexity, dynamic complexity, and resilience. 
Detail complexity is represented in this model by the numbers of 
constituent systems and their interactions (in this case shared situational 
awareness and coordinated engagements). Dynamic complexity is 
represented by the short timeframe in which the systems must behave to 
address the situation (which in this case is the engagement of threat 
missiles). Resilience is a characteristic of this CASoS model as the blue 
force responds to the threat missiles by engaging the threats. 
Additionally, Table 20 contains descriptions of the more CASoS-specific characteristics 
that were also represented in the CASoS model alternative, such as collaboration, self-
organization, adaptation, and detail and dynamic complexity. 
Some aspects of all of the CASoS principles were represented in the CASoS model 





Figure 62.  CASoS Principles Represented in the Model 
Descriptions of how the CASoS model represents and demonstrates aspects of the 
CASoS principles are contained in Table 21. The model demonstrates high flux by having 
blue force weapon and sensor resources that are capable of detecting and intercepting the 
threats. Holism is demonstrated by the blue force’s ability to coordinate engagements and 
develop shared situational awareness. The blue force’s sensors and data architecture in the 
model provide the capabilities that demonstrate the contextual and information principles. 
The CASoS model alternative achieves the goal principle through its ability to purposefully 
defend the HVU and strike group by engaging the threats. Finally, the model demonstrates 
some levels of requisite variety and operational viability by allowing behavior courses of 
action that provide a threat defense even when some blue force assets are destroyed. 
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Table 21.   Descriptions of how CASoS Principles are Represented in the 
Model 
CASoS Principles Represented in the 
Model 
Descriptions of how these Principles are 
Represented in the Model 
High Flux Principle 
The rate of resource flux must support the overall 
ability for adaptation to address the highly 
complex problem space. 
The high flux principle is represented when the 
blue force weapons are capable of intercepting the 
threats (in terms of weapons range, speed, and 
lethality) and when the blue force sensors can 
detect the threats (in terms of sensor range). 
Holism Principle 
A CASoS has emergent behavior that is a result of 
complex constituent system behavior and 
interactions. 
Holism is demonstrated through the emergent 
behavior arising from the interaction and 
collaboration of the distributed blue force ships 
and aircraft in the model. Examples of the 
emergent behavior include shared situational 
awareness and engagement coordination. 
Contextual Principle 
A CASoS as a solution to highly complex problems 
relies on the abilities to gain understanding of its 
context and itself. 
In this model, the blue force CASoS gains an 
understanding of itself and its environment using 
the blue force sensors and data-sharing architecture. 
Goal Principle 
A CASoS achieves specific goals through 
purposeful behavior using behavioral decisions, 
adaptation, and feedback from causal effects and 
the environment. 
The goal principle is demonstrated in the model by 
the blue force CASoS’s ability to purposefully 
defend itself and its HVU by making decisions to 
launch engagement missiles, adapt with the 
inclusion of additional fighter assets, and perform 
battle damage assessment to take additional shots 
when engagements are not successful. 
Operational Viability 
In order for a CASoS to be a viable solution 
during operations, it must maintain stability and 
resilience. 
Operational viability is demonstrated in this model 
by the blue force CASoS’s ability to maintain its 
collaborative architecture and ability to support 
CASoS behavior even as some of its constituent 
warfare systems were destroyed. 
Requisite Variety 
A CASoS must have a greater number of courses 
of action possible in the solution space than there 
are events in the problem space in order to be an 
effective solution. 
In this model, the law of requisite variety is 
demonstrated by the blue force CASoS having 
enough engagement courses of action to defend 
the HVU against the red force threats. 
Information Principle 
A CASoS creates, possesses, transfers, and 
modifies information. 
The information principle is demonstrated in the 
model by the blue force’s ability to sense and 
detect threats, share this data within the CASoS, 
and update this awareness information as the 
environment changes. 
3. Modeling and Simulation Results
Two M&S analyses were conducted. The first M&S analysis compared the 
behavior of the baseline approach with the behavior of the CASoS approach using the 




complexity in the environment by comparing its effect on the baseline and CASoS 
alternatives. In the second M&S analysis, an increase in the operational environment’s 
complexity was modeled by increasing the number, lethality, and speed of the red force 
threats. The same set of evaluation metrics were used in both analyses. Each M&S 
experiment involved 200 simulation runs (100 for the baseline and 100 for the CASoS). 
The metrics for the analyses are shown in Table 22.  
Table 22.   Evaluation Metrics for M&S Analysis 
Metric Metric Description 
Blue Force Casualties Total blue assets killed 
Time Required to Kill 50% 
of the Red Threat 
Time, in time steps, that it took to kill 50% of the red 
force 
Number of DDG Long 
Range Weapons Fired 
Total DDG long-range weapons used (sum over all 6 
DDGs) 
Number of DDG Short 
Range Weapons Fired 
Total DDG short-range weapons used (sum over all 6 
DDGs) 
Number of Fighter 
AMRAAMs fired 
Total Fighter AMRAAMs used (sum over both 
fighters) (AMRAAM = Advanced Medium Range Air-
to-Air Missiles) 
Number of Fighter JDAMs 
Fired 
Total Fighter JDAMs used (sum over both fighters) 
(JDAM = Joint Direct Attack Munition) 
 
The evaluation metrics provide insight into the interactions of the blue force 
solution approaches with their complex operational environment. Collecting data showing 
the number of blue force casualties, the time required to defend against (or kill) red forces, 
and the expenditure of weapons resources, provided evidence of the differences between a 
CASoS and non-CASoS approach to implementing a set of distributed constituent systems, 
or in this case, blue force assets.  
The number of blue force casualties is an overarching indicator of the performance 
of the layered defense—of how well and how quickly the distributed and heterogeneous 
weapons resources are used. This metric indicated the contributions of an adaptive and 
collaborative architecture and purposeful emergent behavior, which the CASoS approach 
provided. It also showed implementation of important CASoS principles such as the 
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information principle, the contextual principle, the goal principle, and the principle of 
holism. 
The time required to kill 50% of the red forces provided a means to evaluate 
whether the CASoS approach would be able to decrease the decision reaction time, thereby 
defending assets more quickly. This evaluation measure demonstrated the contribution of 
shared and improved situational awareness, which is enabled by the CASoS collaborative 
architecture, information principle, and contextual principle. 
The amount of weapons resources expended is indicated by the evaluation metrics 
for numbers of DDG long and short range weapons fired and fighter aircraft AMRAAMs 
and JDAMs launched. These metrics provided insight into the ability of the two approaches 
to provide a layered defense. They measured how well the two approaches were able to 
make use of the different types of distributed weapons resources. The results indicated the 
contributions of CASoS characteristics (adaptiveness, collaboration, purposefulness, self-
organization, emergence, constituent variety, changing boundary) and principles (holism, 
high flux, information, contextual, requisite variety). 
The following two subsections contain the results of the two M&S analyses. 
a. M&S Analysis #1—Comparison of the Current (Baseline) Approach
with a CASoS Approach
The first M&S analysis compared the baseline and CASoS alternatives to study the 
similarities and differences of naval tactical behavior in the two approaches. The two model 
variants were set up as “CASoS No” (for the baseline) and “CASoS Yes” (representing the 
CASoS approach). Each model variant was run 100 times and data was collected according 
to the evaluation metrics shown in Table 22. 
Figures 63–68 show comparison plots of the data results from the simulation runs 
according to the evaluation criteria. The data results were developed using JMP statistical 
software. In the graphical representations of the data, the plots in the left-hand portion 
represent the baseline case (“CASoS = no”) and the plots in the right-hand portion represent 




(1) M&S Analysis #1—Blue Casualties 
The number of blue forces destroyed, on average, was lower in the CASoS 
alternative than in the baseline alternative. Figure 63 shows that the average number of 





Figure 63.  M&S Analysis #1—Comparative Results of the Number of Blue 
Force Casualties 
A one-sided hypothesis test was performed with the alternative hypothesis that the 
mean value of blue casualties in the CASoS alternative is lower than the mean value of 
blue casualties in the baseline alternative. The null hypothesis was that the two means were 
equivalent. The results showed a t-value of -13.108 and a p-value < 0.001 using a 
significance level of 0.05. This statistical test showed that the CASoS approach really does 
have a positive effect on the defense of blue forces; significantly fewer casualties. 
The CASoS alternative’s improvement in the overall number of blue force 
casualties demonstrated the CASoS ability to enhance naval tactical operations. The 
CASoS approach offered improvements in the layered defense of the HVU by optimizing 
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the use of the distributed blue force sensor and weapon assets through purposeful 
collaboration and multi-level behavior.  
(2) M&S Analysis #1—Time Required to Kill 50% of Red Forces
The amount of time required to destroy 50% of the red forces, on average, was 
lower in the CASoS alternative than in the baseline alternative. Figure 64 shows that the 
average time steps required in the baseline alternative was 40.9 minutes (2454.23 time 
steps) and in the CASoS alternative was 25.53 minutes (1531.89 time steps). 
Figure 64.  M&S Analysis #1—Comparative Results of the Time Required to 
Kill 50% of the Red Forces 
A one-sided hypothesis test at a significance level of 0.05 was performed with an 
alternative hypothesis that the mean value of time required to kill 50% of the red forces in 
the CASoS alternative is lower than the mean value in the baseline alternative. The null 
hypothesis was that the two means were equivalent. The results showed a t-value of -
50.2935, which corresponded with a p-value < 0.001. This statistical test showed that the 




engagement decisions and defend blue forces: it took significantly less time in the CASoS 
approach for the blue forces to defend themselves. 
The CASoS alternative’s improvement in the decision reaction time demonstrated 
the CASoS ability to enhance naval tactical operations. The CASoS approach offered 
improvements in the decision reaction time through its collaborative and adaptive 
architecture that enables shared situational awareness among the distributed blue force 
assets. 
(3) M&S Analysis #1—Number of DDG Long Range Missiles Fired 
The number of long range engagement weapons fired by the blue force DDGs was, 
on average, significantly greater in the CASoS alternative than in the baseline alternative. 
Figure 65 shows that the average number of DDG long-range weapons fired in the baseline 
alternative was 26.43 and in the CASoS alternative was 174.7. 
 
Figure 65.  M&S Analysis #1—Comparative Results of the Number of DDG 
Long Range Weapons Fired 
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A one-sided hypothesis test at a significance level of 0.05 was performed with an 
alternative hypothesis that the mean value of long-range engagement missiles fired by the 
blue force DDGs in the CASoS alternative is higher than the mean value of those fired in 
the baseline alternative. The null hypothesis was that the two means were equivalent. The 
results showed a t-value of 75.2599 and a p-value < 0.001. This statistical test showed that 
the CASoS approach really does have a positive effect on the number of long-range 
engagement missiles that can be fired by DDGs; significantly more long-range weapons 
were used. This implies that CASoS engagements can take place earlier and at longer 
distances from the blue forces; thus providing a more layered defense. 
The analysis shows that many more long range engagements were possible in the 
CASoS approach. This indicates that due to shared and increased situational awareness, 
the CASoS approach takes advantage of the distributed sensor detection ranges to launch 
long-range weapons based on “remote” data. In effect, the CASoS approach in enabling 
engage on remote capabilities. This results in a CASoS improvement for naval layered 
defense options. 
(4) M&S Analysis #1—Number of DDG Short-Range Missiles Fired
The number of short range engagement weapons fired by the blue force DDGs was, 
on average, less in the CASoS alternative than in the baseline alternative. Figure 66 shows 
that the average number of DDG short-range weapons fired in the baseline alternative was 





Figure 66.  M&S Analysis #1—Comparative Results of the Number of DDG 
Short Range Weapons Fired 
A one-sided hypothesis test at a significance level of 0.05 was performed with the 
alternative hypothesis that the mean value of short-range engagement missiles fired by the 
blue force DDGs in the CASoS alternative is lower than the mean value of those fired in 
the baseline alternative. The null hypothesis was that the two means were equivalent. The 
results showed a t-value of -11.0786 and a p-value < 0.001. This statistical test showed that 
the CASoS approach really does have a positive effect on the number of short-range 
engagement missiles used by DDGs; in this scenario the CASoS solution used fewer short-
range weapons to defend against the red force. The implications of this result is that CASoS 
engagements can take place earlier and at longer distances from the blue forces; thus, 
providing a more layered defense. 
The analysis shows that the CASoS approach relied primarily on its long-range 
weapons for its defense, while the baseline approach relied heavily on the use of short-
range weapons. Each blue force asset in the baseline approach had a much more limited 
situational awareness, which kept them from being able to use their long range weapons 
and significantly reduced their ability to have a layered defense. The results of this 
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evaluation metric demonstrate that the CASoS approach enables an improvement over the 
baseline in layered defense options. 
(5) M&S Analysis #1—Number of Fighter Aircraft AMRAAMs Fired
The number of advanced medium range air-to-air missiles (AMRAAM) weapons 
fired by the blue force fighter aircraft was, on average, significantly higher in the CASoS 
alternative than in the baseline alternative. Figure 67 shows that the average number of 
fighter AMRAAM weapons fired in the baseline alternative was 3.96 and in the CASoS 
alternative was 21.8. 
Figure 67.  M&S Analysis #1—Comparative Results of the Number of 
Fighter Aircraft AMRAAMs Fired 
A one-sided hypothesis test at a significance level of 0.05 was performed with the 
alternative hypothesis that the mean value of AMRAAMs fired by the blue force fighter 
aircraft in the CASoS alternative is higher than the mean value of those fired in the baseline 
alternative. The null hypothesis was that the two means were equivalent. The results 




CASoS approach really does have a positive effect on the number of fighter aircraft 
AMRAAMs used in this scenario; significantly more AMRAAMs were fired. This resulted 
in the fighter aircraft having much greater participation in the defense of the blue forces in 
the CASoS approach. This implies that the CASoS ability to have a changing boundary 
and adaptive architecture to allow additional blue force systems to join and collaborate, 
allows these additional resources (in this case, the fighter aircraft) to be better utilized for 
addressing the complex environment.  
The CASoS approach enabled the fighter aircraft to purposefully and adaptively 
fire more AMRAAM weapons. This is attributed to the ability of the fighter aircraft to join 
the CASoS and in doing so, greatly improve their situational awareness and enable them 
to adapt their behavior to collaborate with the blue force strike group and participate in the 
layered defense of the HVU. 
(6) M&S Analysis #1—Number of Fighter Aircraft JDAMs Launched 
The analysis of the JDAMs launched, shown in Figure 68, indicated that the average 
number of JDAMs dropped in the baseline and CASoS alternatives were roughly the same 
-- approximately seven and a half, which corresponds with the number of red force 
launchers. 
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Figure 68.  M&S Analysis #1—Comparative Results of the Number of 
Fighter Aircraft JDAMs Launched 
For this evaluation metric, there was not enough evidence to support rejecting the 
null hypothesis. An analysis of individual simulation runs showed that the fighter aircraft 
got approximately the same chance to bomb red force launch sites in the baseline 
alternative with random fighter aircraft motion as in the CASoS alternative with the fighter 
aircraft joining the blue force strike group formation. There were seven red force launchers 
in the scenario; and in approximately 70% of the simulation runs (for both the baseline and 
CASoS approaches), all seven red force launch sites were destroyed. Therefore, in both the 
baseline and CASoS approaches, the fighter aircraft were able to detect and destroy all of 
the distributed red force launch sites about 70% of the time. This indicates that even though 
the fighter aircraft had significantly increased situational awareness in the CASoS 
approach, they had adequate individual detection ranges and speed in the baseline approach 
to cover the tactical area and gain close enough proximity to the distributed red force launch 
sites so they could successfully launch JDAMs and destroy the launchers.  
(7) M&S Analysis #1 Summary
For the case of the CASoS alternative, there were significantly fewer blue force 
casualties and the time required to kill 50% of the red force was significantly lower. The 
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ability for the distributed blue force assets to function collaboratively and exhibit desired 
emergent behavior in terms of shared and increased situational awareness and cooperative 
engagements, resulted in these tactical improvements.  
In the CASoS alternative, the DDGs used many fewer short range weapons and 
many more longer range weapons because they had greater situational awareness and could 
detect threats in time to support the longer range weapons engagement requirements. The 
CASoS approach was, in effect, able to employ a layered defense tactic; whereas the 
baseline approach was only able to employ a short-range close-in defense tactic.  
In the CASoS alternative, the fighter aircraft used more of the AMRAAM missiles 
because they were called into the fight much sooner and could respond adaptively to the 
threat. This indicated that the fighter aircraft took many more shots (or exhibited more 
purposeful and participatory behavior) when they were able to collaborate as part of the 
CASoS.  
Table 23 contains a summary of the M&S #1 analysis results. The analysis 
demonstrated that the CASoS improved layered defense options, reduced casualties, and 
improved the engagement decision reaction time. 







Analysis Results Implications for the 
CASoS Theory Validation 
Blue Force 
Casualties 
2.01 0.78 Alternative Hypothesis 
Accepted: 
Mean number of blue 
casualties was lower in the 
CASoS alternative. 
Indicates that the distributed, 
collaborative, and adaptive 
architecture, which enables 
shared situational awareness 
and behavior that is 
collaborative, adaptive, and 
purposeful led to fewer blue 
force casualties. 
Time Required 
to Kill 50% of 







Mean time required to kill 50% 
of the red forces was lower in 
the CASoS alternative. 
Indicates that the CASoS 
architecture and behavior leads 
to increased and shared 
situational awareness which 
decreases the time required to 
make engagement decisions 
and increases the effective 
engagement range of the blue 
force weapons. Earlier and 
more effective engagement 








Analysis Results Implications for the 
CASoS Theory Validation 
time required to defend against 





26.43 174.7 Alternative Hypothesis 
Accepted: 
Mean number of DDG long 
range weapons was higher in 
the CASoS alternative. 
Indicates that the CASoS 
architecture and behavior 
enables increased and shared 
situational awareness. This 
earlier and shared detection of 
red force threats increases the 
number of long range weapons 
that can be fired—giving the 
blue force a significantly 





60.02 48.83 Alternative Hypothesis 
Accepted: 
Mean number of DDG short 
range weapons fired was lower 
in the CASoS alternative. 
Indicates that the CASoS’s 
increased use of long range 
weapons decreases the number 
of short range weapons that 
need to be used. This is due to 
the fact that the red force threats 
are engaged by the long range 
weapons at larger ranges from 
the blue force assets. Fewer red 
force threats get close enough to 
the blue force assets to require 






3.96 21.8 Alternative Hypothesis 
Accepted: 
Mean number of fighter 
aircraft AMRAAMs fired was 
higher in the CASoS 
alternative. 
This indicates that the ability of 
the fighter aircraft to join the 
Blue Force CASoS enables 
them to participate in the 
CASoS mission of defending 
the blue force HVU. Upon 
joining the CASoS, the fighter 
aircraft have increased and 
shared situational awareness 
with the rest of the blue force 
assets. They have significantly 
improved awareness of red 
force threat location and can 
purposefully coordinate their 
use of AMRAAM weapons as 





7.64 7.38 Null Hypothesis Accepted: 
The mean numbers of fighter 
aircraft JDAMs fired was 
equivalent in the baseline and 
CASoS alternatives. 
There was not a significant 
difference in the number of 
JDAMs fired in the baseline 
and CASoS alternatives. In the 
baseline alternative, the fighter 
aircraft motion was random. In 
the CASoS alternative, the 
fighter aircraft moved in 
conjunction with the blue force 
strike group. The blue force 
movement and random 
movement created 
approximately the same 










Analysis Results Implications for the 
CASoS Theory Validation 
fighter aircraft to launch 
JDAMs. 
 
The improvements in blue force defense and decision reaction time demonstrate the 
benefits of a CASoS approach. The adaptive architecture connecting the distributed blue 
force assets enable the strike group to function as a CASoS. This enables solution behavior 
that is multi-level, emergent, adaptive, purposeful and collaborative. The model 
demonstrates that enabling a changing boundary and maximizing the use of constituent 
variety (a diverse set of warfare resources) provided a layered defense approach that 
resulted in tactical improvements. 
b.  M&S Analysis #2—Effects of Increasing the Complexity of the 
Scenario Environment. 
The second M&S analysis increased the complexity of the threat scenario by 
increasing the number, speed, and lethality of the red force threat to analyze these effects 
on the baseline and CASoS alternatives. The purpose of this analysis was to study the 
behavior of the two approaches (baseline and CASoS) as they encountered a heightened 
level of complexity in the operational environment with a greater number of events (more 
missiles), a faster tempo of events (with greater missile speed), and more deadly 
consequences (greater missile lethality). The same evaluation metrics (listed in Table 22) 
were used in this second M&S analysis. 
A design of experiments (DOE) was conducted to vary the number, speed, and 
lethality of the red force threats to identify values for these threat parameters that would 
provide a more stressing environment without completely overwhelming the blue force 
strike group. The DOE crossed a model alternative factor (2 levels, CASoS/baseline) with 
a 33 Design Point (DP) Nearly Orthogonal Latin Hypercube (NOLH) for the three threat 
factors, resulting in 2x33 = 66 DPs, each run with 100 stochastic replications. The analysis 
was based upon 6600 runs. The evaluation produced the following parameters to represent 
the more stressing environment: a threat number of 12 missiles per launcher, a threat speed 
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of 6000 km/hr, and a threat lethality (probability of kill) of 0.9. Therefore, there were 48 
anti-ship missiles and 36 anti-aircraft missiles in this second M&S scenario, as compared 
with 32 anti-ship missiles and eight anti-aircraft missiles in the first M&S scenario. The 
threat speeds in the first M&S scenario were 1111 km/hr for the anti-aircraft missiles and 
5186 km/hr for the anti-aircraft missiles. These speeds were increased to 6000 km/hr for 
both the anti-aircraft and anti-ship missiles in the second scenario. Finally, the probability 
of kill was raised from 0.8 in the first M&S scenario to 0.9 in the second M&S scenario. 
These values increased the complexity of the threat environment without completely 
destroying the blue force assets as represented in both the baseline and CASoS approaches. 
Figures 69–74 show comparison plots of the data results from the simulation runs 
according to the evaluation criteria. The data results were developed using JMP statistical 
software. In the graphical representations of the data, the plots in the left-hand portion 
represent the baseline case (“CASoS = no”) and the plots in the right-hand portion represent 
the CASoS case (“CASoS = yes”). 
(1) M&S Analysis #2—Number of Blue Casualties
The number of blue forces destroyed, on average, was lower in the CASoS 
alternative than in the baseline alternative. Figure 69 shows that the average number of 
blue force casualties in the baseline alternative was 3.56 and in the CASoS alternative was 
2.74. A one-sided hypothesis test at a significance level of 0.05 was performed with the 
alternative hypothesis that the mean value of blue casualties in the CASoS alternative is 
lower than the mean value of blue casualties in the baseline alternative. The null hypothesis 
was that the two means were equivalent. The results showed a t-value of -6.11 and a p-
value < 0.001. This statistical test showed that the CASoS approach had a positive effect 





Figure 69.  M&S Analysis #2—Comparative Results of the Number of Blue 
Casualties 
The CASoS alternative’s improvement in the overall number of blue force 
casualties is a positive indicator in the CASoS ability to enhance naval tactical operations. 
The CASoS approach offered improvements in the layered defense of the HVU by 
optimizing the use of the distributed blue force sensor and weapon assets through 
purposeful collaboration and multi-level behavior. 
(2) M&S Analysis #2—Required Time to Kill 50% of Red Forces 
The amount of time required to destroy 50% of the red forces, on average, was 
lower in the CASoS alternative than in the baseline alternative. Figure 70 shows that the 
average time required in the baseline alternative was 28.3 minutes (1698.19 time steps) and 
in the CASoS alternative was 20.84 minutes (1250.43 time steps). 
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Figure 70.  M&S Analysis #2—Comparative Results of the Time Required to 
Kill 50% of the Red Forces 
A one-sided hypothesis test at a significance level of 0.05 was performed with an 
alternative hypothesis that the mean value of time required to kill 50% of the red forces in 
the CASoS alternative is lower than the mean value in the baseline alternative. The null 
hypothesis was that the two means were equivalent. The results showed a t-value of -7.46 
and a p-value < 0.001. This statistical test showed that the CASoS approach really did have 
a positive effect—significantly reducing the amount of time it takes to make engagement 
decisions and defend blue forces. 
This result implies that even as the threat environment became more stressing, the 
CASoS alternative was still able to react more quickly, providing a more rapid defense. 
This ability is attributed to the adaptive and collaborative architecture and intelligent agents 
that share information and gain increased and shared situational awareness of the 
battlespace enabling earlier threat detection and extended weapons range.  
The graphical depiction in Figure 70 shows that the spread of data results for the 
baseline alternative had a much larger range of values than for the CASoS alternative. This 




approach. This demonstrates the CASoS ability to purposefully adapt to a changing 
environment—and by doing so collectively, the distributed blue force assets are able to 
reduce the decision reaction time. 
(3) M&S Analysis #2—Number of DDG Long Range Missiles Fired 
The number of long range engagement weapons fired by the blue force DDGs was, 
on average, significantly greater in the CASoS alternative than in the baseline alternative. 
Figure 71 shows that the average number of DDG long-range weapons fired in the baseline 
alternative was just 22.14 and in the CASoS alternative was 167.42. 
 
Figure 71.  M&S Analysis #2—Comparative Results of the Number of DDG 
Long Range Missiles Fired 
A one-sided hypothesis test was performed at a significance level of 0.05 with the 
alternative hypothesis that the mean value of long-range engagement missiles fired by the 
blue force DDGs in the CASoS alternative is higher than the mean value of those fired in 
the baseline alternative. The null hypothesis was that the two means were equivalent. The 
results showed a t-value of 46.49 and a p-value < 0.001. This statistical test showed that 
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the CASoS had a positive effect on the number of long-range engagement missiles that 
could be fired by DDGs; significantly more long-range weapons were used. This 
demonstrated that CASoS engagements took place earlier and at longer distances from the 
blue forces; thereby greatly improving the layered defense. It also demonstrated that even 
with a more highly complex threat environment, the CASoS approach was still able to 
make greater use of its long-range weapons. 
(4) M&S Analysis #2—Number of DDG Short Range Missiles Fired
The mean number of short range engagement weapons fired by the blue force 
DDGs was not statistically distinguishable between the baseline and CASoS alternatives 
in the second M&S analysis. The plots in Figure 72 show that the mean was slightly lower 
in the baseline alternative (with 77.38 shots fired) than in the CASoS alternative (with 
82.16 shots fired). A one-sided hypothesis test was performed with an alternative 
hypothesis that the mean value of short-range engagement missiles fired by the blue force 
DDGs in the CASoS alternative was lower than the mean value of those fired in the baseline 
alternative. For this one evaluation metric, there was not enough evidence to support 
rejecting the null hypothesis. Therefore, the difference between the average number of 
short-range DDG weapons used by the baseline and CASoS alternatives was 





Figure 72.  M&S Analysis #2—Comparative Results of the Number of DDG 
Short Range Missiles Fired 
This analysis shows that DDG short-range missiles were put to great use in both 
the baseline and CASoS alternatives. The baseline alternative relied heavily on short range 
missiles for their close-in defense, and the CASoS alternative took advantage of shared and 
improved situational awareness and coordinated engagements to rely on both long and 
short range missiles for a more layered defense. 
(5) M&S Analysis #2—Number of Fighter Aircraft AMRAAMs Fired 
The number of advanced medium range air-to-air missiles (AMRAAM) weapons 
fired by the blue force fighter aircraft was, on average, significantly higher in the CASoS 
alternative than in the baseline alternative for M&S #2. Figure 73 shows that the average 
number of fighter AMRAAM weapons fired in the baseline alternative was just 4.31; 
whereas in the CASoS alternative it was 23.19.  
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Figure 73.  M&S Analysis #2—Comparative Results of the Number of 
Fighter Aircraft AMRAAMs Fired 
A one-sided hypothesis test at a significance level of 0.05 was performed with the 
alternative hypothesis that the mean value of AMRAAMs fired by the blue force fighter 
aircraft in the CASoS alternative is higher than the mean value of those fired in the baseline 
alternative. The null hypothesis was that the two means were equivalent. The results 
showed a t-value of 30.50 and a p-value < 0.001. This statistical test showed that the 
CASoS approach had a significant positive effect—with significantly more fighter aircraft 
AMRAAMs used in the CASoS solution. This indicated that the fighter aircraft had greater 
participation in the defense of the blue forces in the CASoS approach; even in this more 
stressing threat environment. The results demonstrated the CASoS benefit of fighting as a 
collaborative SoS whose boundary could change to incorporate additional warfighting 
assets (or constituent systems) when they were available. Adding the assets to the CASoS 




(6) M&S Analysis #2—Number of Fighter Aircraft JDAMs Launched 
The analysis of the JDAMs launched, shown in Figure 74, indicated that the average 
number of JDAMs dropped in the baseline and CASoS alternatives were roughly the same 
-- approximately seven and a half.  
 
Figure 74.  M&S Analysis #2—Comparative Results of the Number of 
Fighter Aircraft JDAMs Fired 
A hypothesis test showed that there was not enough evidence to support rejecting 
the null hypothesis. Therefore, the mean numbers of JDAMs launched in the two 
alternatives were roughly equivalent. Therefore, in this naval tactical scenario, the CASoS 
approach didn’t change the way the fighter aircraft used their JDAM bombs. In both 
alternatives, the fighter aircraft had approximately the same number of opportunities to 
bomb red force launch sites in the baseline alternative with random fighter aircraft motion 
as in the CASoS alternative with the fighter aircraft joining the blue force strike group 
formation. 
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(7) M&S Analysis #2 Summary
For the more stressing threat scenario of M&S #2, the CASoS solution alternative 
continued to have fewer blue force casualties, and a shorter time required to kill 50% of 
the red forces than the baseline approach. This demonstrates the tactical benefits of 
implementing the distributed warfare assets as a CASoS—a collaborative and adaptive 
system of distributed constituent systems with desired (purposeful) emergent behavior. 
In M&S #2, the CASoS used a significantly greater number of long range DDG 
weapons and fighter aircraft AMRAAMS than the baseline approach. However, the CASoS 
used approximately the same number of short range DDG weapons and fighter aircraft 
JDAMs, on average, as the baseline approach. The use of the fighter aircraft weapons 
resources followed a similar behavior as in M&S #1. Upon joining the CASoS, in the 
CASoS alternative, the fighter aircraft were able to fire many more AMRAAMs, 
benefitting from the collaborative, adaptive architecture with improved and shared 
situational awareness (earlier threat detection), and changing boundary to allow the fighters 
to join the CASoS. This clearly demonstrates the utility of these CASoS characteristics and 
principles.  
The use of fighter aircraft JDAMs followed a similar behavior pattern as in M&S 
#1. In both the first and second M&S analyses, the fighter aircraft fired a little over seven 
JDAMs on average in both the baseline and CASoS solution approaches. This coincided 
with the number of red force launch sites, which in both M&S #1 and M&S #2, was seven. 
On average, the fighter aircraft destroyed the seven red force launch sites in the simulation 
runs and then ran out of targets. In some cases, the JDAMs missed their target and fired 
again—resulting in more than seven total JDAMs fired. In some cases, fewer than seven 
JDAMs were fired because the fighter aircraft were not close enough proximity to the 
launch sites. The use of JDAMs in the modeling analyses did not end up being a 
distinguishing factor between the baseline and CASoS alternatives; however, it provided 
more insight into the behavior and utility of having constituent variety in the available 
resources. A closer examination of individual simulation runs, showed that in both the 
baseline and CASoS variants, there were instances in which the JDAMs destroyed red 




time required to kill 50% of the red forces. The CASoS approach could evolve to improve 
the use of the JDAMs with more sophisticated predictive analytics and intelligent agents. 
Table 24 contains a summary of the M&S #2 analysis results. The analysis 
demonstrated that the CASoS continued to decrease blue force casualties, improve decision 
reaction time, and maximize the use of distributed heterogeneous assets as a layered 
defense; even as the threat situation grew in complexity. 







Analysis Results Implications for the 
CASoS Theory Validation 
Blue Force 
Casualties 
3.56 2.74 Alternative Hypothesis 
Accepted: 
Mean number of blue 
casualties was lower in the 
CASoS alternative. 
Demonstrates that the 
distributed, collaborative, and 
adaptive architecture, which 
enables shared situational 
awareness and behavior that is 
collaborative, adaptive, and 
purposeful led to fewer blue 
force casualties. 
Time Required 
to Kill 50% of 







Mean time required to kill 50% 
of the red forces was lower in 
the CASoS alternative. 
Demonstrates that the CASoS 
architecture and behavior leads 
to increased and shared 
situational awareness which 
decreases the time required to 
make engagement decisions and 
increases the effective 
engagement range of the blue 
force weapons. Earlier and 
more effective engagement 
shots lessens the amount of time 
required to defend against the 





22.14 167.42 Alternative Hypothesis 
Accepted: 
Mean number of DDG long 
range weapons was higher in 
the CASoS alternative. 
Demonstrates that the CASoS 
architecture and behavior 
enables increased and shared 
situational awareness. This 
earlier and shared detection of 
red force threats increases the 
number of long range weapons 
that can be fired—giving the 
blue force a significantly 





77.38 82.16 Null Hypothesis Accepted: 
The mean number of DDG 
short range weapons fired were 
not dissimilar enough between 
the two alternatives to reject 
the null hypothesis. 
Demonstrates that given a more 
stressing threat environment, 
the CASoS relied as heavily on 
short range DDG weapons as 
the baseline approach. This 
indicates that the CASoS adapts 
its behavior to use both long 
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CASoS Theory Validation 
in a collaborative way as the 





4.31 23.19 Alternative Hypothesis 
Accepted: 
Mean number of fighter 
aircraft AMRAAMs fired was 
higher in the CASoS 
alternative. 
Demonstrates that the ability of 
the fighter aircraft to join the 
Blue Force CASoS enables 
them to participate in the 
CASoS mission of defending 
the blue force HVU. Upon 
joining the CASoS, the fighter 
aircraft have increased and 
shared situational awareness 
with the rest of the blue force 
assets. They have significantly 
improved awareness of red 
force threat location and can 
purposefully coordinate their 
use of AMRAAM weapons as 





7.54 7.86 Null Hypothesis Accepted: 
The mean numbers of fighter 
aircraft JDAMs fired was 
equivalent in the baseline and 
CASoS alternatives. 
There was not a significant 
difference in the number of 
JDAMs fired in the baseline 
and CASoS alternatives. In the 
baseline alternative, the fighter 
aircraft motion was random. In 
the CASoS alternative, the 
fighter aircraft moved in 
conjunction with the blue force 
strike group. The blue force 
movement and random 
movement created 
approximately the same 
number of opportunities for the 
fighter aircraft to launch 
JDAMs. 
The improvements in blue force defense and decision reaction time demonstrate the 
benefits of a CASoS approach. The adaptive architecture connecting the distributed blue 
force assets enable the strike group to function as a CASoS. This enables solution behavior 
that is multi-level, emergent, adaptive, purposeful and collaborative. Analyzing how the 
CASoS solution approach behaved in a more complex environment, provided more insight 
into the value of the CASoS characteristics and principles. The model demonstrated that 
the CASoS solution approach was able to adapt to the changing threat environment by 
doubling its use of short range weapons to continue to provide tactical advantages over the 




constituent variety (diverse warfare resources) to provide an improved layered defense 
strategy. 
c. Overall Summary of M&S Analysis Results 
In summary, the CASoS solution alternative demonstrated tactical improvements 
over the baseline alternative in an initially complex threat environment; and continued to 
demonstrate improvements in a more stressing threat environment. The results showed 
significant improvements in (1) blue force defense (lowering the number of casualties), (2) 
decision reaction time (destroying red forces more quickly), and (3) layered defense 
(maximizing the use of different warfare weapon assets). 
As the threat environment grew in complexity (from M&S #1 to M&S #2), the 
mean number of blue force casualties increased for both the baseline and CASoS 
approaches. However, there were fewer blue force casualties using the CASoS approach; 
and therefore, the CASoS was better able to address the increased threat than the baseline 
approach. 
The overall time required to kill 50% of red forces, for both the baseline and CASoS 
alternatives, decreased as the threat environment became more complex. The scenario had 
a much faster tempo as the speeds of the incoming red threat missiles were much faster in 
the second scenario. The CASoS alternative had a significantly higher speed of defense—
killing 50% of red forces much faster than the baseline, even as the threat environment was 
more stressful. 
The CASoS alternative employed a layered defense—making better use of the 
variety of weapons than the baseline alternative. The baseline approach used a close-in 
defense, depending primarily on the DDG short range weapons to defend the blue force 
ships. The baseline used only roughly 15% of the amount of long range DDG weapons and 
18% of the AMRAAMs used by the CASoS. These percentages stayed the same as the 
threat environment became more complex. The baseline also took advantage of the random 
path of the nearby fighter aircraft to launch JDAMs at the red force launch sites if they 
happened to be within proximity. The CASoS approach used a layered defense strategy, 
making the most of the different types of weapons available. In the initial scenario, the 
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CASoS primarily depended on long-range DDG weapons as well as fighter aircraft 
AMRAAMs and JDAMs. As the scenario became more complex, the CASoS approach 
doubled the number of short-range DDG weapons fired while still using about the same 
numbers of long-range weapons, AMRAAMs, and JDAMs. This demonstrated the ability 
of the CASoS to adapt to the changing circumstances and to take advantage of the 
constituent system variety. 
Table 25 compiles the results of M&S #1 and #2 to summarize the mean values 
computed for each evaluation metric. The table compares the results gathered in the initial 
complex scenario of M&S #1 with the more stressing scenario of M&S #2. The last column 
in the table contains descriptions of how the results demonstrate the CASoS theory. 



























2.01 3.56 0.78 2.74 Demonstrates that the CASoS distributed, 
collaborative, and adaptive architecture, 
which enables shared situational awareness 
and behavior that is collaborative, adaptive, 
and purposeful, led to fewer blue force 















Demonstrates that the CASoS architecture 
and behavior leads to increased and shared 
situational awareness which decreases the 
time required to make engagement 
decisions and increases the effective 
engagement range of the blue force 
weapons. The CASoS’s earlier and more 
effective engagement shots decrease the 
amount of time required to defend against 






26.43 22.14 174.7 167.42 Demonstrates that the CASoS architecture 
and behavior enables increased and shared 
situational awareness. This earlier and 
shared detection of red force threats 
increases the number of long range 
weapons that can be fired—giving the blue 





60.02 77.38 48.83 82.16 Demonstrates that the CASoS approach 
enabled adaptive behavior by doubling the 


































scenario became more complex. The 
CASoS used its adaptive behavior and 
constituent variety to employ a more 






3.96 4.31 21.8 23.19 Demonstrates the CASoS changing 
boundary, adaptive architecture, 
purposeful collaborative behavior, and 
constituent variety. The CASoS continued 
to take advantage of the fighter aircrafts’ 





7.64 7.54 7.38 7.86 Demonstrates that the baseline and CASoS 
alternatives took advantage of the fighter 
aircraft JDAMs. In the baseline, the fighter 
aircraft’s random movement placed them 
in proximity of red force launch sites. In 
the CASoS, the fighter aircraft joined the 
CASoS and then fired JDAMs as the strike 
group as a whole approached red force 
launch sites. 
 
The M&S analyses demonstrate many aspects of the CASoS theory. Table 26 lists 
and describes the CASoS characteristics that were represented in the model and explains 
how the M&S results demonstrated these characteristics. 





Descriptions of how these 
Characteristics are Represented in 
the Model 
Demonstrated Value of the 
CASoS Characteristics 
Openness The blue force strike group is an “open” 
CASoS because it exchanges 
information (sensing) and kinetic 
weapons with its environment. 
Blue and red casualties demonstrated 
that the CASoS was an open system. 
If the CASoS had been a closed 
system, it would not have been able to 
launch engagement missiles to defend 






The CASoS blue force strike group in 
the model has an architecture that is 
collaborative, adaptive, connected, and 
distributed. The ships and aircraft in the 
model are geographically distributed but 
connected as they share information 
concerning situational awareness and 
The CASoS solution’s improved 
tactical operations were directly 
dependent on the collaborative and 
adaptive architecture that connected 
the distributed blue forces. The 
CASoS architecture provided shared 






Descriptions of how these 
Characteristics are Represented in 
the Model 
Demonstrated Value of the 
CASoS Characteristics 
self-awareness. Their architecture allows 
them to collaborate to gain shared 
situational awareness and to coordinate 
engagements. The CASoS architecture 
in the model is adaptive as it “adapts” to 
include the fighter aircraft when they 
join. 
enabling earlier threat detection and 
weapon launches. The CASoS 
architecture also enabled the 
coordination of engagements among 
the distributed blue assets. 
Behavior The CASoS in the model exhibits the 
following behavior: multi-level, 
collaborative, purposeful, self-
organizing, and adaptive. The model 
CASoS exhibits multi-level and 
collaborative behavior as constituent 
systems act independently or 
collaboratively. The CASoS is 
purposeful in terms of exhibiting desired 
defensive behavior. An example of self-
organization and adaptation is when the 
fighter aircraft change their behavior 
after joining the CASoS. 
The CASoS solution’s improved 
tactical operations were directly 
dependent on the CASoS behavioral 
capabilities: collaborative and 
emergent behavior enabled 
coordinated engagements; adaptive 
behavior enabled a layered defense, 
participation of the fighter 
AMRAAMs, and the use of more 
short range weapons as the threats 
grew more complex; the fighters self-
organized to join the CASoS (thereby 
improving the defense); and all blue 
force assets behaved purposefully to 
achieve force-level goals. 
Changing 
Boundary 
The CASoS in the model has the 
characteristic of changing boundary. The 
boundary of the CASoS changes as the 
fighter aircraft join the CASoS. 
The fighter aircraft were able to join 
the CASoS because of the 
characteristic of allowing its boundary 
to change. The addition of the fighter 
aircraft improved tactical operations. 
Constituent 
Variety 
The CASoS in the model has constituent 
variety, as it consists of different types 
of constituent systems: DDGs, AEWs, 
and fighter aircraft. Each of these types 
of constituent systems has different 
properties and capabilities. 
The CASoS maximized the use of its 
constituent variety (diverse set of 
warfare assets) by taking advantage of 
the strengths of the different assets—
long range missiles, short range 




The CASoS in the model exhibits the 
following characteristics of complexity: 
detail complexity, dynamic complexity, 
and resilience. Detail complexity is 
represented in this model by the 
numbers of constituent systems and their 
interactions (in this case shared 
situational awareness and coordinated 
engagements). Dynamic complexity is 
represented by the short timeframe in 
which the systems must behave to 
address the situation (which in this case 
is the engagement of threat missiles). 
Resilience is a characteristic of this 
CASoS model as the blue force responds 
to the threat missiles by engaging the 
threats. 
The CASoS’s innate complexity 
characteristics demonstrated value in 
the model. The CASoS was modeled 
to address detail complexity by 
making automated force-level 
engagement decisions; whereas the 
baseline model represented manual 
decision-making by making only 
platform-centric engagement 
decisions. This ability resulted in a 
decrease in decision reaction time (or 
time to kill 50% of the red forces). 
Dynamic complexity was 
demonstrated in M&S #2 as the 
CASoS was able to still show tactical 
improvements as the tempo of the 








Descriptions of how these 
Characteristics are Represented in 
the Model 
Demonstrated Value of the 
CASoS Characteristics 
missiles and greater numbers of threat 
missiles). The CASoS demonstrated 
resilience by continuing to operate 
collaborative and with shared 
situational awareness even as assets, 
such as AEW or blue ships, were 
destroyed during the scenario runs. 
   
In summary, Table 26 describes how the CASoS characteristics demonstrate value 
as a solution approach to the naval tactical domain. Through a combination of openness, 
architecture, behavior, changing boundary, constituent variety, and complexity, the CASoS 
solution improved tactical operations; even as the threat environment became more 
complex. 
Table 27 lists and describes the CASoS principles that were represented in the 
model and explains how the M&S results demonstrated these principles. 
Table 27.   Validation of CASoS Principles through M&S Effort 
CASoS Principles 
Represented in the 
Model 
Descriptions of how these 
Principles are Represented in 
the Model 
Demonstrated Value of the 
CASoS Principles 
High Flux Principle 
The rate of resource flux 
must support the overall 
ability for adaptation to 
address the highly complex 
problem space. 
The high flux principle is 
represented when the blue force 
weapons are capable of 
intercepting the threats (in terms of 
weapons range, speed, and 
lethality) and when the blue force 
sensors can detect the threats (in 
terms of sensor range). 
The CASoS solution created 
many more possible courses of 
action for tactical responses to the 
threat. This was demonstrated by 
the use of more types of weapons 
as an improved layered defense. 
High flux was a contributor to the 
decrease in blue force casualties 
and decision reaction time. 
Holism Principle 
A CASoS has emergent 
behavior that is a result of 
complex constituent system 
behavior and interactions. 
Holism is demonstrated through 
the emergent behavior arising from 
the interaction and collaboration of 
the distributed blue force ships and 
aircraft in the model. Examples of 
the emergent behavior include 
shared situational awareness and 
engagement coordination. 
The CASoS solution’s ability to 
be holistic allowed the blue force 
strike group to fight at the force-
level—to use its distributed 
resources for force-level goals 
and coordinate engagements. 
Holism was a contributor to the 
improved tactical operations. 
Contextual Principle In this model, the blue force 
CASoS gains an understanding of 
The CASoS’s ability to gain 
contextual knowledge, or 
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CASoS Principles 
Represented in the 
Model 
Descriptions of how these 
Principles are Represented in 
the Model 
Demonstrated Value of the 
CASoS Principles 
A CASoS as a solution to 
highly complex problems 
relies on the abilities to gain 
understanding of its context 
and itself. 
itself and its environment using the 
blue force sensors and data-sharing 
architecture. 
situational assessment, played a 
crucial role in its improved 
tactical operations. The CASoS 
had both shared and increased 
situational awareness, resulting in 
earlier threat detection and earlier 
launch of weapons. 
Goal Principle 
A CASoS achieves specific 
goals through purposeful 
behavior using behavioral 
decisions, adaptation, and 
feedback from causal effects 
and the environment. 
The goal principle is demonstrated 
in the model by the blue force 
CASoS’s ability to purposefully 
defend itself and its HVU by 
making decisions to launch 
engagement missiles, adapt with 
the inclusion of additional fighter 
assets, and perform battle damage 
assessment to take additional shots 
when engagements are not 
successful. 
The CASoS’s ability to purposely 
select courses of action (or 
behaviors) that were goal-oriented 
and addressed force-level goals 
and also adapted in response to 
feedback from the environment, 
allowed it to maximize the use of 
the various distributed weapons 
for force-level goals. Goal-
oriented and adaptive behavior 
enabled the CASoS to address the 
threat environment, even as it 
became more complex. 
Operational Viability 
In order for a CASoS to be a 
viable solution during 
operations, it must maintain 
stability and resilience. 
Operational viability is 
demonstrated in this model by the 
blue force CASoS’s ability to 
maintain its collaborative 
architecture and ability to support 
CASoS behavior even as some of 
its constituent warfare systems 
were destroyed. 
The CASoS’s ability for 
operational viability enabled it to 
continue operations, even when 
blue force assets were destroyed. 
This meant that if an AEW or 
blue ship was destroyed, the 
overall situational awareness 
would decrease, but would still be 
shared and would still contain 
detections from the remaining 
asset’s sensors. Likewise, the 
CASoS strike group would have 
to accommodate lost weapon 
systems as ships were destroyed. 
Requisite Variety 
A CASoS must have a 
greater number of courses of 
action possible in the 
solution space than there are 
events in the problem space 
in order to be an effective 
solution. 
In this model, the law of requisite 
variety is demonstrated by the blue 
force CASoS having enough 
engagement courses of action to 
defend the HVU against the red 
force threats. 
The CASoS’s requisite variety 
was demonstrated by the number 
of possible courses of action to 
defend against the red force 
missile threats. The CASoS had 
more requisite variety than the 
baseline approach, as was 
demonstrated by the numbers of 
different weapons fired. The 
CASoS also increased its requisite 
variety as the environment 
increased in complexity. The 
CASoS had to use double the 
number of short range missiles to 






Represented in the 
Model 
Descriptions of how these 
Principles are Represented in 
the Model 
Demonstrated Value of the 
CASoS Principles 
Information Principle 
A CASoS creates, possesses, 
transfers, and modifies 
information. 
The information principle is 
demonstrated in the model by the 
blue force’s ability to sense and 
detect threats, share this data 
within the CASoS, and update this 
awareness information as the 
environment changes. 
The CASoS ability to manage 
(create, share, etc.) information 
and enable shared and increased 
situational awareness using data 
from its distributed sensors, 
enabled a huge advantage over 
the baseline approach. The 
demonstrated value of the CASoS 
information principle was 
indicated by the earlier detection 
of threats and earlier weapon 
launches. 
 
In summary, Table 27 describes how the CASoS principles demonstrate value as a 
solution approach to the naval tactical domain. Through a combination of high flux, holism, 
context-knowledge, goal-oriented, operational viability, requisite variety, and information 
management, the CASoS solution improved tactical operations; even as the threat 
environment became more complex. 
D. THEORY VALIDATION 
This chapter concludes with an explanation of how the naval tactical modeling and 
simulation analysis of the CASoS approach demonstrates GT theory validity. The GT 
research method enables the discovery, development, refinement, and validation of a 
theory using data from observation, literature review, and case study. Theory validation 
results from theoretical saturation and through constant comparison which results in 
concepts that explain observed phenomena. GT validity is judged by fit, relevance, 
workability, and modifiability (Glaser and Strauss 1967). This section discusses the 
CASoS theory validation as it relates to these four aspects. 
1. Fit 
A theory that “fits” has concepts that are closely connected to what they represent. 
For the CASoS theory, “fit” is demonstrated through the representation and analysis of the 
CASoS approach to address a highly complex naval tactical problem domain using 
modeling and simulation. 
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The naval tactical domain exhibits the characteristics of highly complex 
environments. The theory describes characteristics of highly complex problem domains 
and prescribes using a CASoS approach when a problem demonstrates enough of the 
characteristics to overwhelm existing solution approaches. The analysis of the naval 
tactical domain found evidence that as this operational environment becomes increasingly 
complex, existing warfare systems cannot react quickly enough or manage the decision 
complexity to maintain tactical superiority. Therefore, this problem domain is an 
application that “fits” the CASoS theory as a highly complex operational environment. 
The M&S analysis demonstrated that a CASoS solution approach improves 
warfighting operations in comparison with a baseline non-CASoS approach. The analysis 
showed that a CASoS approach improved the tactical performance of existing warfare 
resources. Even as the threat environment grew in complexity, the CASoS approach had 
fewer blue force casualties, required less time to defeat red forces, and was able to employ 
a more layered defense, maximizing the use of distributed and heterogeneous warfare 
assets. The M&S analysis results demonstrated the “fit” of the CASoS approach to the 
naval tactical domain. 
2. Relevance
A relevant theory evokes “grab.” It captures attention and exceeds or goes beyond 
academic interest. The CASoS theory provides a solution approach to real world problems 
that have been observed. The CASoS theory provides a critical solution to a number of 
problem domains that are growing in complexity as a result of technological advances. 
The naval tactical domain presents an example of a highly complex operational 
environment that poses a current challenge as well as an evolutionary challenge—one that 
continues to change and grow. The Navy is highly aware of a growing threat space resulting 
from advances in technology, political changes, increases in adversarial military asset 
development, globalization, and the exploitation of new technology as weapons. The 
Navy’s own growing reliance on information technologies creates new vulnerabilities as 




domain is a relevant endeavor with interest from the academic community, defense 
community, and political community. 
Interest in tackling the naval maritime domain to gain tactical advantage has been 
a long-standing mission for many centuries. Historically the ability to maintain warfare 
superiority is a critical component to a nation’s defense and for negotiating in the realm of 
global politics. Developing and applying a theory for engineering a new solution to address 
complexity in the naval tactical domain supports this higher-level relevant mission. 
The relevancy of the CASoS theory can be further demonstrated as it is applied to 
additional problem domains such as future self-driving transportation, cyber warfare, and 
the future complex airspace. The introduction of self-driving cars into society presents a 
challenging domain of millions of highly automated and sensing vehicles that are 
distributed (Hanebrink et al. 2016). Applying a CASoS approach offers an opportunity to 
create an adaptive architecture to connect the smart vehicles and provides increased 
situational awareness and a holistic perspective. Enabling self-organized purposeful 
cooperative behavior can decrease traffic jams (Walter 2017), increase energy efficiency 
(Wadud 2016), and improve road safety (Laris 2017). Cyber warfare presents a complex 
problem domain with computer hacking arising from distributed and unpredictable sources 
including nation-states, terrorist groups, and individual actors (Genge, Kiss, Haller 2015). 
As more systems become automated and networked, there are more cyber vulnerabilities. 
A CASoS approach would take advantage of the cyber domain’s networked architecture of 
distributed systems to provide a holistic perspective that could improve early detections of 
cyber-attacks and attempt to reduce their negative cascading effects. Characterizations of 
the future complex airspace predict significant increases in volume and variety resulting in 
crowded skies, safety issues, longer delays, more congestion at airports and less response 
time for air traffic controllers (Katina and Keating 2013). A CASoS approach with 
distributed intelligent agents and an adaptive architecture to connect aircraft and share 
knowledge can create a holistic solution for a highly interconnected domain. 
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3. Workability
A theory “works” when it explains how a problem is being solved. This chapter’s 
modeling and simulation analysis demonstrated how the CASoS approach provided an 
improved solution to the naval tactical problem domain. The naval tactical model of a 
highly contested A2/AD scenario provided insight into how a CASoS approach to blue 
force operations could improve layered defense options and increase the amount of 
decision reaction time available. The model demonstrated how the CASoS solution would 
work in practice to solve real-world problems. 
The CASoS theory’s engineering framework with required capabilities and systems 
engineering approach apply as a workable solution to real world problems. For the naval 
tactical domain, the CASoS engineering approach takes advantage of existing warfare 
assets. The existing naval warfare assets are a result of many years of research, 
development, and investment. The CASoS approach incorporates these assets into the 
solution framework, implementing them with a new adaptive and intelligent system of 
systems architecture to benefit from their individual performance and create new 
opportunities for emergent collaborative behavior. This approach maximizes the 
performance of existing warfare assets to improve tactical warfighting operations. The 
CASoS systems engineering approach is workable—establishing an architecture that can 
implement a new solution and approach by adding new warfare assets as they become 
available and replace or update legacy assets. This allows for a naval tactical solution that 
can evolve as the threat space evolves and as technology evolves. 
4. Modifiability
Grounded theories can continue to evolve (or be modified) as new relevant data is 
discovered and compared to existing data, and when this results in a required change to the 
theory. A theory is modifiable that can be altered in this situation. As the field of complex 
systems science continues to develop, it is possible that new data (from observing new 
phenomena) may be discovered that modifies our understanding of complexity. The growth 
of new technologies might enable new observations or offer new solution capabilities. This 




environment which might require additional or revised characteristics and principles of a 
CASoS to address them. The CASoS theory is organized and described in a way that allows 
for possible revisions. Possible modifications could include revisions to the: 
• Characterization of highly complex operational environments 
• Characteristics of a CASoS 
• Principles of a CASoS 
• Conceptualization of the required engineered capabilities of a CASoS 




A. SUMMARY OF RESULTS
This dissertation was motivated by the existence and rise of highly complex
problems, and the need to engineer solutions to address them. These problems are 
characterized by their unpredictability, numerous and distributed negative (and often dire) 
effects, and non-linearity. They present a complex decision space for solutions, in which 
situational knowledge is incomplete and inaccurate, reaction times are highly shortened, 
and there are a large number of diverse and distributed resources to direct. Evidence has 
shown that highly complex problems overwhelm traditionally engineered systems that are 
not adaptive and do not produce the necessary complex behavior. This dissertation 
developed a theory for a new class of systems, CASoS, which can be engineered to address 
these complex problems. The CASoS theory establishes the definition, characteristics and 
principles for this new class of system solutions. The research also studied the implications 
of this theory, producing a conceptualization of an engineered CASoS and a CASoS 
systems engineering approach. 
The dissertation research followed a classic grounded theory approach, studying 
systems theory knowledge domains and engineering process domains to allow the 
conceptual CASoS theory to emerge. As an intentionally designed and engineered CASoS 
does not yet exist, it was necessary to gather and study data from systems and complexity 
theorists to understand what characteristics and principles would be needed to address the 
problem domain. Classic grounded theory provided a rigorous qualitative approach 
necessary to allow a theory to emerge from the data. This study relied primarily on 
literature review as the source of data. The data consisted of established ideas and theories 
that were then extended to create the new CASoS theory. The research followed three 
phases: an initial phase with low level coding that produced the CASoS as a core variable; 
an intermediate phase with medium level coding that produced the CASoS theory; and an 





The primary results of the dissertation were twofold: (1) the establishment of a 
theory for the new class of systems solutions: CASoS, and (2) the derived 
conceptualization and approach for engineering a CASoS. The dissertation research 
focused on producing these results as a response to the original research question: what are 
the characteristics of CASoS and how can they be engineered to address highly complex 
problems? 
The CASoS theory established a definition and a set of characteristics and 
principles of this new class of systems. CASoS are systems that adapt to their environment 
through complex interactions among their self-organizing constituent systems, giving rise 
to purposeful, emergent, meta-level, and multi-minded behavior. CASoS are a unique 
blend of complex systems with major elements and characteristics from systems of systems 
and complex adaptive systems. They are comprised of a large number of heterogeneous, 
distributed constituent systems that are highly connected and can adapt by performing 
autonomous processes that use the outcomes of their interactions and behavior to select a 
subset for replication and enhancement. The characteristics of CASoS are openness; 
dynamic internal and external boundaries; constituent system variety; adaptive 
architectures that promote collaboration among highly connected and distributed 
constituent systems; behavior that is multi-level, multi-minded, purposeful, self-
organizing, collaborative, adaptive, and evolving; and complexity that is detailed, dynamic, 
resilient and at times, nonlinear. The principles that apply to CASoS are the Principle of 
Holism, the Contextual Principle, the Goal Principle, the Principle of Operational Viability, 
the Principle of Requisite Variety, the High Flux Principle, and the Information Principle. 
The class of CASoS lie within the intersection of the class of SoS and the class of complex 
systems. CASoS distinguish themselves from these classes of systems through their 
purposeful adaptive behavior, through their ability to self-organize, through their adaptive 
architecture, and through their ability to anticipate the future by creating internal models 
and hypothesizing the effects and consequences of their intended behaviors.  
The implications of the CASoS theory produced a conceptualization of an 
engineered CASoS and a CASoS systems engineering approach. Engineered CASoS rely 




the ability to discover knowledge, and the ability to predict the outcomes and effects of 
actions and use this to guide desired behavior. These capabilities rely on an underlying 
decision paradigm in which distributed intelligent agents share information, produce a 
shared awareness, identify actions necessary to address a problem space, and make 
decisions to self-organize and produce emergent behavior based on a holistic and 
collaborative perspective. Constituent systems must synchronize their decision-making to 
enable purposeful multi-minded and multi-level behavior that can be responsive, reactive, 
and proactive, to address the dynamically changing problem space. These engineered 
capabilities produce a solution that is both adaptive and evolving.  
CASoS solutions require a top-down and adaptive systems engineering process. 
The CASoS SE approach is based on three goals: (1) to engineer a solution that can address 
a highly complex problem; (2) to ensure that CASoS emergent behavior is desired and that 
undesired emergence is avoided; and (3) to engineer a solution that can evolve over time 
as the problem domain changes. The CASoS SE approach has two phases. The first phase 
is a top-down needs analysis, design, and development, test, and evaluation of an adaptive 
architecture and set of initial constituent systems embedded with intelligent agents. The 
second phase is the adaptive operational and development phase during which CASoS 
operations occurs in parallel with an on-going process of continued needs analysis, design, 
development, test, and evaluation. During the second phase, an operational CASoS has the 
ability to adaptively address the changing problem domain. A parallel process of recursive 
development of additional constituent systems and intelligent agent updates relies on the 
CASoS built-in ability to anticipate the future problem space and additional resource needs. 
Theory validation was accomplished by a modeling and simulation analysis using 
a highly complex naval tactical problem domain as an application of the CASoS approach. 
The analysis compared a baseline non-CASoS approach that represented an abstraction of 
current tactical operations with the CASoS solution approach. These two variants were 
applied to a blue force strike group in a highly complex A2/AD threat environment. The 
analysis evaluated each variant according to their ability to defend blue assets, react and 
kill red forces quickly, and take advantage of a set of diverse weapon assets. The analysis 




decreasing blue casualties, decreasing the time required to kill red forces, and 
implementing an improved layered defense. The analysis also demonstrated that the 
CASoS solution was superior to the baseline approach even as the threat environment 
increased in complexity. The analysis showed that if Navy SoS are designed with more of 
the characteristics and behaviors of complex adaptive systems, they will have improved 
tactical performance in complex operational environments. The modeling and simulation 
analysis demonstrated the value of the CASoS characteristics and principles as enablers of 
the improved solution for the naval tactical problem domain. The naval tactical application 
and modeling and simulation results demonstrated the four validation criteria of grounded 
theories: fit, relevance, workability, and modifiability. 
B. DISSERTATION CONTRIBUTIONS 
The primary contribution of this dissertation is a theory for an engineered system 
solution and approach to address highly complex problems. This theory describes a new 
class of systems, a conceptualization of required engineered capabilities, and a systems 
engineering approach to produce them. The engineered CASoS theorized in this 
dissertation overcomes the challenges of highly complex problems that emerge from 
operationally complex environments by taking advantage of the capability opportunities 
from information technology advancements and applying a holistic and adaptive systems 
engineering architecture and process. 
The second contribution is an addition to the body of systems theory knowledge in 
the form of a theory for a new class of systems: CASoS. Systems theory is a discipline that 
began in the 1920s as Ludwig von Bertalanffy identified the benefits of a holistic 
perspective for conducting biological research to overcome the limitations of a reductionist 
approach. The discipline had significant advancements in the 1940s as academics 
contributed systems theories in information theory, cybernetics, game theory, and the 
social sciences. The field has continued to grow through advancements in systems 
engineering with the recognition of vast improvements in technology development by 
employing a systems approach. This dissertation contributes to this field through the 
definition, characteristics, and principles of the new CASoS class of systems. This theory 
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relied on a grounded theory methodology, which roots (or grounds) the theory in a 
foundation of concepts, ideas, and existing theories from the systems discipline body of 
knowledge. 
The third contribution is the addition of a novel approach to the discipline of 
systems engineering. This new SE approach provides guidance for engineering an adaptive 
solution to a changing problem domain. Specifically, this dissertation describes a proposed 
CASoS SE approach for a top-down adaptive process, which promotes continuous design 
and development in parallel with operations following an initial build of an adaptive 
architecture and system of intelligent constituent systems. The CASoS SE approach 
extends the systems engineering body of knowledge and opens up a new field for studying 
CASoS as engineered solutions to complex problem domains. 
C. FUTURE WORK
This dissertation identifies a number of new and interesting applications and
research areas. The high-level conceptualization and systems engineering approach that 
derived from the CASoS theory present rich areas for further research, modeling, and 
development. This section describes opportunities for future work resulting from this 
dissertation. 
Studying CASoS applications to complex problem domains is an immediate need 
with critical implications. This area of future work begins with the identification of highly 
complex problems, which could be addressed by a CASoS solution. Problem domain 
applications include: military tactical operations (including naval tactical maritime 
operations, army land-based tactical operations, joint and coalition theater and area 
operations, littoral combat, missile defense, special forces operations, space as a military 
domain); future complex airspace (including commercial, personal, military, and 
unmanned aviation); future automated land-based transportation (with future self-driving 
cars and associated automation in navigation and traffic control); cyberspace (as 
automation and networks continue to increase presenting great vulnerabilities); and global 




distribution). Future work would focus on developing conceptual designs for engineered 
CASoS solutions to these problem domains. 
A number of interesting studies involving modeling CASoS behavior can be 
conducted to better understand CASoS behavior. Studies can include: understanding 
emergent behavior as designed from a top-down perspective; studying the effects of 
uncertainty that can result from incomplete and inaccurate data (studying how this affects 
knowledge discovery, predictive analytics, and decision-making); studying the expected 
performance capabilities of multi-level, multi-minded constituent systems under a variety 
of operational scenarios; studying complex problem domains based on different 
operational scenarios; studying temporal effects on CASoS decision-making (how decision 
time affects decisions and their outcomes); studying predictive analytic methods (studying 
their effect on decisions and decision outcomes).  
An important contributing study would be the review of data analytic methods to 
support a more detailed design of CASoS intelligent agents. Many data analytics and 
artificial intelligence method exist and continue to be developed. A review of these 
methods could identify effective capabilities and applications in support of CASoS 
decision-making, prediction, knowledge discovery, data management, self-awareness, 
situational awareness, synchronization among distributed intelligent agents, developing 
confidence levels associated with knowledge and decision. Identifying these methods will 
support the eventual detailed design of a CASoS intelligent agent. 
Developing a more detailed design of the CASoS adaptive architecture is an area 
of future work. This dissertation lays the foundation for the characteristics, principles, and 
high-level capabilities required for a CASoS architecture. Next steps would include the 
development of detailed requirements, detailed design, and modeling of the architecture 
structure and functionality. Specific detailed architecture designs would require the 
identification of a problem domain application. Areas of study would include distributed 
data management architectures, data formats, data basing, knowledge representation and 
management, data mining, and data communications (required data rates and bandwidth). 
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Another important and interesting area of study would be the human machine 
interaction (HMI) with a CASoS system. Much of the CASoS knowledge discovery and 
decision-making would require automation. However, depending on the problem domain, 
human interaction with this process would be necessary. One type of HMI study would be 
to identify required human interaction for each specific problem domain application. This 
would first require understanding the types of decisions that need to be made and then to 
study how humans need to participate in this process. Areas that need to be studied include: 
the use of HMI modes (manual, semi-automated, fully automated), the design of effective 
interfaces for human participation, a study of human trust to better understand what types 
of information and interactions support appropriate levels of human trust and skepticism 
in HMI decision-making; and the role of multiple humans given a system of distributed 
systems requiring HMI for synchronized decision-making. 
A final area of future work that would extend the knowledge of CASoS 
implementation would be a detailed study of the systems engineering life cycle for a 
CASoS. This dissertation presents a high-level approach for a top-down adaptive SE 
approach to engineering a CASoS. This framework requires more detailed studies in a 
number of areas. These include studying CASoS acquisition, program management, test 
and evaluation, production, integration of intelligent agents into existing systems, 
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APPENDIX A. SELECTIVE CODING: TYPES OF SYSTEMS 
This appendix explores what it means to view the world in a “systemic” way. 
Understanding systems theory, systems thinking, characteristics of systems, and purposeful 
systems provides a background, context, and theoretical basis for developing theories for 
system of systems and complex system solutions. 
A good starting place is the definition of a system as “an open set of 
complementary, interacting parts with properties, capabilities and behaviors of the whole 
set emerging both from the parts and from their interactions” (Hitchins 2005, 1). 
A. SYSTEMS THEORY
Scientists seek to understand phenomena. Historically they have reduced objects
into parts to determine what each part does in an attempt to better understand the whole. 
Douglas Hofstadter (1979) jokes that “reductionism is the most natural thing in the world 
to grasp. It’s simply the belief that ‘a whole can be understood completely if you understand 
its parts, and the nature of their ‘sum’’” (Hofstadter 1979, 312). Scientists have continued 
this reductionist approach, discovering that each part is comprised of smaller parts and so 
on (Bar Yam 2004a). What is left out of this approach are the relationships that exist 
internally between the parts of objects and externally with their environment. Systems 
science recognizes the limitations of reductionism and takes a holistic and expansionist 
approach to understanding phenomena. This approach views the world in terms of 
“systems,” studying system behaviors and how they interact with their environments.  
Systems theory had its beginnings in the late 1920s as the need for a systems 
approach arose when the biologist, Bertalanffy realized that the reductionist and 
mechanistic approach of physicists and other scientists up until that point failed to provide 
a complete understanding of physical phenomenon. Specifically, a mechanistic approach 
cannot fully explain the biological phenomena of life. Bertalanffy advocated an approach 
to biology that considered the organism as a whole or a system. He based this approach on 
the fact that organisms are open systems. He developed the General Systems Theory (GST) 




to address system concepts such as: order, organization, wholeness, and teleology 
(purposeful phenomena or behavior); all of which had been neglected by mechanistic 
science (Bertalanffy 1950, 1951, 1968, 1972). 
Bertalanffy saw organismic and systems theory as representing what Kuhn (1962) 
called paradigm shifts, or revolutions in scientific thought and theory. He saw this as a 
departure from classical analytical (reductionist) science that was dependent on 1) the 
isolation of component parts and, 2) the linear behavior of the parts themselves. He cited 
Rapoport (1966) who asserted that systems represent organized complexity with 
interactions that are non-linear. 
In the late 1940s, further theoretic advancements contributed to the rethinking and 
broad applications of system science. Norbert Wiener published his theory of cybernetics 
in 1948, based upon emerging developments in computer technology, self-regulating 
machines, and information theory. Cybernetics focuses on the servomechanisms that 
provide for negative feedback behavior in teleological (self-regulating, goal-seeking) 
systems. Bertalanffy saw cybernetics as a special case of the general theory of systems, 
focused on control systems that use communication and information transfer between the 
system and its environment and feedback of the system’s function about the environment. 
The development of cybernetics coincided with Shannon’s information theory (1948), and 
Neumann and Morgenstern’s game theory (1944). Wiener suggested the application of 
cybernetics and information theory went far beyond engineering to the fields of biology 
and the social sciences. The mathematics and principles of cybernetics developed by 
Wiener, Rosenblueth, Bigelow, Ashby, and others—informed by social scientists Lewin, 
Bateson, Mead, and Deutsch—was promoted as having equal weight in mechanical, 
biological, and social systems (Porter 2016). Shannon and Weaver’s information theory, 
which plays a large role in both cybernetics and GST, can be described as the isomorphic 
mapping of information onto the concepts of negative entropy in thermodynamics of open 
systems. However, much more recently, Hitchins (1992) reminds us that classical science 
and engineering concentrate on closed systems. He points out that although the second law 
of thermodynamics shows that entropy, the amount of disorder, increases with time in a 
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closed system, this knowledge is not very useful since the systems we normally see and 
interact with are open systems.  
Ackoff and Emery (1971) explain this revolution in thought as a methodological 
key to open doors previously closed to science. Before the systems revolution scientists 
derived their understanding of how things function using reductionist methods to study the 
parts and their structure. Now scientists tend to derive an understanding of the parts and 
their relationships by first understanding the functioning of the whole. The advent and 
evolution of computers has supported this revolution. Computers have enabled scientists 
to study systems that are far more complex by using non-linear computational models. 
Computer simulation has replaced some laboratory and field experimentation to expedite 
an understanding of complex systems. Adams et al. (2014) write that systems theory is 
necessary for understanding multidisciplinary systems. They point out the benefits from 
the application of systems theory to multidisciplinary systems and their related problems. 
The multi-disciplinary and systemic-perspectives of this 20th century paradigm shift in 
scientific inquiry established an ideological foundation for the current focus of systems 
science on nonlinearity and uncertainty in the behavior of complex systems. 
B. SYSTEMS THINKING
Systems thinking is a way of understanding problems and developing solutions
using a systemic approach. Modern system theorists are concerned with system thinking 
and its many applications. A number of recent books and articles discuss the use of systems 
thinking for business applications as well as for addressing complex problems. This section 
describes systems thinking and highlights aspects of using it as an approach for grappling 
with complex problems. Note: There is a distinction between systems thinking and 
systematic thinking: systems thinking focuses on relationships and interdependencies; 
systematic thinking is process driven and tends to be reductionist. 
Systems thinking fits in alongside science and engineering as a type of inquiry for 
gaining knowledge and truth (Zandi 2000). Employing expansionism over reductionism 
enables the inclusion of context and environment into inquiries. Systems thinking 
necessarily includes more real world considerations than classical science inquiries. These 
218 
real world inquiries include irreversibility, complexity, emergent properties, 
indeterminism, complementarity, and open systems. Zandi (2000, 12) writes that “the most 
important implication of system thinking is that almost every problem that is perceived to 
be well-structured is at best really an approximation of an ill-structured one, and it depends 
on the purpose of inquiry whether or not the approximation is acceptable.” 
Figure 75.  Systems Thinking Process. Source: Hitchins (1992). 
The systems thinking method begins with a description of the real world in terms 
of systems. Real world entities are identified and represented as systems and their 
boundaries, components, structure, and relationships are defined. Principles and 
characteristics of the systems are elicited from the system’s relationships and behavior. 
Finally, their behavior is described in terms of inputs, outputs and state descriptions 
(Checkland 1993). Hitchins (1992) developed a cyclical model of a systems thinking 
process based on Checkland’s soft systems methodology. Figure 75 shows this cyclical 
model. It illustrates a series of steps that begin and in end in the real world. The real world 
problem is mapped into the “systems thinking world” in steps 3 and 4. These steps view 
and model the problem systemically. The next steps compares the system model of the 
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world with the real world problem to ascertain desirable changes (step 6) and determines 
improvements and actions (step 7). 
There are a number of benefits to approaching a problem using system thinking. 
Systems thinking in terms of structure, connectedness, relationships, and context are 
enablers for understanding complex systems and behaviors. A systems view facilitates 
holistic knowledge of systems in their context. It enables objects to be viewed as networks 
of related systems, embedded within larger networks (Capra 1996). 
According to Gharajedaghi (2011), in his book on applying systems thinking to 
business applications, there are three categories of systems thinking: holistic thinking, 
operational thinking, and design thinking. He writes that the three are interrelated and 
complementary, and that they are all necessary to deal with the complexities of emerging 
chaotic environments. His work focuses on applying system thinking to sociocultural 
business organizations, but his systems methodology has application for engineered 
systems as well. Holistic thinking is acquiring and iteratively expanding one’s 
understanding of the structure, function, and process of a system concurrently. Operational 
thinking is a focus on relationships: understanding interactions, interconnections, activity 
flow, and the rules of the game. It provides insight into how systems do what they do: how 
system structural elements produce desired functions. Design thinking focuses on a desired 
outcome or future and developing ways to get there. Design thinking often requires dealing 
with real world, ill-defined, and ill-structured problems. All three types of thinking are 
important aspects of systems thinking and provide a foundation for engineering CASoS. 
C. CHARACTERISTICS AND PRINCIPLES OF SYSTEMS
This section provides definitions, concepts, and theories concerning the
characteristics and principles pertaining and related to systems. Hitchins (2009, 1) defines 
systems as “open sets of complementary, interacting parts with properties, capabilities and 
behaviors of the whole set emerging both from the parts and from their interactions.” He 
generalizes systems in his book, Putting Systems to Work (1992), as containing interrelated 
components, interactions with their environment in the form of inflow and outflow and 
220 
with a set of characteristics including physical properties, capacity, order, structure, and 
information. Figure 76 presents his illustration of a generalized system.  
Figure 76.  A General View of Any System. Source: Hitchins (1992). 
Before discussing the characteristics and principles of general systems, the concept 
of an “absolutely ideal system” is presented. Petrov (2002) defines an absolutely ideal 
system as one that is perfect in terms of performing all possible functions at the right time 
and in the right place with total effectiveness and no negative effects. He explains that an 
absolutely ideal system would not consume power, material, energy, or information. 
Although such systems do not exist, the concept of an ideal system provides a good 
construct for understanding the characteristics and principles of real-world systems.  
This section presents general characteristics and principles of systems. System 
characteristics are distinguishable features or qualities that belong to systems and serve to 
identify systems. System principles are fundamental assumptions or concepts that serve to 
guide system behavior or conduct in their environment. Axioms are established principles 




The architecture is the form of the system. It is the structure in which the subsystems 
or components are organized in relation to each other. The components may be physical 
entities or abstractions. The relationships may be physical or logical interfaces and 
examples of component exchanges include information, power, and heat. Checkland 
(1993) writes that systems must show some degree of organization beyond a random 
aggregate of components. He also explains the importance of hierarchy in understanding 
system architecture, noting that systems are usually part of a hierarchy being comprised of 
subsystems and are often part of a wider system.  
b. Behavior
A system’s behavior is another fundamental distinguishing characteristic. System 
behavior is defined as the actions performed internally in conjunction with itself or 
externally in conjunction with its environment. System behavior may arise in response to 
external stimuli or may be purposeful. System behavior can be conscious or subconscious; 
internal or external; and voluntary or involuntary. Emergent system behavior is that which 
arises from a combination of internal subsystem relationships and behaviors. One method 
for understanding system behavior is to identify system states. Ashby (1956) describes 
behavior as the internal state of the system in terms of suitable variables and changes from 
one state to another. Another method for understanding system behavior is in terms of a 
“black box.” Checkland (1993) explains that a system can be viewed as a “black box” 
embodying a transformational process, which converts inputs into outputs. This method 
focuses on the beginning and end states rather than on the internal system mechanisms 
creating the behavior.  
c. Boundary
The boundary of a system distinguishes it from its environment, defining what 
entities are inside the system and which are not. The system boundary is a construct that 




machines, money, information, energy, and influences (Checkland 1993). The system 
boundary can be defined by the set of interactive variables under the control of the system. 
Alternatively, entities outside the system boundary can be described as all those variables 
that may affect the system, but which are not controlled by the system. According to Zandi 
(2000), if an entity affects the purpose of a system and is controlled by the system, then it 
belongs to the system and is within the system’s boundary. He writes that if an entity affects 
a system, but is not controlled by the system, then it belongs to the environment and is 
outside the system’s boundary. Finally, he explains that if an entity has no effect on a 
system and is not controlled by the system, then it is irrelevant in terms of the system 
description. 
d. Openness 
Open systems interact with their environments and maintain a continuous inflow 
and outflow in a state of thermodynamic equilibrium called a steady state (Hitchins 1992). 
Gharajedaghi (2011) points out that this interaction means that open systems can only be 
understood in the context of their environment. Checkland (1993) reiterates this idea that 
no problem or solution involving open systems is valid free of its context.  
2. System Principles and Axioms 
a. Principle of Adaptation and Viability Axiom 
The principle of adaptation describes the ability of a system to endure in a changing 
environment if it has the ability to adapt. Hitchins (1992, 63) writes “a set of open, 
interacting systems in a changing environment will endure only if they can adapt to that 
environment. Hence the mean rate of adaptation must exceed the mean rate of change of 
environment.” This indicates that a system must not only have the ability to adapt, but must 
also be able to adapt quickly enough to endure the tempo of changes in the environment. 
The viability axiom is intrinsically linked to the principle of adaptation. The 
viability axiom explains that key system parameters need to be controlled to ensure the 
system can endure in a changing environment (Adams et al. 2014). The viability axiom 
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implies that a system’s design should allow it to identify and address changes in its 
environment to sustain itself. 
b. Centrality Axiom
The centrality axiom as applied to systems refers to two pairs of mutually dependent 
propositions that exist in (or are central to) all systems. The first pair is emergence and 
hierarchy. The second pair is communication and control. Checkland (1993, 75) writes 
about these concepts at length and argues that “systems thinking is founded upon two pairs 
of ideas, those of emergence and hierarchy, and communications and control.” In simple 
terms, a system’s hierarchy is intrinsically related to its emergent behavior. This implies 
that the system’s architecture of relationships between elements at one level and between 
hierarchical levels is associated with the system’s emergent properties. Similarly, a systems 
ability to control its behavior is intrinsically related to its ability to communicate 
information. For open systems that interact with a changing environment, the ability to 
adapt is dependent on the communication of information for purposes of regulation or 
control. Thus, these two abilities are mutually dependent and “central” to enduring open 
systems.  
c. Principle of Connected Variety
The principle of connected variety states that interacting systems create a condition 
of stability within an environment that increases with system variety and/or degree of 
connectedness. Therefore, as more systems interact and as their interactions increase and 
diversify, the more probable it will become that the output and input of systems will lead 
to a condition of stability (Hitchins 1992, 63). This principle is evident in complementary 
systems, which are open systems that have mutually satisfying inputs and outputs. Stability 
within an environment is likely to increase as the number of complementary systems and 
their interactions increase. This principle has beneficial implications for achieving stability 
in changing and complex environments. 
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d. Contextual Axiom (Environment)
The contextual axiom states that a system is only fully understood by also 
understanding its context or environment. Adams et al. (2014, 119) write that “system 
meaning is informed by the circumstances and factors that surround the system.” The 
contextual axiom implies that understanding a system’s environment is a necessary part of 
understanding the system itself. This axiom conveys the importance of thinking 
expansively and holistically when defining systems to ensure that the system’s 
environment is part of the definition. 
e. Principle of Cyclic Progression
The principle of cyclic progression explains a cyclic relationship between system 
variety and a system life cycle of decay and regeneration. This principle addresses the 
phenomenon that systems do not last forever (Hitchins 1992). Figure 77 shows that as a 
dominant mode emerges and suppresses system variety, the dominant mode decays or 
collapses and survivors emerge that eventually regenerate variety. The cycle then repeats 
itself. The dominant mode might represent a particular system behavior that is favored over 
others. It could also represent a dominant interaction or hierarchical level.  
Figure 77.  Cyclic Progression. Source: Hitchins (1992). 
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f. Law of Entropy
Entropy can be seen as a measure of the probability in which a closed system leads 
to a state of most probable distribution (disorder). Open systems maintain themselves in a 
steady state (dynamic equilibrium) that can avoid the increase of entropy and self-organize 
toward increased order and organization. A good example of this difference is seen in the 
law of dissipation in closed systems in physics and the law of evolution in open systems in 
biology. On the one hand, the second law shows closed system events in nature tending 
toward dissipative states of disorder and on the other hand, evolution demonstrates an open 
system tendency toward higher order, heterogeneity, and organization. 
g. Principles of Equifinality and Multifinality
The Principle of Equifinality states that the final state of an open system can be 
reached by different initial conditions and by different processes. Open systems exchange 
materials with their environment via inflows and outflows. These processes can allow 
different paths to lead to the same end state. However, the opposite is true for closed 
systems. Closed systems do not interact with their environment, so there is a direct cause-
and-effect relationship between the initial and final states of a closed system. Therefore, 
the final condition of a closed system is determined by the initial conditions. The principle 
of equifinality highlights an important distinction between open and closed systems. This 
concept was originated by the biologist, Hans Driesch and applied later by Bertalanffy. 
The Principle of Multifinality describes the condition in open system when similar 
initial conditions lead to dissimilar end states. Multifinality leads to the concept of 
emergence. 
h. Law of Evolution
For biological systems, evolution is the change in the inherited characteristics of 
populations over many successive generations (Gould 2002). Evolution is a process of 
selection among variation. Petrov (2002) developed a set of laws that define a general 
direction of evolution for human-made technology systems. He identified system behaviors 




improving the degree of ideal performance; irregularity within the evolution of system 
components that lead to new dominant features; an increase in system dynamics due to 
environmental changes; new variations of coordination among systems; and transitions 
from systems to super systems. System evolution can lead to novel methods of addressing 
complexity.  
i. Principle of Expansionism 
The principle of expansionism refers to the process of embedding a system under 
consideration into a larger system in order to better understand the system’s emerging 
properties. It can be thought of as zooming out from the perspective of the original system 
to understand its context within a larger perspective. Zandi (2000) points out that the 
problem with the process of expansionism is that as the problem under study enlarges, it 
inevitably ends up at the level of the entire universe.  
j. Information Axiom 
The information axiom simply states that systems have the ability to create, possess, 
exchange, and modify information (Adams et al. 2014). The information axiom provides 
insight into how systems produce information and how information affects systems. 
k. Principle of Limited Variety 
The Principle of Limited Variety explains that a limit exists in terms of system 
differentiation that ultimately limits stability of interacting systems within their 
environment. Hitchins (1992, 64) writes that “variety in interacting systems is limited by 
the available space and the minimum degree of differentiation.” There are only so many 
different types of systems that can exist and only so much “space” for increased 
specialization and differentiation. The limits to differentiation create a limit to the ability 
for connected and interacting systems to address and adapt to their environment. Therefore, 
the principle of limited variety affects the principle of connected variety. 
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l. Principle of Multidimensionality and Principle of Plurality
The Principle of Multidimensionality explains the ability for systems with opposing 
tendencies to coexist, interact, and form complementary relationships (Gharajedaghi 
2011). In some cases, this principle extends to more than two variables within a system. 
Gharajedaghi (2011) discusses a fallacy that has dominated thought—that opposing 
tendencies comprise a zero-sum game in which conflicting entities are conceptualized as 
mutually exclusive and discrete. He gives sociological examples such as security vs. 
freedom; collectivity vs. individuality; modernity vs. tradition; rights of victims vs. rights 
of accused. However, within system frameworks, it is possible for opposing tendencies to 
coexist through a variety of system behaviors or interconnected multi-system behaviors. 
The Principle of Plurality simply means that systems can have multiple structures, 
functions, and processes. The principle of plurality is the means by which systems can 
exhibit the principle of multidimensionality. Gharajedaghi (2011, 43) argues that this 
principle “denies the classical view of a single structure with a single function in a single 
cause-and-effect relationship.” Plurality of function can manifest itself as implicit and 
explicit functions. Plurality of structure refers to heterogeneity and variability in system 
elements and relationships. Plurality of process implies that the process, in addition to the 
initial conditions, contributes to the future state of the system. 
m. Principle of Preferred Patterns
The Principle of Preferred Patterns refers to interactions between systems and that 
particular patterns of interactions are likely to be preferred or to become more dominant 
over time. Hitchins (1992) writes that as system interactions increase and become more 
complex, it is more probable that feedback loops and mutual causality will arise through 
recursive system exchanges. These loops may result in stability or locally stable 
configurations (patterns) among the interacting systems. This principle addresses the 
emergence of dominance. Hitchins (1992) describes several examples of this principle. He 
explains that the short-term dominance of some high-tech organizations indicate a 
“preferred pattern” of behavior that is counter to the long-held theory of supply and demand 




configurations in a discovery made by Duncan and Rouvray (1989) of small aggregates of 
atoms forming discrete phases of matter in very stable configurations. 
D. PURPOSEFUL SYSTEMS 
A type of system that is of particular interest is the purposeful system. This type of 
system is defined as “one that can change its goals in constant environmental conditions; 
it selects goals as well as the means by which to pursue them. It thus displays will” (Ackoff 
and Emery 1972, 31). The intent of engineered systems that are both complex and adaptive 
is to develop them in a way to enable them to select new goals in response to a changing 
environment. Thus, this section explores the nature of purposeful systems. 
This section begins with a discussion of the general classification of systems to 
provide context for purposeful systems. Kenneth Boulding (1956, 202) developed the 
general systems framework—an “arrangement of theoretical systems and constructs in a 
hierarchy of complexity.” He calls the most basic level the “static structure”—referring to 
the static relationships and patterns of natural phenomena such as electrons, cells, atoms, 
molecules, etc. The second level is the “simple dynamic system” with predetermined 
motions—the “clockworks” level. The third level is the “cybernetic system”—differing 
from the control mechanism in level two due to the “transmission and interpretation of 
information.” A thermostat is an example of the third level. The fourth level is the “open 
system” or “self-maintaining structure.” The fifth level is the “genetic-societal level,” 
typified by the plant, and characterized by differentiated and mutually dependent parts and 
“blueprinted” growth. The sixth level is the “animal level,” including abilities such as 
mobility, teleological behavior, and self-awareness. The seventh level is the “human level” 
including self-consciousness, which is different from self-awareness, because “he not only 
knows, but knows that he knows” (Boulding 1956, 135). Level eight is “social 
organization” which includes interrelationships, value systems, and social systems. Finally, 
level nine is “transcendental systems,” that Boulding describes as the “unknowables” or 
higher-level questions that do not have answers but do exhibit systematic structure and 
relationship. 
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Based on Ackoff and Emery’s (1972) definition of a purposeful system, they fit 
into Boulding’s system classification framework at level six and above. The systems below 
level six, such as plants with “blueprinted growth” (level five), the self-maintainers (level 
four) and the cybernetic “thermostat-like” systems (level three), exhibit behavior in a 
predetermined fashion based on environmental conditions. These “non-purposive” systems 
adapt to their environment and have characteristics that enable them to sense aspects of 
their environment including changes; however, they cannot change their goals in constant 
environmental conditions. This distinction is an important consideration for the 
engineering of system solutions that are purposeful and that can make decisions concerning 
their actions and behavior. Systems that include human participation in decision-making 
for behavioral actions are examples of purposeful systems. The other example is systems 
that include artificial intelligence or automated decision aids for determining purposeful 
actions. 
State-maintaining systems react to change to maintain their state under different 
environmental conditions. These types of system reactions are not necessarily purposeful 
or goal-seeking. Goal-seeking, or purposeful, systems have the ability to respond 
differently to a various environmental conditions to produce a particular and desired 
outcome (state). Gharajedaghi (2011) refers to this ability as “responsive” as opposed to 
“reactive,” which is the term he uses for the non-purposeful state-maintaining systems. 
Responsive systems have a choice of actions and the actions are voluntary. Additionally, 
purposeful systems can cause different end states (goals) under constant conditions. 
Gharajedaghi (2011) refers to this ability to change ends under constant conditions as “free 
will.” He writes that “such systems not only learn and adapt; they can also create” 
(Gharajedaghi 2011, 37).  
1. Characteristics of Purposeful Systems
a. Autonomy
Autonomy refers to the independence of purposeful systems whose behavior is not 




of independent action and decision-making. Engineering autonomous systems implies a 
need for artificial intelligence to enable automated decision-making. 
b. Self-organization 
Self-organization is a type of autonomous behavior. It refers to the ability of a 
system to adapt its structure (organize itself) to perform goal-driven behavior. This 
behavior is self-generated and self-initiated rather than being directed by an external entity 
(Nichols and Dove 2011). Azani (2009) describes self-organization as a process that results 
in increased order. Camazine et al. (2001) describe it as the emergence of patterns 
stemming from interactions among elements. Engineering self-organizing systems requires 
system knowledge of its own structure and the capability to reorganize itself to enable 
desired behavior. 
c. Situational Awareness 
Situational awareness (SA) is the ability to have a clear understanding of current 
events in the operational environment (Nichols and Dove 2011). SA requires a system’s 
ability to sense its environment and create a picture (or model) of its real world 
environment. In a changing environment, a system’s SA must also change over time to 
reflect changing events in the environment. SA has attributes such as spatial boundary, 
accuracy in time, completeness, accuracy per environment object or event. Endsley (2000) 
defines three levels of SA: (1) basic perception—monitoring the environment and 
identifying objects, (2) object correlation–understanding how objects influence objectives, 
and (3) prediction—projection of possible futures involving how the environment might 
change. The level of SA varies according to the sophistication of the purposeful system. 
d. Directiveness 
Directiveness refers to the level of direction levied on a system. Bertanffy (1950) 
mentioned “directiveness” as a characteristic of systems in his GST. Eckstein (1997) 
describes directiveness as an authority pattern that determines the extent of free choice of 
purposeful systems. Directiveness can be described as a continuum between total 
regimentation and total permissiveness. It is dependent on the extent to which directives 
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exist. Directives can add value or constrain action. They can also be accompanied by 
consequences for non-compliance. Directiveness is an important consideration for 
engineered systems. Directives can be used to constrain purposeful systems from undesired 
behaviors. Mechanisms for issuing directives and ensuring compliance with directives 
must be designed into engineering purposeful systems. 
e. Purposeful Evolution
Purposeful evolution is the ability of a system’s goals to evolve. This characteristic 
is necessary for systems that address complex environments whose changes over time 
require highly adaptable system solutions. Such environments may have unforeseen 
changes and problems. Alternatively, they may cause many different problems and 
missions for systems to address. Engineering systems that can handle evolving goals 
requires creative design processes that focus on flexible and evolving architectures 
allowing new variants of system interactions and behaviors.  
2. Principles and Axioms of Purposeful Systems
a. Goal Axiom
The Goal Axiom refers to systems achieving specific goals through purposeful 
behavior (Adams et al. 2014). The goal axiom is inherent to purposeful systems. For 
engineering purposeful systems, the aim is to design system structures and capabilities so 
that interactions and behaviors can lead to the pathways and means to achieve desired 
goals.  
b. Operational Axiom
The Operational Axiom states that purposeful systems can only be fully understood 
(or described) in their operational environments. This axiom provides guidance to system 
designers who must understand how the system will function to produce behavior and 




c. Design Axiom 
The Design Axiom refers to an intentional imbalance of relationships and resources 
in the design of a system. This purposeful imbalance arises from trades among limited 
resources that are never sufficient to satisfy all possible system behaviors and 
characteristics. This is related to the nonexistence of ideal systems. The Design Axiom 
provides guidance on planning and evolving a system how a system in a purposeful 
manner, given limited resources (Adams et al. 2014). 
d. Principle of Conditional Dependency 
The Principle of Conditional Dependency refers to how the behavior of each 
component in a system influences the behavior of all others. Ashby (1962) explains that 
system organization requires dependencies between all components and that self-
organizing systems have conditional dependency. Nichols and Dove (2011) point out that 
this does not require every system to be connected to every other system, but that 
dependencies will exist within systems.  
e. Principle of Counterintuitive Behavior 
The Principle of Counterintuitive Behavior refers to the condition in which desired 
behavior is the result of counterintuitive actions. This can also be described as a negative 
feedback loop in which actions in a certain direction have the opposite effect. An example 
is a thermostat in which applying a cold source to a thermostat’s sensor causes the furnace 
to turn on and produce heat. A sailboat is another example in which the rudder in the rear 
of the boat is turned to the left to cause the boat to steer to the right. Designers of engineered 
purposeful systems may employ this principle in certain circumstances. 
E. SYSTEMS OF SYSTEMS 
The concepts, “Systems within systems” and the more well-known “system of 
systems” (SoS), were first written about by Berry (1964) and Ackoff (1971). These new 
types of systems came into popularity in the 1990s as a number of systems engineers began 
to study them with regard to “joint warfighting” (Manthorpe 1996), “large-scale concurrent 
and distributed systems” (Kotov 1997), and “large networks of systems” (Shenhar 1994). 
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The SoS concept has continued to gain interest and assert itself as a sub-discipline of 
systems engineering, referred to as SoS engineering (SoSE). SoSE has evolved to address 
the unique challenges that characteristics of a SoS present. Much of the focus of SoSE has 
been on integrating existing systems with the prospect of purposefully gaining emergent 
capabilities through their interactions. Hitchins (2005, 5) criticizes the bottom-up 
integration of joining or networking existing systems together. He writes that such efforts 
are “very likely to inadvertently couple functions that were previously not coupled which 
may unwittingly be creating a complex mesh of unforeseen unwanted couplings, the 
behavior of which can be both unexpected and counter-intuitive.” SoSE is discussed later 
in this chapter. This section covers SoS theory and characteristics. 
A SoS is the meta-level system structure resulting from the collaboration of 
independent systems. The SoS exhibits increased functionality and performance 
capabilities, referred to as emergent behavior. Additionally, if any part of the SoS is lost or 
degraded, this will degrade the performance of the whole (Dagli and Kilicay-Ergin 2009). 
The concepts of collaboration and the meta-level within the SoS structure are important 
features for addressing complex problems. Both offer potentially significant advantages 
for engineered SoS—with the possibility of functionality at multiple levels and emergent 
behavior. Coupling these ideas with the system feature of purposefulness enables 
intentional goal-driven emergent functionality at multiple levels. This capability is the 
basis for seeking a SoS solution to complex problems. 
Hitchins (2005, 8) defines a SoS as “an open set of complementary, interacting 
systems with properties, capabilities and behaviors of the whole SoS emerging both from 
the systems and from their interactions.” Hitchins’ definition adds the important feature of 
openness and highlights the interaction of the systems to achieve the emerging capabilities 
and behaviors. Hitchins’ illustration of a SoS is shown in Figure 4. Hitchins explains that 
a SoS is the same as a system except with a simple hierarchy twist. He stressed the 
importance of approaching SoS from top-down, explaining that a bottom up approach will 
cause chaos as systems interact. He points to cooperation/coordination (or collaboration) 
and non-linear behavior as two essential aspects of SoS to study. However, the “other 
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constituent systems” shown in Figure 78 are not SoS’s since their subsystems are not 
independently functioning systems in their own right. 
Figure 78.  A System of Systems. Adapted from Hitchins (2003).  
1. Characteristics of SoS
a. Collaboration
Collaboration is goal-oriented interaction among systems to create emerging new 
functionality and/or increased performance. Collaboration is the cooperation and 
coordination of the actions of various independent systems. Different levels of 
collaboration exist. Collaboration among independent systems for desired external effects 
is the capability required to enable super systems or SoS to exist (Hitchins 2009).  
b. Non-linear Dynamics and Behavior
Non-linear dynamics and behavior describes physical systems in which the change 
of the output is not proportional to the change of the input. The behavior of nonlinear 
systems can be described by changes in variables over time, which may appear chaotic, 
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unpredictable, or counterintuitive. Nonlinear behavior is often the byproduct or result of 
complex systems interacting with each other and their environment (Hitchins 2009). Most 
open SoS’s exhibit nonlinear behavior—often at both the system level as well as the 
emergent meta-level, as it is interacting with its operational environment at both levels. 
c. Emergence
Emergence in SoS is the meta-level behavior that arises due to the interactions and 
behaviors of the constituent systems. This behavior emerges from system interactions, 
cooperation, distributed control, cascade effects and orchestration. (Fisher 2006). 
Emergent behavior enables a SoS to achieve its purpose or the shared goals of the 
autonomous constituents. Emergent behavior refers to system behaviors as a whole that are 
not a simple resultant combination of the subsystem actions. It refers to the “whole” being 
greater than the “sum of the parts.” Fisher (2006) discusses how SoS have holistic 
properties that cannot be accounted for by simply combining the actions of the constituents. 
In other words, SoS are not simply reducible.  
d. Interdependence
Interdependence describes the connections between constituent systems in a SoS. 
Bar-Yam (2004a) writes that when the constituent systems are independent of one another, 
they are free to respond in an independent manner to their environment. However, when 
the environmental demands on the systems become interlinked, an interdependence can 
arise if they are connected and can collectively respond to the demands. Effective SoS’s 
depend on interdependent systems to connect and collaborate. However, Bar-Yam (2004a) 
cautions that systems should only connect and become interdependent when the need arises 
and should otherwise remain independent.  
e. Interoperation
Interoperation refers to the cooperative interactions of constituent systems to 
generate adaptive emergent SoS behavior. Interoperation enables desired SoS emergent 
effects in continuously changing situations. Fisher (2006) discusses how this characteristic 




coordination among predictable components in predetermined solutions. He explains that 
interoperability depends on independent constituent systems sharing a common purpose 
and being able to act and interact to achieve that purpose. He writes that not all of the 
actions need to be coordinated, and that not all of the constituents need to support all 
aspects of the purpose. Further, that the constituents do not need to function correctly all 
of the time. However, Fisher explains that a sufficient degree of interoperation, cooperation 
and consistency of action must exist to produce the desired emergent behavior. 
f. Geographic Distribution 
Geographic distribution refers to the situation in which constituent systems are not 
collocated, but are spread out with geographic distance between them. Fisher (2006) and 
Maier (1998) list “geographic distribution” as a common characteristic of many, but not 
all, SoS. This characteristic affects the ability for constituent systems to interact and 
collaborate. It can have negative effects on the ability of a SoS to achieve desired emergent 
behavior. However, it can support the maintenance of autonomy among the constituent 
systems. It is an important consideration for the design of engineered SoS.  
g. Evolution 
SoS evolution refers to the evolution of goal-oriented emergent behavior over time 
in response to changing environments. Fisher (2006) describes most SoS as evolving with 
their behavior changing continuously as they adapt to their environment.  
h. Cascade Effects 
Cascade effects results from a single initial event or influence that causes a 
succession of system state changes (Fisher 2006). Cascade effects are commonly found in 
SoS as a result of multiple independent systems behaving and interacting. The cascade 
effect occurs whenever an external influence forms a chain of events in multiple systems. 
Cascade effects often occur in the interactions of constituent systems in a SoS. Their effects 
can amplify or dampen during the sequence of cascading state changes (Fisher 2006).  
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i. Connectedness
Connectedness is a term in graph theory that refers to paths between vertices (or 
communication links between systems). For a SoS, the measure of connectedness describes 
the density of the interfaces and interactions between constituent systems. It is an especially 
useful measure for SoS’s with distributed constituent systems; indicating the density of the 
interactions between the constituent systems, which is an indicator of interdependence, 
likeliness of cascade effects, likeliness of collaboration, and likeliness of emergent 
behavior. 
j. Multi-mindedness
Multi-mindedness is the ability of a SoS to address opposing (or non-
complementary) goals. Gharajedaghi (2011) introduces the concept of the “multi-minded” 
system of systems. He discusses this in the context of a multi-dimensional framework in 
which opposing tendencies can be complementary if considered in the plurality of function, 
structure, and process. With an emphasis on the interaction of systems within a SoS, an 
outcome of synergy, stability and an order of magnitude improvement of performance can 
be created. The multi-mindedness principle applies to a system of purposeful systems that 
share in the decision-making of their individual and collective actions. However, it 
“requires a collective understanding” among the constituent systems. 
F. COMPLEXITY
“Armageddon is not around the corner. This is only what the people of violence
want us to believe. The complexity and diversity of the world is the hope for the future” 
(Palin 2003, 1). 
Complexity is a result of open systems and their nonlinear interactions with each 
other and their environments. As mentioned earlier, the ever-advancing progression of 
computers and analytic computational methods has enabled a better understand complex 
behavior. These methods of identifying and understanding complex behavioral dynamics 
have spread to many disciplines that span the understanding of complexity in natural 




migrations, and epidemics]) and socio-technical systems (e.g., financial networks, social 
media interaction, communication systems, information systems, power systems, military 
conflicts, transportation, urban studies). Many universities and institutes are applying 
complexity theories and approaches to study a variety of natural and human-generated 
phenomena. They seek to understand the complexity and its causes and to prevent or lessen 
the damaging results of financial crises, natural disasters, and epidemics, to name a few. 
They hope that by studying complexity, they can better identify and predict complex 
behavior. 
This section provides an overview of complexity theory, defining complex systems 
and their principles and characteristics. It provides a literature review of existing concepts 
and theories for complex adaptive systems (CAS) and complex adaptive systems of 
systems (CASoS). 
1. Theories of Complexity 
A simple way to introduce complexity is with the BOAR principle: “complexity 
lies Between Order And Randomness” (Page 2011, 32) 
Complexity theory has arisen from observed phenomena that produced surprisingly 
unpredictable results from simple structures. (Honour 2006). Scientists and theoreticians 
studying these phenomena were unable to explain the behavior. Waldrop (1992) explains 
that complexity is operating at the “edge of chaos.” Complexity occurring in systems can 
be described as exhibiting chaotic behavior while also characterized by recognizable 
patterns (Honour 2006). Theorists explain that complex systems can withstand chaotic 
environments even as their structure or components change and adapt. The complex 
systems have enough adaptability to respond and survive by altering their behavior. 
Complex systems, therefore, provide useful solutions to complex environments through 
their dynamic characteristics (Honour 2006). 
Complexity theory contributes to an understanding of how environments affect 
complex systems and how they can learn by attempting alternative behavioral approaches 
for improvement (Dagli and Kilicay-Ergin 2009). This dissertation is grounded in a 
foundation of complexity theory—particularly as it applies to understanding complex 
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problems and developing complex system solutions. However, we keep in mind a 
cautionary principle that complexity is DEEP: “complexity cannot be easily Detected, 
Evolved, Engineered, or Predicted” (Page 2007, 32). 
Combining biology and system science with an understanding of thermodynamic 
equilibrium and entropy, has formed a foundation that has produced new theories of 
complexity and chaos. These theories are attempting to explain the non-linearity of 
interactive behavior in organic and inorganic systems (Ackoff 1981, Prigogine and 
Stengers 1984, Simon 1996). This section describes some of these theories. 
a. Chaos
Systems can be studied according to their behavior. Static systems do not change. 
Dynamic systems change with time. Dynamic system can exhibit linear and nonlinear 
behavior. Nonlinear dynamic systems can have behavior that ranges from orderly (even 
predictable) to chaotic (unpredictable). Complexity appears to belong in the region 
between order and chaos. Chaos refers to the long-term aperiodic behavior of a 
deterministic system that has a sensitive dependence on initial conditions. Long-term 
aperiodic behavior means that the behavior does not exhibit long-term regularity. 
“Common sense” would wrongly suggest that the future behavior of the chaotic system 
could be determined exactly from the behavior. The irregular behavior comes from the 
nonlinearity of component interactions, not from random driving forces. Sensitive 
dependence on initial conditions means that small changes in initial conditions lead to 
arbitrarily large differences in behavior over time. (Harney 2012) 
b. The 2nd Law of Thermodynamics
The 2nd Law of Thermodynamics states that in any closed system the amount of 
order can never increase, only decrease over time. Thus, in closed systems, entropy always 
increases. This law has important implications for complexity theory since many observed 
open systems (and life itself) contradicts this law. Richardson (2004a) points to the 
phenomena of self-organization in complex systems as being based on order emerging 




c. Interacting Agents 
Complexity can arise from the interaction of many systems or “agents.” Honour 
(2006) refers to these agents as “relatively independent” as they work together to produce 
emergent properties. The agents perform functions and their interactions produce emergent 
behavior. An example is the stock market with individual investors and individual public 
corporations as “agents” that buy and sell shares. Each agent attempts to achieve a better 
profit from their participation in the market. It is the purchases and sales of many agents 
that create the large-scale behavior of the stock market. 
d. Detail Complexity 
Detail complexity is the characteristic of detail in the scalability and increasing 
numbers of entities in complex systems that humans cannot comprehend due to natural 
cognitive limitations (Miller 1956, Senge 2006). This can manifest in limiting the abilities 
of larger and larger teams to communicate effectively (Cockburn 2001). Sterman (2000) 
writes that detail complexity is due to high levels of combinatorial complexity. He 
describes these as “needle-in-the-haystack” problems. An example is the task of optimally 
scheduling airline flights and crews. The complexity lies in finding the optimal solution 
out of an enormous number of possibilities. 
e. Dynamic Complexity 
Dynamic complexity occurs when the interaction between entities becomes more 
dominant than vertical influences. This can occur as the scale of the numbers of agents or 
and/or interactions grows (Robinson, Pawlowski and Volkov 2003, Senge 2006). As 
dynamic complexity increases, humans are no longer able to cognitively work with the 
large amounts of information and interactions. (Simon 1962). Sterman (2000) explains that 
dynamic complexity arises from the interactions among the agents over time. Often, the 
agents are simple systems and the complexity arises from the large number of components 
or combinations of possible courses of action. Dynamic complexity, instead, arises from 
the agent interactions, which often introduce time delays that add volatile unpredictability 
for the state of the system. Dynamic complexity is attributed to a number of factors 
including tight coupling, feedback, nonlinearity, adaptiveness, and self-organization. 
241 
f. Disorganized Complexity
Disorganized complexity occurs when the interactions of local entities tend to 
smooth each other out. For very large numbers of agents, disorganized complexity can 
cause an “unusually high value for one random value to be compensated for by an 
unusually low value of another” (Miller and Page 2007, 48). Thus, some fairly precise 
predictions can be made for the emergent behavior of complex systems exhibiting 
disorganized complexity. 
g. Organized Complexity
Organized complexity refers to unanticipated statistical regularities emerging in 
complex systems. These regularities “go beyond the usual bounds covered by the Central 
Limit Theorem (CLT) (Miller and Page (2007, 49–50).” For systems characterized by the 
CLT, interactions cancel one another out and result in a smooth bell curve. However, in 
cases of organized complexity, the interactions reinforce one another and result in 
abnormal behavior. Examples include earthquakes, floods, fires, stock market crashes, 
riots, and traffic jams. These types of complex systems exhibit emergent behavioral 
patterns that do not occur in normal distributions. 
h. Self-Organized Criticality
Self-organized criticality (SOC) refers to behaviors that cause self-organizing systems to 
converge to a critical point at which a small event can have a huge impact (Miller and Page 
2007. 165–176). An example is a house of cards. The addition of some cards cause the 
structure to become unstable or perhaps for a card to fall. However, it the point at which 
the entire structure collapses when a card is added that is a condition of SOC. 
2. Complex Systems
The science of complex systems studies how component systems and their 
interactions can give rise to emergent behaviors and how such systems interact with their 
environment (Bar-Yam 1997, 2004a). Complex systems are defined as large combinations 
of interacting elements (or components) that have no central control and whose interactive 




sense their environment and are able to process this information. They adapt to their 
environment through learning and evolution. They produce emergent and self-organizing 
behavior.  
The following is a list of properties of complex systems (Miller and Page 2007, 
Dagli and Kilicay-Ergink 2009).  
• A large number of decisions exist regarding design 
• A complex operational environment 
• The degree of control is decentralized rather than centralized 
• There are many objectives and some are inconsistent with others 
• The implications of design decisions are less predictable 
• Change at any level in the system may have system-wide impacts due to the 
interrelationships of parts and small changes within the system can have 
large effects at the system-level 
• Lateral influences in the system structure are stronger and more dominant 
than hierarchical relationships 
• System risk is dominated by system-level risk rather than local risk 
• Long-term planning is impossible 
• Dramatic change can occur unexpectedly 
• Short-term behavior can be predictable, but long-term behavior is 
unpredictable  
• Innovation and adaptation are possible 
Hitchins (2012) defines complexity as having just three components: variety, 
connectedness, and disorder. He explains that a system is more complex if there is greater 
variety in the components; if the number of connections between the components is large; 
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and if the variety and the connections are mixed and tangled-up, rather than orderly. Figure 
79 illustrates the difference between a noncomplex system that is weakly integrated and a 
complex system that is highly integrated. 
Figure 79.  Weakly vs. Highly Integrated Systems. Source: Calvano and John 
(2004). 
Figure 80 illustrates three categories of systems: ordinary, systems of systems, and 
complex systems. It shows examples of real world systems in each category.  
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Figure 80.  Systems According to Degree of Complexity. Adapted from White 
(2005). 
An important distinction to make is the difference between a complicated system 
and a complex system. Miller and Page (2007) explain that in complicated systems, the 
constituent systems are somewhat independent from one another. Therefore, if one 
constituent is removed, it doesn’t cause the total system to collapse. On the other hand, in 
a complex system, the constituents are more highly interrelated. Therefore, if a constituent 
system is removed from a complex system, it will have a negative affect and the complex 
system will no longer be able to accomplish its mission. Thus, complexity is known as a 
deep property of a system. Complicatedness is not a deep property of a system. Allen 
(2016) distinguishes between complex and complicated systems by their outcomes: 
complicated systems have a relatively high degree of certainty of outcome repetition; 
whereas complex system outcomes are often uncertain. The implication is that complex 
systems built from scratch will likely behave in unintended ways. 
The next two subsections present the characteristics and principles of complex 
systems.  
3. Complex System Characteristics
a. Emergent Behavior
Complex systems exhibit emergent behavior. These meta-level properties are only 
perceptible at the holistic level and cannot be understood or predicted from the lower-level 
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constituent behavior (Honour 2006). Emergent properties may be desirable, purposeful, 
unintentional, unpredictable, and/or destructive. 
b. Reflexivity
Reflexivity refers to the reflexive nature of the interactions of constituent systems 
in a complex system. Honour (2006) explains that as the constituent systems behave, their 
actions have impacts on other systems, which cause these systems to act in response. He 
explains that this reflexive response behavior causes a cascading effect of even more 
reflexive actions.  
c. Connectedness
Connected refers to the “tightly coupled” nature of agents within a complex system 
(Sterman 2000). Complex systems have strong internal interactions as well as strong 
interactions with their environment. This is consistent with Alberts (2011) descriptions of 
the “Age of Interactions” in which everything is connected to everything else.  
d. Governed by Feedback
Complex systems are governed by feedback. Because of their connectedness and 
strong interactions, the actions of complex systems alter their environment, which then 
triggers actions in other systems, giving rise to new situations, which influence the original 
complex system. Sterman (2000) writes that dynamic behavior arises from these many and 
varied feedback loops.  
4. Principles of Complex Systems
a. The Principle of System Holism
The principle of system holism is that the whole is greater than the sum of its parts. 
This implies that lower-level constituent behavior leads to higher-level behavior that 
cannot be derived from the micro-level from which it emerged (Richardson 2004a). 




b. The Principle of Local Information 
The principle of local information explains that in many complex systems, agents 
act on local information rather than global information (Honour 2006). Many complex 
system structures contain numerous agents, each of which communicates with only a few 
other nearby agents. 
c. The Darkness Principle 
The darkness principle explains that an outside viewer cannot have a complete 
understanding of a complex system (Richardson 2004a). Richardson (2004a) explains that 
representations of systems that are complex will automatically misrepresent certain 
aspects. He explains that the implication of this is that for complex systems, the only correct 
representation is the system itself. Richardson (2004a) explains that the darkness principle 
is due to the nonlinearity of complex systems, which he explains is irreducible. 
d. The 80/20 Principle 
The 80/20 principle explains that in a large complex system, only 20% of the system 
produces 80% of the output. 
e. The Principle of Behavior Prediction 
The principle of behavior prediction refers to the ability to predict the behavior of 
complex systems. This ability is dependent on gaining adequate knowledge of the system 
and its environment. It is also dependent on the forces of chaos and anti-chaos. Richardson 
(2004b) writes that the forces of chaos make prediction impossible while the forces of anti-
chaos make prediction possible. He explains, however, that most complex systems live 
somewhere between the two extremes so that effective prediction, while difficult, is 
actually possible.  
f. The Principle of Sub-Optimization 
The principle of sub-optimization refers to the efficiency of a complex system’s 
performance. If each constituent systems behavior is optimized, then the whole system’s 
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behavior will not be optimized. Also, the reverse is true—that if the system as a whole is 
optimized, then the constituent systems will not be optimized (Richardson, 2004b).  
g. The Principle of Irreversibility
The principle of irreversibility refers to the history-dependent nature of complex 
systems (Sterman 2000). Path dependence is when a system goes down one “path” (or takes 
one course of action) which then precludes it from taking others. The path taken ultimately 
determines the system’s end state or future. This notion of path-dependence explains how 
the behavior of complex systems is irreversible. An example of irreversibility is how it is 
impossible to unscramble an egg.  
h. The Principle of Self-Organization
The principle of self-organization explains how patterns of organized behavior arise 
spontaneously in complex systems. Sterman (2000) explains that small behaviors within 
complex systems are amplified and reoccur with feedback, causing the generation of higher 
level patterns of behavior. He describes examples such as the pattern of stripes on zebras, 
our rhythmic heartbeats, patterns in the real estate market, and the shapes of seashells. He 
explains that self-organizing behavior emerges spontaneously from the interactions and 
feedback among the small components within a large complex system. Nicolis (1989) add 
the idea that self-organization occurs without the control of an external source. 
5. Complex Adaptive Systems
“Complexity often leads to adaptation, in which the complex structure changes to 
better fit its environment. The complex structure responds to inputs from the environment 
that act as either threats or opportunities” (Honour 2006, 4). The complex structure then 
modifies itself to enhance its performance and courses of action to address the 
environment. Evolution is an example of adaptation, leading to the selection and 
proliferation of some systems while others become extinct (Sterman 2000). Purposeful 
adaptation can arise from learning. Adaptation occurs when a complex system has self-





Complex adaptive systems (CAS) are a subset of complex systems. Such systems 
contain the characteristics of complexity described in the previous section; but they also 
have the additional ability of being able to adapt. CAS are identified by three properties: 
“(1) diversity and individuality of components, (2) localized interactions among those 
components, and (3) an autonomous process that uses the outcomes of those interactions 
to select a subset of those components for replication or enhancement” (Levin 2002, 4). An 
important aspect of CAS is the emergent behavior from the cooperation, coalition, and 
network of interaction. This emergent behavior can provide feedback to influence those 
behaviors. 
“The study of CAS, from cells to societies, is a study of the interplay among 
processes operating at diverse scales of space, time, and organizational complexity. The 
key to such a study is an understanding of the interrelationships between microscopic 
processes and macroscopic patterns, and the evolutionary forces that shape systems” 
(Levin 2002, 3)  
Figure 81 illustrates the adaptive nature of cells within the life cycle of the amoeba. 
Given an environment with bacteria as a food source and the right conditions, independent 
cells begin to interact and aggregate to form higher structures of connected cells that 
produce an emergent structure that exhibits higher forms of behavior in its environment 
and even provides spores for reproduction and replication.  
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Figure 81.  A CAS Example: Life Cycle of the Amoeba. Source: Wu and 
Kessin (2003). 
CAS change by reorganizing their components to adapt themselves to the problems 
posed by their environment (Holland 1992). CAS have the ability to evolve, aggregate their 
behavior and anticipate their surroundings. A pivotal characteristic of CAS is the ability of 
their parts to adapt or learn. These adaptive processes are complex because they involve 
many parts and widely varying individual criteria for what constitutes a good outcome. 
Holland (1992) writes that CAS exhibit an aggregate behavior that is not simply derived 
from the actions of the parts; but that it emerges from the interactions of the parts. He also 
writes that CAS adapt to changing circumstances through their parts that develop rules that 
anticipate the consequences of certain responses. He gives an oil shortage as an example. 
“The anticipation of an oil shortage, even if it never comes to pass, can cause a sharp rise 
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in oil prices, and a sharp increase in attempts to find alternative energy sources” (Holland 
1992, 20).  
CAS evolve and adapt in order to stay relevant and vital in conditions with 
persistent environmental effects. They achieve this adaptation without a centralized control 
mechanism or authority (Polacek et al. 2012). Figure 82 illustrates this point, showing birds 
that can produce aggregate swarming without centralized control. Holland (1992) proposes 
that massively parallel computation methods ae needed for modeling CAS as a distributed, 
many-ruled system. 
Figure 82.  A CAS Example: A Swarm. Source: D. Dibenski (Auklet flock in 
Alaska, 1986). 
6. Complex Adaptive Systems of Systems
A CASoS has the characteristics of complex systems and CAS, but with the 
additional feature of being comprised of independent constituent systems that adapt and 
act in their own right. Thus, the CASoS exhibits both system level behavior and SoS level 
behavior. 
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The term, CASoS, was coined by Sandia National Laboratories. They have been 
studying complex systems since 2002 and initiated the Sandia Phoenix initiative in 2008 
to create and evolve CASoS engineering as a discipline. They defined CASoS as vastly 
complex eco-socio-economical-technical systems, which must be understood to design a 
secure future for the world (Glass et al. 2011). 
The Phoenix initiative developed the concept of aspirations, to serve as engineering 
goals to influence CASoS. They established categories for the aspirations: (1) to predict; 
prevent or cause; prepare; (2) to monitor; recover or change; and (3) to control (Glass et al. 
2011). Additionally, they define three key components that must accompany each 
aspiration: decision, robustness of decision, and enabling resilience. Figure 83 illustrates 
examples of CASoS and perturbations that affect them. 
Figure 83.  Engineering: CASoS, Perturbations, and Aspirations. Source: 
Glass et.al. (2011). 
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While Sandia is focused on understanding existing and observed CASoS as 
problem spaces, this dissertation is focused on understanding how an engineered version 
can be applied as a solution to complex problems. Ames et al. (2011, 14) writes, “CASoS 
engineering focuses almost exclusively on making changes to existing systems (i.e., 
retrofitting, designing, small changes), rather than designing complete systems.” This 
important aspect of the Phoenix initiative differentiates it from the focus of this 
dissertation. 
While this dissertation aligns with the CASoS definition and concepts introduced 
by the Sandia Phoenix initiative, the focus of this dissertation differs in two ways: 
This dissertation focuses on a subset of CASoS: intentionally designed (or 
engineered) CASoS. A primary goal of the research is to engineer human-made CASoS 
that are inspired by naturally occurring CASoS that the Phoenix initiative has been 
studying. Consequently, the first goal of this dissertation is to establish the defining 
characteristics of CASoS. 
This dissertation focuses on engineering “intentionally designed” CASoS as a 
solution to address complex problems; whereas the Phoenix initiative is primarily focused 
on making changes to existing systems (Ames et al. 2011). Thus, the second goal of the 
research is to develop an engineering framework for designing and developing human-
made technological CASoS solutions for addressing complex problems. 
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APPENDIX C. ADVANCED CODING: SYSTEMS ENGINEERING 
APPROACHES 
A. INTRODUCTION
If a “system” is defined as a set of interacting elements exhibiting an overall
behavior beyond those of its individual parts, then engineers have been
designing systems for many years, although the scope of such engineered
systems has changed dramatically. (Calvano and John 2004, 30)
This phase of the advanced coding process focused on gathering, coding, and
analyzing data concerning systems engineering methods and practices that have been 
developed and continue to be developed to engineer human-made systems. Blanchard and 
Fabrycky (1998, xi) write that “systems may be classified as either natural or human-made. 
Natural systems come into existence by natural processes. Human-made systems, or 
technical systems, come into being by human intervention in the natural order utilizing 
pervasive technologies through system components, attributes, and relationships.” 
This appendix presents how the engineering of systems is changing as technology 
and complexity are evolving. Three codes or types of systems engineering approaches were 
identified: traditional systems engineering (TSE), systems of systems engineering (SoSE), 
and complex systems engineering (CSE). This appendix is organized into three sections 
based on the three codes. The first subsection discusses traditional or classical systems 
engineering which refers to the engineering of systems whose boundaries, behaviors, and 
interfaces can be understood and are well-defined. These systems may be large in scale, 
span multiple disciplines, and address highly critical problems. Examples include aircraft, 
spacecraft, weapon systems, submarines and many other high technology systems. The 
second subsection discusses the engineering of SoS that exhibit “emergent” or “meta-level” 
behavior based on the collaboration of component or constituent systems. SoSE has been 
recognized as a distinct approach that faces a number of technical, acquisition, and 
management challenges. The third subsection discusses the engineering of complex 
systems. This is a relatively new field with the goal of engineering highly complex systems 
with emergent behaviors that are not apparent from the analysis of the component parts 




B. TRADITIONAL SYSTEMS ENGINEERING (TSE) 
Traditional systems engineering focuses on how to design systems to meet a set of 
well-specified requirements. Kossiakoff and Sweet (1998, 3) write that “No particular date 
can be associated with the origins of systems engineering. SE principles have been 
practiced at some level since the building of the pyramids and probably before. (The Bible 
records that Noah’s Ark was built to a system specification).” SE began to be recognized 
as a distinct activity following World War II. A number of textbooks were published in the 
1950s and 1960s that identified SE as a distinct discipline and defined its place in the 
engineering of systems. Since this time, many SE methods, concepts, organizational 
structures, and modeling techniques have been developed to support the better 
understanding of systems and the design, development, test, evaluation, production, and 
operation of systems as they grow in scale and complexity.  
Calvano and John (2004) discuss the evolution of systems engineering: that early-
on, systems were considered engineered products—an idea that evolved from the simpler 
machines that existed. The early systems were based on well-defined architectures and they 
evolved as new technology was integrated into these architectures. They described TSE as 
being based on system architectures with clearly defined relationships and well-defined 
functions. TSE design concepts and associated efforts could be partitioned easily and with 
confidence and system architectures were well-defined and well-understood mechanical 
interfaces.  
TSE is described as a “closed system” philosophy by Hitchins (1992). He explains 
that although TSE is holistic, encompasses all the aspects of the system life cycle, and 
considers interfaces with other systems, it does not allow for adaptation. As an example, 
he writes that in classical SE, interfaces “tend to be fixed, once chosen, and the concept of 
the future system within the interface boundary adapting form and function in response to 
interchanges across the interfaces is quite alien” (Hitchins 1992, 265–266). Another 
example of the TSE “closed system” philosophy is the standard practice of developing a 
fixed system according to a set of fixed requirements. Hitchins (1992) also describes the 
engineers’ philosophy in which systems engineers cannot operate without fixed 
requirements and specifications. 
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The failure of TSE lies in the fact that many engineered systems are open systems. 
Hitchins (1992) explains that SE has unfortunately evolved from conventional hard 
engineering and classical science, which inhibit an “open system” attitude. He explains that 
this has resulted in TSE concentrating on producing fixed technological solutions to a 
continually moving problem. He proposes an “open system” philosophy for systems 
engineering with an understanding that most systems are open and need to adapt to 
changing environments. 
C. SYSTEMS OF SYSTEMS ENGINEERING (SOSE)
Traditional systems engineering approaches have proven effective in
addressing complex systems problems where technical aspects dominate the
solution space and boundaries are clearly discernable. However, a new class
of complex systems problems has begun to emerge. This class of systems is
referred to as a system of systems. (Keating 2009, 169)
A significant body of knowledge has been developed and accumulated for SoSE.
The Department of Defense (DoD) defines a SoS as a “set or arrangement of systems that 
results when independent and useful systems are integrated into a larger system that 
delivers unique capabilities” (OUSD AT&L 2008, 4). Dahmann et.al. (2008) write that the 
main challenge of engineering SoS is having to use existing systems as components to meet 
stakeholder needs. They point out that the constituent systems have their own management 
and budgets and therefore the SoS engineers have no control over their development. Thus, 
a bottom-up SoSE process to integrate and interoperate existing systems has generated 
much industry, government, and academic attention. Significant effort has focused on 
addressing the technical challenges of interoperability; however, an equal, if not greater, 
effort has focused on overcoming the acquisition, management, and governance 
challenges. In fact, the OUSD AT&L guide to SoS (2008) cites Maier (1998) and Dahmann 
(2008) in its definition of four types of SoS, based on their type of management: 
• Virtual—Virtual SoS lack a central management authority and a centrally
agreed upon purpose for the SoS. Large-scale behavior emerges—and may
be desirable—but this type of SoS must rely upon relatively invisible




• Collaborative—In collaborative SoS the component systems interact more 
or less voluntarily to fulfill agreed upon central purposes. The Internet is a 
collaborative system. The Internet Engineering Task Force works out 
standards but has no power to enforce them. The central players collectively 
decide how to provide or deny service, thereby providing some means of 
enforcing and maintaining standards. 
• Acknowledged—Acknowledged SoS have recognized objectives, a 
designated manager, and resources for the SoS; however, the constituent 
systems retain their independent ownership, objectives, funding, and 
development and sustainment approaches. Changes in the systems are based 
on collaboration between the SoS and the system. 
• Directed—Directed SoS are built and managed to fulfill specific purposes. 
They are centrally managed during long-term operation to continue to fulfill 
those purposes as well as any new ones the system owners might wish to 
address. The component systems maintain an ability to operate 
independently, but their normal operational mode is subordinated to the 
centrally managed purpose. 
A problem with classifying SoS in this manner—according to how the SoS will be 
managed rather than basing it on their principal characteristics of multi-level systemic 
behavior and emergence resulting from collaboration—is that it is derived from a 
reductionist view and presupposes a set of design solutions. The “directed” category allows 
for SoS to be designed and built with the SoS in mind (as opposed to the other three 
categories which indicate the integration of existing systems). However, it specifies that 
the SoS be centrally managed; which prevents a holistic systems approach. In contrast to 
the DoD approach to SoSE, this dissertation proposes an additional category of SoS with 
a purely top-down system approach that doesn’t prescribe a management style and is based 
on the level of collaborative emergence achieved and the ability to exhibit multi-level 
systemic behavior. 
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Hitchins (2009) criticizes SoSE in general as being misconceived, as he contends 
that SoS are really just systems. He writes, “while we may need to continue developing 
and evolving SE, the idea that there is a new subject called ‘SoSE’ seems to me to be arrant 
nonsense: a ‘SoS’ is a system, so SoSE simply reverts to SE (Hitchins 2005, 4).” He 
criticizes a bottom-up SoSE approach as “reductionist” and argues that thee reductionist 
methods do not accommodate complexity, but actually make it worse. He describes 
bottom-up SoSE practices as a “Lego building block approach to systems. Join the blocks 
together in the right way, it proposes, and you can construct whatever you want from the 
bottom up” (Hitchins 2005, 4–5). He explains that the problem with this approach is that it 
does not accommodate systems with people in them because people are flexible and 
adaptable. This would also apply to adaptive technology systems. 
Hitchins (2005) advocates a top-down approach for SoSE: “In designing the whole 
system, then, it is necessary to start at the top and work down.” He proposes that SoSE 
focus on the whole system of systems in terms of function management, form management, 
and concept of operations. Operationally, the SoS will function as a whole with no aspects 
in isolation, so SoSE must be performed holistically from the top down. The subsystems 
are the constituent systems of the SoS. Hitchins proposes that they be viewed as a substrate 
upon which to lay the whole system (SoS) functions and behavioral features. He explains 
that the whole system functions exchanged information upwards and downwards with the 
constituent systems, and therefore, the couplings between the constituent systems should 
be loose. Giammarco (2017) writes about engineering a system with a goal of steering its 
emergent behavior. She presents the idea of using engineering design to suppress undesired 
emergent behavior and support desired emergent behavior. Thus, Hitchins and Giammarco 
are paving the way for a shift in the focus of SoSE to a top-down intentionally designed 
systems approach rather than a bottom-up integration of existing systems. 
D. COMPLEX SYSTEMS ENGINEERING (CSE)
Bar-Yam (2004) asserts that high complexity tasks require system solutions that are
sufficiently complex to perform them. Engineered (human-made) systems become 




uncertain environments. Designing a system to respond appropriately and effectively to 
unpredictable situations is challenging. As engineered systems become more complex, 
TSE methods no longer apply (Calvano and John 2004). CSE does not “…primarily seek 
to produce predictable, stable behavior within carefully constrained situations, but rather 
to obtain systems capable of adaptation, change, and novelty—even surprise” (Braha, 
Minai, and Bar-Yam 2006, 9).  
Advances are being made in the science of complexity based on the study of 
complexity found in natural and social systems (Ames 2011). These are leading to novel 
approaches to designing and developing complex human-made systems (Bar-Yam 2003). 
A central tenet of complex systems is the principle of emergence: that the whole is greater 
than the sum of its parts. This implies potential advantages for higher-level functionality 
emerging from engineered elements comprising a system. According to John Holland 
(1992), it is this aggregate behavior that is of interest. Another implication is that 
unpredictable emergent behavior can arise. When the principle of emergence is applied to 
complex engineered systems, these human-made systems may behave in unexpected ways 
(Bar-Yam 2004). CSE is attempting to address this question by exploring methods to best 
engineer complex systems by taking advantage of their complexity while managing 
unpredictability (Calvano and John 2004). 
1. TSE Limits for Complex Systems 
TSE methods do not work for engineering complex systems. The TSE method, 
according to Bar-Yam (2003), is basically to design by decomposition. He writes that the 
TSE method begins with a high-level description which is then decomposed into 
components and then further decomposed. Neill et al. (2010, 11) explain that TSE methods 
are appropriate for less complex, hardware dominated systems, with relatively stable, long 
planning cycles.” White (2005) explains that TSE can serve two roles: (1) to design systems 
that are not overly complex and (2) to design the interactions among components of 
complex systems.  
A number of CSE practitioners write about the inability of TSE to produce adaptive 
or agile systems. Haberfellner and deWech (2005, 7) caution that installing intentional and 
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purposeful agility into a systems using the TSE process, requires more effort in “thinking, 
planning, rethinking, and modifying.” Polacek et al. (2012) explain that TSE focuses on 
attaining ideal requirements that are complete, unambiguous, and testable. Well-defined 
hierarchies of requirements are decomposed from the ideal requirements. However, by 
designing systems to meet the ideal requirements, they limit the systems from addressing 
unforeseen situations. 
The main challenge for CSE lies in the difficulties of engineering complex systems 
that can handle uncertain and unpredictable situations (Polacek et al. 2012). Uncertainty 
and unpredictability cause poor assumptions and uninformed decisions during the design 
process (Beckerman 2000). Developing more detail to address increasing complexity can 
cause a new kind of complexity within the system’s design. This can lead to a system whose 
possible states and behaviors become unknowable which can lead to undesired behavior. 
This results in an impractical and unachievable system. 
2. CSE Approaches
a. Design the Environment
Bar Yam (2003) proposes a CSE approach focused on creating an environment or 
process instead of an end product. He writes that the TSE process has the objective of 
designing a system, while CSE should create processes or environments by which the 
system will appear and evolve over time. He uses manufacturing processes as an example 
of designing a process instead of a system. His other example is the Internet, which was 
designed as an environment for applications created by users. White (2005) proposes the 
CSE idea of designing the environment and processes by which the system is going to be 
created, instead of designing the system itself. 
b. Principles-Oriented
A principles-oriented CSE approach is proposed as a method for handling system 
risk in complex systems. Polacek et al., (2012) propose a method of exerting external 
influence on complex systems as a way of controlling behavior and avoiding risks of 
undesired behavior. They write about intra-system and inter-system leverage points for 
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managing this external influence. They discuss differences between rules-oriented systems 
(which control processes and behavior) and principles-oriented systems (which indirectly 
control systems). Using a principles-oriented methodology may be effective for complex 
systems that are too detailed and unpredictable for a rules-oriented approach.  
c. Distributed Peers
Vakili, Tabatabaee, and Khorsandi (2012) describe a CSE approach based on 
designing “distributed peers” that act as “autonomous machines.” They envision a peer-to-
peer architecture that provides constituent systems in the form of a “large pool of 
resources.” They recommend using cooperation policies between the peers to establish how 
resources are contributed and coordinated. They identify the need for an overall 
performance utility that incentivizes the distributed peers to participate and contribute 
resources while also meeting individual peer goals. Figure 84 is an illustration of their CSE 
approach. 





d. A Balance of Top Down and Bottom Up 
Vakili et al. (2012)’s proposed CSE method includes top down and bottom up 
systems engineering methods. They point out that the top-down method requires 
knowledge of all possible system states which is not possible in peer-to-peer systems. They 
also point out that a strictly bottom-up peer-to-peer system will self-organize and produce 
emergent behavior, but the behavior will not meet overall objectives. Therefore, they 
propose a balance between the top-down and bottom-up methods. The recommend starting 
with a top-down approach that establishes the intended overall behavior, and then 
developing peers and their interactions to meet these behavioral goals. 
e.  Local Behavior and Emergence 
Fisher (2006) proposes a CSE method that focuses on local actions and interactions 
of constituent systems with a goal of gaining an understanding of emergent processes. He 
bases his method on a study of natural systems to provide insight into the nature of 
complexity in SoS. He observes that automated systems, like natural systems, are often 
highly complex in terms of large numbers of constituents and interconnections, dynamic 
interactions, unexpected external influences, and unpredictable behavior. He also observes 
that the local behaviors and neighbor interactions are relatively simple. As a result, he 
recommends a focus on understanding what types of emergent behaviors are possible from 
the simple local actions and interactions of the constituent systems. He contends that this 
method will overcome the perceived challenges of engineering a complex system and can  
predictably produce desired emergent behavior. 
E. CSE CONCLUSION 
This literature review concludes with an observation from Sheard (2007, 296): 
“What is needed in these cases is CSE, but to date, hardly anyone knows what that is, or 
even that it is needed. Some people deny that there is anything different about CSE; many 
of them will have to be convinced, or will retire, before the industry fundamentally 
improves its ability to engineer complex adaptive systems.” In any case, current complex 
systems practitioners share many of the original goals of the general systems movement, 




growing increase in complexity. This dissertation aims to extend the study of CSE to 
include the engineering of systems that are complex, adaptive, and exhibit multi-level 
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